CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 16 juin 2005

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s32B93E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:5pt } .s1E59FF54 { margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:10pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s35F1F2CB { margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt } .s995BFA6B { margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:5pt } .s9AE6264A { margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s6DCE261A { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s9B49264A { margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:5pt } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   332 16.6.2005   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT INDEPENDENT NEWS AND MEDIA PLC AND INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS (IRELAND) LIMITED v. IRELAND   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of Independent News and Media plc and Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Limited v. Ireland (application no. 55120/00).   The Court held by six votes to one that there had been no violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights.   (The judgment is available only in English.)   1.     Principal facts The case concerns an application (no. 55120/00) brought by two companies incorporated under Irish law, Independent News and Media plc and Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Limited. The second applicant company publishes newspapers, including the Sunday Independent , and is a wholly owned subsidiary of the first applicant company (formerly known as Independent Newspapers plc). On 13 December 1992 the Sunday Independent published an article entitled "Throwing good money at jobs is dishonest". The article commented on, among other things, a recently discovered letter allegedly to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It was alleged in the article that Mr   de Rossa – a well-known Irish politician – was one of two people who had signed the letter, which referred to "special activities" that had previously been carried out in order to meet shortfalls in the funding of the Workers’ Party, a political party of which Mr de Rossa had been leader. According to the article, those "activities" were of a criminal nature. At the time of publication, Mr de Rossa was the leader of another political party (the Democratic Left) and a member of the Irish parliament (the Dáil). He was also involved in post-election negotiations about his party’s participation in government. In August 1993 Mr de Rossa instituted libel proceedings in the High Court against Independent News and Media plc. In July 1997 the jury found the article published by Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Limited to be defamatory and awarded Mr de Rossa 300,000 Irish pounds (approximately 381,000 euros) in damages. Independent News and Media plc appealed unsuccessfully. The award, which was upheld by the Supreme Court, was three times the highest libel award previously approved by that court. The award and Mr de Rossa’s legal costs were paid by Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Limited, as were the first applicant company’s own legal costs.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged on 20 December 1999 and declared admissible on 19 June 2003. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 16 October 2003.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of 7 judges, composed as follows:   Georg Ress (German), President , Ireneu Cabral Barreto (Portuguese), Lucius Caflisch (Swiss) [2] , Riza Türmen (Turkish), Boštjan M. Zupančič (Slovenian), John Hedigan (Irish), Kristaq Traja (Albanian), judges , and also Mark Villiger , Deputy Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [3]   Complaint   The applicant companies complained under Article 10 that the award was disproportionately high and that there are no adequate and effective safeguards in Ireland against such awards.   Decision of the Court   Having regard to its case-law, the Court considered that the essential question to be answered in the present case was whether, in view of the size of the award, there were adequate and effective domestic safeguards, at first instance and on appeal, against disproportionate awards which assured a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the award and the injury to reputation.   In this connection the Court examined principally the extent of the guidance given by the trial judge to the jury and the nature of the review by the Supreme Court.   It noted that the trial judge had given the jury two concrete indications as to the level of any damages to be awarded. He had provided the example of a relatively minor defamatory comment to allow the jury in the present case to assess the relative seriousness of the defamatory article published by the second applicant. He had then followed up that example with a clear direction to the jury that, if it was to award damages, they would have to be substantial.   In the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice explained, on the one hand, the notion of proportionality in Irish law: he pointed out that finding a due balance between conflicting constitutional rights (expression and reputation) relied on the notion of proportionality in Irish law, which concept mirrored that of the Convention. On the other hand, the Chief Justice outlined in some detail the “unusual and emphatic sanctity” of jury awards so that Irish appellate courts had been “extremely slow” to interfere with such awards, he expressly disagreed with a more intrusive test adopted by the United Kingdom courts because he considered that its application would remove the sanctity of jury awards and would mean that an appellate court would no longer give “real weight” to the possibility that the jurors' judgment was to be preferred to that of the judge. An award made by a jury might only be set aside therefore if the appellate court was satisfied that in all the circumstances the award was so disproportionate to the injury suffered and wrong done that no reasonable jury would have made such an award.   Applying that test, the Court noted that the Supreme Court had taken into account a number of relevant factors, including the gravity of the libel, the effect on Mr de Rossa and on his negotiations to form a government at the time of publication, the extent of the publication, the conduct of the first applicant newspaper and the consequent necessity for Mr de Rossa to endure three long and difficult trials. Having assessed these factors, it had concluded that the jury would have been justified in going to the top of the bracket and awarding as damages the largest sum that could fairly be regarded as compensation. While IR£ 300,000 was a substantial sum, it noted that the libel was serious and grave, involving an imputation that Mr   de Rossa was involved in or tolerated serious crime and personally supported anti-Semitism and violent Communist oppression. “Bearing in mind that a fundamental principle of the law of compensatory damages is that the award must always be reasonable and fair and bear a due correspondence with the injury suffered and not be disproportionate thereto”, the Supreme Court had not been satisfied that the present jury award went beyond what a reasonable jury applying the law to all the relevant considerations could reasonably have awarded and had considered it “not disproportionate to the injury suffered by the Respondent.”   In conclusion, having regard to the particular circumstances of the present case, notably the measure of appellate control, and the margin of appreciation accorded to a State in this context, the Court did not find that it had been demonstrated that there had been ineffective or inadequate safeguards against a disproportionate award of the jury in the case under review.   There had therefore been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.     Judge Cabral Barreto expressed a dissenting opinion, which is annexed to the judgment.     ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] Judge elected in respect of Liechtenstein. [3] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.