CEDH · PRESS;ADMISSIBILITYDECISIONS;ENG — 30 mars 2005

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   162 30.3.2005   Press release issued by the Registrar   INADMISSIBILITY DECISION VON MALTZAN AND OTHERS, VON ZITZEWITZ & OTHERS AND MAN FERROSTAAL & ALFRED TÖPFER STIFTUNG v. GERMANY   The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has declared inadmissible the applications lodged in the case of von Maltzan and Others v. Germany (application no. 71916/01), von Zitzewitz and Others v. Germany (no. 71917/01) and Man Ferrostaal and Alfred Töpfer Stiftung v. Germany (no.   10260/02).   (The decision is available in French and English).   The applicants   The applications were lodged by 68 German nationals, a Swedish national and two entities incorporated under German law. The first of them was lodged by Wolf-Ulrich Freiherr von Maltzan and 46 others, the second by Margarete von Zitzewitz and 21 others and the third by the Alfred Töpfer Foundation and the company Man Ferrostaal.   Summary of the facts   The cases concern one of the major issues to arise after the reunification of Germany: the indemnification and compensation terms for those whose property was expropriated either after 1949 in the GDR or, as in the vast majority of cases, between 1945   and   1949 in the former Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany. The terms of indemnification and compensation are set out in the Indemnification and Compensation Act ( Entschädigungs–und Ausgleichsleistungsgesetz – “ the EALG ”) of 27   September 1994.   On 29 June 1995 some of the applicants applied to the Federal Constitutional Court arguing, among other things, that the provisions of that Act were incompatible with the Basic Law in that they generally prescribed amounts that were less than the current market value of the expropriated property. On 22 November 2000 the First Division ( erster Senat ) of the Federal Constitutional Court delivered its leading judgment on the issue and dismissed the application. Those of the applicants who had not been parties to the proceedings nonetheless referred to that leading judgment.   Complaints   The applicants submitted that the Property Act of 23 September 1990, the Indemnification and Compensation Act of 27 September 1994 and the leading judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 22 November 2000 had infringed the rights of property guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to the European Convention on Human Rights that had been theirs at the time of German reunification. The amount of compensation they had received was, they alleged, far less than the real value of the property that had been illegally expropriated.   They also considered that they had been discriminated against in breach of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 because, unlike other categories of people, they had been unable to claim a right to restitution of their property.   The applicants also complained of the Administrative Rehabilitation Act of 23 June 1994 and the decisions of the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal Constitutional Court of 16   May and 12 August 2002 respectively. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken alone and Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and with Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and family life).   Lastly, the applicants who had lodged an application with the Federal Constitutional Court submitted that the length of the proceedings before it had exceeded the reasonable time provided for in Article 6   § 1 of the Convention (right to a hearing within a reasonable time).   Procedure   The applications were lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 3, 17 and 18 May 2001 respectively. A Chamber hearing was held on 29 January 2004.   On 11 March 2004 the Chamber to which the applications had been assigned relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, with neither party objecting [1] . A Grand Chamber hearing was held on 22 September 2004.     Decision of the Court [2]   Article 1 of Protocol No. 1   The Court found that the FRG did not have any responsibility for acts committed at the instigation of the Soviet occupying forces or for those perpetrated by another State against its own nationals, even though the GDR had subsequently been succeeded by the FRG, for it was “political” obligations that were at issue in the present case. Accordingly, the Court lacked competence to examine the circumstances in which the expropriations had been carried out or the continuing effects produced by them up to the present date.   The Court therefore had the task of examining whether the applicants had a “legitimate expectation” of realising a current and enforceable claim, that is, obtaining either the restitution of their property or compensation (for the 1945-1949 expropriations) or indemnification (for the post-1949 expropriations) of a particular amount commensurate with the real value of their possessions.   Regarding the expropriations carried out between 1945 and 1949 in the Soviet Occupied Zone in Germany Any right to restitution had been expressly ruled out by the Joint Declaration signed by the FRG and the GDR on 15 June 1990 which stipulated that “expropriations carried out by the occupying authorities [between 1945 and 1949] can no longer be revoked”. Moreover, the Federal Constitutional Court had confirmed that that exclusion of any right to restitution did not breach the Basic Law.   