CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 7 février 2006

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s1C7BEF1E { margin-left:28.52pt; padding-left:7.48pt; font-family:serif } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   65 7.2.2006   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT SCAVUZZO-HAGER AND OTHERS v. SWITZERLAND   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing its Chamber judgment [1] in the case of Scavuzzo-Hager and Others v. Switzerland (application no. 41773/98).   The Court held unanimously:   that there had been no violation of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to life) on account of the use of force by police officers and the State’s obligation to protect the life of the applicants’ relative; that there had been a violation of Article 2 in that the Swiss authorities had not conducted an effective investigation into the circumstances of the death of the applicants’ relative; that there had been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment).   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction), the Court awarded the applicants 12,000 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 9,500 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)     1.     Principal facts   Elisabeth Scavuzzo-Hager and her husband Sandro Scavuzzo are Swiss nationals who were born in 1939 and 1943 and live in Birrhard (Switzerland); their son, Carmelo Scavuzzo, is an Italian national who was born in 1968 and lives in Nussbaumen (Switzerland). The applicants are the parents and brother of P., who died in July 1994 aged 28, shortly after being arrested by police officers.   On 22 July 1994 P. was discovered climbing the scaffolding attached to a block of flats in Bellinzona. As he seemed to be behaving strangely, one of the occupants of the building took him inside his flat to try to get him to calm down, while another person informed the police.   Two officers arrived, checked P.’s identity and realised that he was known to the police after committing robberies in two cantons. He agreed to accompany them, but once inside their vehicle he became agitated and attempted to get away. He struggled violently before losing consciousness. The police officers called for an ambulance and placed P. in the lateral safety position. Paramedics arrived four to five minutes later and resuscitated P., but he lost consciousness again while being driven to hospital. He died there three days later, on 25 July 1994, without regaining consciousness.   The authorities of the Canton of Ticino opened an investigation into the circumstances of P.’s death, in the course of which the officers who had arrested him questioned a number of persons. An autopsy report stated that P.’s death had been caused by a drug overdose. In January 1995 the public prosecutor discontinued the proceedings on the ground that P.’s death was not attributable to intervention by others.   The applicants brought an action for damages against the Canton of Ticino. At the request of the Federal Court, a forensic medical report was produced at the University of Zürich in January 1997. It concluded that P. had died from hyperthermia, with a temperature of about 40°, brought on by cocaine consumption and accompanied by a massive attack of rhabdomyolosis, that is destruction of the muscle fibres, renal failure and blood circulation problems. The report said that P.’s death had not been caused exclusively by the overdose but was the result of physical effort on top of a pre-existing state of weakness.   On 2 December 1997 the Federal Court dismissed the applicants’ action on the ground that there was no real causal link between the actions of the police officers and P.’s death, which would in all probability have followed soon after, even if the events which formed the subject of the present case had not occurred, given P.’s acute state of weakness.     2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 2 June 1998 and transmitted to the European Court of Human Rights on 1 November 1998. It was declared admissible on 30 November 2004.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Nicolas Bratza (British), President , Josep Casadevall (Andorran), Luzius Wildhaber (Swiss), Giovanni Bonello (Maltese), Stanislav Pavlovschi (Moldovan), Lech Garlicki (Polish), Javier Borrego Borrego (Spanish), judges ,   and also Michael O’Boyle , Section Registrar .           3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   The applicants alleged that the police officers had used excessive force when arresting P. and had not tried to resuscitate him when he lost consciousness. They further submitted that the authorities had not conducted an effective investigation into their relative’s death and that he had been inhumanly treated. They also complained that the proceedings in the Federal Court had been unfair. They relied on Articles 2, 3 and 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing).   Decision of the Court   Article 2   The use of force by the police In the light of the information available to the Court, it appeared that the arresting officers had not used such force as to cause P.’s death directly. However, the Court took the view that in so far as his lapse into unconsciousness had occurred exactly when they were trying to restrain him, it was not to be excluded from the outset that the force used, even though not fatal per se, had nevertheless led to P.’s death on account of his state of weakness.   Even supposing that the struggle between P. and the police officers, and the neighbour who came to their assistance, had had a detrimental effect on P.’s state of health, the officers also had to have been reasonably able to realise that he was in a state of vulnerability requiring a high degree of caution in the use of the “normal” arrest techniques. However, although it was astonishing that the officers concerned had not been questioned on the point, it was clear from the forensic medical report produced by the University of Zürich that it had been impossible for the police to be aware that P.’s vulnerability was such that the slightest impact on his body could lead to fatal complications.   That being so, the Court considered that it could not be concluded that P.’s death had been caused by the use of force on the part of the police. It accordingly held that there had been no violation of Article 2 in that respect.   The police officers’ failure to resuscitate P. Noting that the police had immediately called for an ambulance and placed P. in the lateral safety position, the Court doubted that in such situations police officers could reasonably be expected to take further steps.   In addition, the Court endorsed the findings of the forensic medical report ordered by the Federal Court, to the effect that resuscitation, which was a complicated technique for non-specialists and had a very limited success rate, would in all probability not have prevented P.’s death.   That being so, the Court found that the police officers had not failed to discharge their obligation to protect P.’s life. It accordingly held that there had been no violation of Article 2 in that respect.   The investigation into the circumstances of P.’s death The Court noted in the first place that it was the police officers who had arrested P. who had conducted the initial phase of the investigation. They had questioned witnesses but had never themselves been questioned. Such a practice could hardly be said to be compatible with the requirement of hierarchical, institutional and practical independence on the part of officials responsible for the investigation required by Article 2 of the Convention.   In addition, the Court noted that the Swiss authorities had discontinued the proceedings on the sole ground that P.’s level of intoxication would in any case have caused his death, without submitting to experts the question whether the force used by the police, even though not lethal in itself, had nevertheless caused or at least hastened his death. Regard being had to the fact that P. had lost consciousness at the very time when the police officers were using force to restrain him, the investigation should have covered that question. Since the two officers had never been called in for questioning, the precise method used to restrain P., including such details as whether and to what extent he had been pinned down on the ground or handcuffed, had never finally been uncovered.   What is more, the prosecuting authorities of the Canton of Ticino should have asked themselves whether the two police officers could or could not have been aware of P.’s vulnerability.   That being so, the Court considered that Switzerland had failed to discharge its obligation to conduct an effective inquiry into P.’s death. It accordingly concluded that there had been a violation of Article 2 in that respect.   Article 3   The Court considered that it would be purely speculative to say that the treatment inflicted on P. during his arrest was contrary to Article 3. It therefore concluded that there had been no violation of Article 3 in its substantive aspect and that no separate issue arose regarding the procedural aspect of that provision.   Article 6   The Court observed that the facts forming the basis of the allegation under Article 6 were the same as those relating to the procedural aspect of Article 2. It considered that it was not necessary to examine the complaint separately on the merits under Article 6.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54)   Beverley Jacobs (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 54 21) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. More detailed information about the Court and its activities can be found on its Internet site. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.