CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 21 juillet 2005

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s331C3E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:6pt } .s48A8B0C6 { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:6pt } .s47E2B0C6 { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s7E99EE1A { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:12pt } .s6F57788 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt } .s4B8D41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   409 21.7.2005   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT ROHDE v. DENMARK   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of Rohde v. Denmark (application no. 69332/01).   The Court held by four votes to three that there had been no violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights. (The judgment is available only in English.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicant, Peter Rohde, is a Danish national who was born in 1965.   Mr Rohde was questioned by the police concerning 5.684 kg of cocaine which had been discovered on 25   October 1994 in a consignment of green papaya fruits that he had ordered from Brazil. He denied all knowledge of the cocaine, explaining that he had planned to develop a health product using the seeds. On 13   December 1994 he was arrested and charged with drug trafficking.   He was placed in an observation cell, from 13 December 1994 at 8   p.m. until 14   December   1994 12.30 p.m, because he had claimed to be suffering from claustrophobia and to be contemplating suicide. His condition was monitored 36 times by prison staff and twice by nurses.   On 14 December 1994 Copenhagen City Court decided to remand him in custody until 10   January 1995 – placing him in solitary confinement until 28 December 1994 – in accordance with section 762, 1 (iii) and section 770a of the Administration of Justice Act.   On 12 September 1995 PL admitted responsibility for smuggling the cocaine and claimed that Mr Rohde had participated, but on the understanding that they would be smuggling diamonds. Mr Rohde confirmed that he and PL had planned to smuggle the diamonds in the papaya fruit and that PL had already sold them, making a profit of 500   000 Danish kroner (DKK).   The order for the applicant’s solitary confinement was extended many times and was finally lifted on 28   November   1995 (although he remained voluntarily in solitary confinement until 12 December). During that time Mr Rohde received regular visits from medical and health care staff: 27 from doctors, 43 from nurses, 32 from physiotherapists, and a couple from a dentist. During a period starting around mid January 1995 until the end of that month, the applicant went on a hunger strike, drinking only fruit juices. He was monitored once or twice a day by doctors throughout his hunger strike. On 17 January the prison doctor found nothing remarkable about the applicant’s mental or physical state and, on around 18 January, a psychiatrist found his behaviour to be a “situational reaction”. The applicant’s detention on remand was prolonged several times by the courts until 14   May 1996, when he was acquitted of the drug offences. He was convicted of aggravated tax fraud and sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment and fined DKK 875,000 (or in the alternative, 60 days’ imprisonment).   On 12 July 1996, the applicant applied to the city court for compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage arising out of his detention. His lawyer relied on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and requested a psychiatric report from the Legal ‑ Psychiatric Clinic. The report found that the applicant, who “had never exhibited any signs of a mental disorder until just over three years ago”, was “psychotic” and likely to be suffering from a paranoid psychosis. It was considered probable that there was a causal connection between the onset and development of his mental illness and the long period he had spent in solitary confinement. Statements of 30   March   and 4   May 1998 from the Medico ‑ Legal Council were also submitted to the court, which considered that the applicant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and that, although it was very difficult to establish the exact cause of his illness, “the solitary confinement was a particular and severe mental strain” and one of the factors which might have contributed to the development of his mental disorder. An assessment of 3   August 1998 by the National Board of Industrial Injuries submitted to the court found that the degree of the applicant’s disablement amounted to approximately 30   % and that he had lost one third of his working capacity.   On 2 October 1998 the Chief Consultant of the Copenhagen Prisons stressed that the applicant had not been found to be significantly mentally ill, borderline psychotic or psychotic during his detention. None of the highly qualified and trained doctors and nurses dealing with the applicant during the relevant period had noted any signs of mental disorder, despite their experience in dealing with incipient isolation syndrome.   However, various witnesses called, stated, among other things, that: during his solitary confinement the applicant wrote weird letters, that he used to be dynamic, committed and extrovert but had become grumpy and inaccessible (his mother); that he seemed deeply unhappy and preoccupied, that he had also changed his appearance, having grown a beard and lost weight (his cousin); that he moved with great care around the prison grounds and practically walked sideways along the wall (the prison chaplain); and, that, from the first day, he seemed desperate and then more and more depressed, that his attention to personal hygiene worsened and he had difficulties concentrating (the prison teacher).   