In those conditions the applicants did not have any legal basis on which to ground a legitimate expectation of securing the restitution of their property.   In the Court’s view, the applicants’ rights regarding the amount of compensation they could legitimately expect to receive had been clearly established in the Indemnification and Compensation Act of 27   September   1994. Neither the Joint Declaration nor the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgments could allow them to expect higher compensation. The claims of Alfred Töpfer Stiftung and Man Ferrostaal clearly fell outside the provisions of the Indemnification and Compensation Act as they were not entitled to any compensation under that Act.   With regard to rehabilitation coupled with restitution, the Court noted that the legislature had passed two laws in that connection: the Criminal Rehabilitation Act of 29   October 1992 and the Administrative Rehabilitation Act of 23 June 1994. The applicants’ claims fell outside the provisions of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act and it was clear from the provisions of the Administrative Rehabilitation Act taken in conjunction with the Property Act that any right to administrative rehabilitation coupled with restitution of property confiscated between 1945 and 1949 had been ruled out.   In those circumstances the Court found that the applicants did not have a legitimate expectation of being entitled to administrative rehabilitation coupled with restitution of their property.   Regarding the expropriations carried out after 1949 in the GDR The conditions in which restitution of property could be obtained had been clearly established in the Property Act. If those conditions were not satisfied, because restitution was impossible in practice or third parties had acquired the property in good faith, the applicants’ claims clearly fell outside the scope of the Property Act.   The same was true of the applicants’ rights regarding the amount of indemnification that they could legitimately expect to receive, which had been clearly established in the Indemnification and Compensation Act of 27   September 1994.   Conclusion In conclusion, the Court reiterated that in a number of cases brought before it relating to German reunification it had referred to the exceptional context of that reunification and the enormous task faced by the legislature in dealing with all the complex issues which had inevitably arisen at the time of transition from a communist regime to a democratic, market-economy system. By choosing to make good injustices or damage resulting from acts committed at the instigation of a foreign occupying force or by another sovereign State, the German legislature had had to make certain choices in the light of the public interest. Where a State elected to redress the consequences of certain acts that were incompatible with the principles of a democratic regime but for which it was not responsible, it had a wide margin of appreciation in the implementation of that policy.   In challenging the constitutionality of the statutes enacted after German reunification, the applicants had hoped to obtain either restitution of their property or compensation or indemnification commensurate with the real value of their property. However, the belief that the laws then in force would be changed to the applicants’ advantage could not be regarded as a form of legitimate expectation for the purposes of the Convention. There was a difference between a mere hope, however understandable that hope might be, and a legitimate expectation, which had to be of a more concrete nature and be based on a legal provision or have a solid basis in the domestic case-law.   In those circumstances the Court held that the applicants had not shown that they had claims that were sufficiently established to be enforceable, and they therefore could not argue that they had “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Accordingly, the Court declared that complaint inadmissible.   Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1   Having regard to the conclusion that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was inapplicable, the Court held that Article 14 of the Convention could not be taken into account in the present case.   Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8   The Court found that Article 8 of the Convention was inapplicable, which meant that Article 14 could not come into play in the present case. It accordingly rejected that complaint.   Article 6 § 1   The Court noted that the proceedings had lasted nearly five years and five months. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, and particularly the exceptional context of German reunification, the Court found that the “reasonable time” prescribed by Article 6 § 1 had not been exceeded and that there had therefore not been an appearance of a violation of that provision on this point. Consequently, it rejected that complaint.     ***   The decision is available today on the Court’s Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. [1] Under Article 30 of the Convention: where a case pending before a Chamber raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention or the protocols thereto, or where the resolution of a question before the Chamber might have a result inconsistent with a judgment previously delivered by the Court, the Chamber may, at any time before it has rendered its judgment, relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, unless one of the parties to the case objects. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.