CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 19 juillet 2005

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s1C7BEF1E { margin-left:28.52pt; padding-left:7.48pt; font-family:serif } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   408 19.2005   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT P.M. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of P.M. v. the United Kingdom (application no. 6638/03).   The Court held unanimously that there had been: a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to the Convention; no violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy).   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction), the Court awarded the applicant 292   euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage and EUR 7,000 for costs and expenses.   (The judgment is available only in English.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicant, P.M., is a British national who was born in 1956 and lives in Durham, the United Kingdom.   Between 1987 and 1997, he lived in a stable relationship with Miss D. They never married. On 18 June 1991, Miss D. had a daughter. The applicant was registered as the father on the birth certificate.   In October 1997, the applicant and Miss D. separated. On 29 June 1998, they entered into a deed of separation by which the applicant undertook to pay weekly maintenance of 25 pounds sterling (GBP) for his daughter. In the 1998-1999 tax year, he paid GBP 1,300 under the deed. The sum increased over time in accordance with the applicant’s increase in earnings. Since April 2002, the applicant has made weekly maintenance payments of GBP   35.   For the year of assessment 1997-1998, the applicant was granted tax relief for the maintenance payments made under the deed. The United Kingdom Government stated that this was an error by the Inland Revenue. In 1998-1999, the applicant put in a further claim to deduct those maintenance payments, which would have reduced his income tax liability by GBP 195.   By letter dated 21 December 2000, the Inland Revenue refused the claim for tax relief in respect of the maintenance payments: “because you were never married to your daughter’s mother”.   The applicant appealed. On 15 August 2002, his appeal was rejected, primarily on the ground that the Human Rights Act 1998 did not apply to the case, as it had only come into force on 2 October 2000, after the tax year in question.   Miss D. married during the 1999-2000 tax year, on 24 July 1999.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 14 February 2003 and declared admissible on 24 August 2004.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Josep Casadevall (Andorran), President , Nicolas Bratza (British), Matti Pellonpää (Finnish), Rait Maruste (Estonian), Kristaq Traja (Albanian), Ljiljana Mijović (Citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Ján Šikuta (Slovakian), judges , and also Françoise Elens-Passos , Deputy Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   The applicant complained that, as an unmarried father, he was unable to deduct for tax purposes maintenance payments made in respect of his daughter.   He relied on Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and Article 13.   Decision of the Court   Article 14 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 The Court found that the applicant could claim that, as an unmarried father separated from his former partner, he was treated differently to married fathers who had separated or divorced and were also living apart from their child. Both were parents of the child to be maintained and under an obligation to pay maintenance. The applicant differed from a married father only in terms of marital status and might, for the purposes of his application, claim to be in an relevantly similar position.   The justification for the difference in treatment relied on by the United Kingdom Government was the special regime of marriage which conferred specific rights and obligations on those who chose to join it. The Court recalled that it had in some cases found that differences in treatment on the basis of marital status had had objective and reasonable justification. However, as a general rule, unmarried fathers, who had established family life with their children, could claim equal rights of contact and custody with married fathers.   In the applicant’s case, he had been acknowledged as the father and had acted in that role. Given that he has financial obligations towards his daughter, which he had duly fulfilled, the Court saw no reason to treat him differently from a married father, now divorced and separated from the mother, regarding the tax deductibility of those payments. The purpose of the tax deductions was purportedly to render it easier for married fathers to support a new family; it was not readily apparent why unmarried fathers, who undertook similar new relationships, would not have similar financial commitments equally requiring relief.   The Court concluded therefore that there had been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   Article 13 The Court reiterated that Article 13 did not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing the primary legislation of a State which had ratified the European Convention on Human Rights to be challenged before a national authority on the grounds that it was contrary to the Convention. The discrimination in the applicant’s case derived from the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988.     The facts of his case therefore disclosed no violation of Article 13.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.