On 27   August 1999 the applicant was awarded 1,109,600 Danish DKK in compensation by the Supreme Court, which found that his solitary confinement was the main reason for his mental suffering. Also, noting that there was no reason to assume that the applicant had not been treated in a proper manner during his detention on remand, it confirmed that the case disclosed no appearance of a violation of Article 3.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 19 February 2001 and declared admissible on 4 December 2003.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Christos Rozakis (Greek), President , Loukis Loucaides (Cypriot), Françoise Tulkens (Belgian), Peer Lorenzen (Danish), Nina Vajić (Croatian), Snejana Botoucharova (Bulgarian), Anatoli Kovler (Russian), judges , and also Santiago Quesada , Deputy Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints The applicant alleged that his pre-trial detention in solitary confinement (from 14   December   1994 until 28   November   1995) was excessive and that the monitoring of his mental health while in solitary confinement was inadequate, in violation of Article 3.   Decision of the Court   Article 3   Length of detention in solitary confinement The Court observed that the issue of solitary confinement had featured prominently in the ongoing dialogue between the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and the Danish authorities. The CPT stressed that all forms of solitary confinement without appropriate mental or physical stimulation were likely in the long term to have damaging effects on detainees, resulting in the deterioration of their mental faculties and social skills.   The length of the applicant’s solitary confinement (11 months and 14 days) gave rise to concern, therefore, because of the risk to his mental health.   However, when assessing whether this period of time was excessive under Article 3, the Court took into account the detention conditions, including the extent of the applicant’s social isolation. The applicant was detained in a cell of about eight square metres which contained a television. He also had access to newspapers. He was totally excluded from association with other inmates, but during the day had regular contact with prison staff. In addition, every week the prison teacher gave him lessons in English and French, he visited the prison chaplain and received a visit from his lawyer. He had contact 12 times with a welfare worker; and was attended to 32 times by a physiotherapist, 27 times by a doctor; and 43 times by a nurse. Visits from the applicant’s family and friends were allowed under supervision. The applicant’s mother visited the applicant for about an hour every week. In the beginning friends came with her, up to five at a time, but the police eventually limited the visits to two at a time. The applicant’s father and a cousin also visited him every two weeks.   In those circumstances, the Court found that the period of solitary confinement in itself, lasting less than a year, did not amount to treatment contrary to Article 3.   Monitoring of the applicant’s mental health The Court noted that the applicant was placed in an observation cell for a 16-and-a-half-hour-period, during which he was observed 36 times by the prison staff and twice by nurses. During the period of solitary confinement, he received regular visits from medical or health care staff. On the basis of the medical notes submitted, the Court considered it established that the applicant was attended to by medical staff automatically and regularly, and that the latter reacted promptly and increased their observation of the applicant whenever he showed any change in mood or behaviour.   The Court further took note of the statement from the Chief Consultant of the Copenhagen Prisons that the applicant had not been found to be significantly mentally ill by any of the highly-trained medical staff looking after him. In those circumstances the Court could not share the applicant’s view that the monitoring carried out was not adequate and sufficient. Admittedly, the applicant was not automatically or regularly examined by a psychologist or a psychiatrist. In the Court’s opinion, however, such a general obligation could not be imposed on the authorities, or the detainees for that matter, as a condition for compliance with the requirement that detainees in solitary confinement be effectively monitored.   Finally, the Court examined whether observations made by other people about the applicant’s behaviour during his pre-trial detention in solitary confinement could or should have prompted the authorities to increase their monitoring or to send the applicant for further psychological or psychiatric tests. In particular, the Court noted the testimonies given by the applicant’s mother, his cousin, the prison chaplain, and the prison teacher. However, not one of those four witnesses expressed the opinion that the applicant had developed a mental illness and they did not at any time during the applicant’s detention in solitary confinement report their observations or their concerns to the courts, the lawyers, prison management, the nurses or doctors. Had they done so, the practice of the Chief Consultant of Copenhagen Prison was to report any suspicion of incipient isolation syndrome to the relevant authorities.   The Court therefore concluded that there was no lack of effective monitoring of the applicant’s condition or lack of psychiatric assessment or lack of medical attention, which could amount to treatment contrary to Article 3.     Judges Rozakis, Loucaides and Tulkens expressed a dissenting opinion, which is annexed to the judgment. ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments.   [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.