CEDH · PRESS;ADMISSIBILITYDECISIONS;ENG — 5 septembre 2005

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THE UNITED KINGDOM     The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has today declared admissible the applications in the case of Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (application nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01).   By a majority, the Court declared admissible the applications of: Anna Stec, born in 1933 and living in Stoke-on-Trent; Patrick Lunn, born in 1923 and living in Stockton-on-Tees; Sybil Spencer, born in 1926 and living in Bury; and, Oliver Kimber, born in 1924 and living in Pevensey. All four applicants are United Kingdom nationals living in the United Kingdom.   The case originally concerned five applicants and was called Hepple and Others v. the United Kingdom . However, the application of Regina Hepple, born in 1933 and living in Wakefield, was struck out of the list on 9 March 2005 in the light of her request not to continue with the case for personal reasons. The Court confirmed its position on this point in today’s decision.   The text of the decision is available today in English and in French on the Court’s Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ). The Court will give separate consideration to the merits of the remaining applicants’ complaints. Its judgment will be delivered at a later date.   Summary of the facts   The applicants all complain about sex-based differences in eligibility for reduced earnings allowance (REA) and retirement allowance (RA), which are earnings-related benefits payable to employed or formerly employed people who have suffered an impairment of earning capacity from a work-related injury or disease.   Before 1986 there was a continued right to REA, which was payable concurrently with the State pension. From 1986 a succession of legislative measures attempted to remove or reduce the REA being received by claimants no longer of working age, by imposing cut-off or limiting conditions at 65 for men and 60 for women (the ages used by the statutory old-age pension scheme) until 1996, tapering up to eventual equality at 65 in 2020. The Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 brought in new provisions [1] which treated male and female REA recipients differently according to their circumstances prior to 10 April 1989.   All five applicants received REA.   When Mrs Stec reached the age of 60, it was decided that, from 31 March 1996, her REA should be replaced by RA, a lower payment. She complained that a man of the same age would have continued to receive REA.   From 31 March 1996 and 29 September 1994 respectively Mr Lunn and Mr Kimber received a statutory retirement pension. Their REA was subsequently replaced by RA. They complained that a woman in the same circumstances would have been treated as having retired on or before the more stringent rules came into force in 1989 and so would have been entitled to a frozen rate of REA for life. From 23 December 1986 Mrs Spencer started to receive a retirement pension. Her REA was subsequently frozen for life. She complained that, had she been a man, she would have continued to receive unfrozen REA . All five applicants’ cases were joined by the Social Security Commissioner who referred two questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ gave judgment on 23 May 2000, finding that the discriminatory criteria in relation to REA were not incompatible with European Community law because they were linked to receipt of old-age benefit and thus fell outside the scope of Directive 79/7/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment in matters of social security. On 31 July 2000 the Commissioner, following the ECJ’s ruling, struck out the applicants’ cases where they were the appellants.   Complaints The applicants complain that they have suffered sex discrimination as a result of changes to the REA scheme. They all rely on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) combined with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights.   Procedure The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 30 January 2001. On 24   August 2004 the Chamber of the Court dealing with the case relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, under Article 30 [2] of the Convention. A public hearing was held on 9 March 2005.   Summary of the Court’s reasoning on the admissibility of the applications   The Court had to determine at the outset whether the applicants could rely on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. The Government’s main argument was that the benefits claimed by the applicants were of a non-contributory nature and thus did not fall within the scope of the interests protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. On that account, the applicants could not complain about the alleged discriminatory treatment.     The Court accepted that its previous case-law was ambiguous on the applicability of Article 1 to non-contributory benefits. It wished to clarify this issue. In its opinion, the approach to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 should reflect the reality of the way in which welfare provision is currently organised within the Member States of the Council of Europe. It was clear that within those States, and within most individual States, there existed a wide range of social security benefits designed to confer entitlements which arise as of right. Benefits were funded in a large variety of ways: some were paid for by contributions to a specific fund; some depended on a claimant’s contribution record; many were paid for out of general taxation on the basis of a statutorily defined status. The REA and RA were good examples of this. Originally funded out of the national insurance fund, since 1990 they have been financed by general taxation. Given the variety of funding methods, and the interlocking nature of benefits under most welfare systems, it appeared to the Court to be increasingly artificial to hold that only benefits financed by contributions to a specific fund fall within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In addition, to exclude benefits paid for out of general taxation would be to disregard the fact that many claimants under this latter type of system also contribute to its financing, through the payment of tax.   The Court stressed that in the modern, democratic State, many individuals were, for all or part of their lives, completely dependent for survival on social security and welfare benefits. Many domestic legal systems recognised that such individuals required a degree of certainty and security, and provided for benefits to be paid - subject to the fulfilment of the conditions of eligibility - as of right. Where an individual had an assertable right under domestic law to a welfare benefit, the importance of that interest should also be reflected by holding Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to be applicable Accordingly, if any distinction could still be said to exist in the case-law between contributory and non-contributory benefits for the purposes of the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, there was no ground to justify the continued drawing of such a distinction.   The Court concluded therefore that it could examine the merits of the applicants’ complaint under the Convention that the domestic law in this area unjustifiably discriminated between women and men.     Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. [1] Prior to 10 April 1989 REA recipients who had reached either (1) 70, if a man, or 65, if a woman, or (2) the date of retirement fixed by a notice, at age 65+ for a man or 60+ for a woman, would receive a frozen rate of REA for life. All other REA recipients would cease to receive REA, and would instead receive RA either on reaching (1) 70, if a man, or 65, if a woman, or (2) the date of retirement fixed by a notice, at age 65+ for a man or 60+ for a woman or on giving up employment at 65 for a man or 60 for a woman.   [2] Where a case pending before a Chamber raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention or the protocols thereto, or where the resolution of a question before the Chamber might have a result inconsistent with a judgment previously delivered by the Court, the Chamber may, at any time before it has rendered its judgment, relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, unless one of the parties to the case objects.