CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 22 juin 2006

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   364 22.6.2006   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT KAFTAILOVA v. LATVIA   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing its Chamber judgment [1] in the case of Kaftailova v. Latvia (application no. 59643/00).   The Court held by five votes to two that there had been a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights.   Noting that Mrs Kaftailova had not submitted a claim for just satisfaction within the required time-limit, the Court considered that it was not necessary to make an award under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention.     (The judgment is available only in French.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicant, Natella Kaftailova, is of Georgian origin. She was born in 1958 and lives in Riga (Latvia). She had Soviet nationality until 1991 and currently has no nationality.   In 1982 the applicant, who was then resident in Russia, married a Soviet civil servant, employed by the Ministry of the Interior of the USSR. The couple had a daughter in 1984 and settled in Latvia.   In July 1988 the applicant’s husband exchanged the dwelling which he had rented in Kazan (Russia) until that date against the right to rent a state apartment in Riga, into which he and his family then moved. In March 1990 the applicant, who had been registered until then in Volzhsk (Russia), cancelled her official residence registration; the following month her husband registered her, without her knowledge or consent, as resident at their family’s new address in Riga, and also registered himself at that address. Having discovered her entry on the register in question, the applicant had it cancelled on 15 June 1990. The couple divorced in October 1990.   In 1991 the Soviet Union broke up and Mrs Kaftailova found herself with no nationality.   In February 1993 the applicant was granted the right to rent a room obtained by her ex-husband in 1987, which was located in a “duty residence” and asked the Department of Nationality and Migration Affairs at the Latvian Ministry of the Interior ( Iekšlietu ministrijas Pilsonības un imigrācijas departaments , “the Department”) to register her on the list of residents ( Iedzīvotāju reģistrs ) as a permanent citizen of Latvia. In her request, however, she indicated the address at which her ex-husband had unlawfully registered her, and not the address in Riga at which she then lived.   Initially the Department granted her request. In July 1993, however, the Department cancelled the applicant’s registration on the ground that the stamp in her passport was false. On 15   February 1994 the Department struck the applicant out of the list of residents, cancelled her personal identification code and overturned the decision granting her the right to rent the room in which she lived.   On 9 January 1995 the Department served a deportation order on the applicant, ordering her to leave Latvia with her daughter. The Department had noted that on 1 July 1992, the critical date laid down by the Law on the Entry into and Residence of Aliens and Stateless Persons in the Republic of Latvia, the applicant had not been officially registered as having any permanent residence in Latvia; in those circumstances, she ought to have applied for a residence permit within one month of that law entering into force, failing which she would be subject to a deportation order; however, the applicant had not done so.   None of the administrative and judicial appeals lodged by the applicant with a view to having her situation regularised was successful.   After the European Court had declared this application admissible, the Latvian authorities offered in January 2005 to regularise the applicant’s situation by issuing her with a permanent residence permit, and invited her to file the necessary documents to that end. However, it appeared from the case file that the applicant had not submitted the necessary papers by the date of the Court’s judgment.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged on 10 April 2000 and declared partly admissible on 21 October 2004.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Christos Rozakis (Greek), President , Françoise Tulkens (Belgian), Nina Vajić (Croatian), Anatoli Kovler (Russian), Dean Spielmann (Luxemburger), Sverre Erik Jebens (Norwegian), Jautrite Briede (Latvian), judges , and also Søren Nielsen , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaint   The applicant alleged, in particular, that the Latvian authorities’ refusal to regularise her situation constituted a violation of her right to respect for private and family life, guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.   Decision of the Court   Article 8   The Court noted that, during the period in which she lived in Latvia, Mrs Kaftailova had formed and developed personal, social and economic relationships, which constituted the private life of any human being. The Latvian authorities’ prolonged refusal to grant her the right to reside lawfully and permanently in Latvia represented an interference in her private life.   That interference was “in accordance with the law” and sought to ensure compliance with the legislation on immigration; it therefore pursued a “legitimate aim”, namely “to prevent disorder”.   As to whether the disputed measure had been “necessary in a democratic society”, the Court noted that the applicant had lived in Latvia for 22 years. Admittedly, she was not of Latvian origin and had spent a significant part of her life in Russia, but that aspect was not decisive in her case. Firstly, there was nothing to show that the applicant was entitled to Russian or Georgian nationality. Furthermore, it was not disputed that since 1984 the applicant had developed sufficiently strong personal and social contacts in Latvia for it to be asserted that she was sufficiently integrated into Latvian society. Equally, the Court noted that, although the applicant had been officially registered as resident in Russia until 1990, it did not appear that she had maintained stable and genuine links with that country since that date. In any event, she had not formed personal and social ties in any other country similar to those that she enjoyed in Latvia.   In those circumstances, only particularly serious grounds could justify the measure in dispute; however, the Court had not found any in the applicant’s case. While acknowledging the right of States to take effective measures in order to ensure compliance with the legislation on immigration, the Court considered that a measure such as that imposed on the applicant could be proportionate only where the conduct of the person concerned was particularly dangerous.   Having regard to the circumstances of the case, and in particular to the 11-year period of precariousness and legal uncertainty experienced by the applicant in Latvia, the Court considered that the Latvian authorities had not struck a fair balance between the legitimate aim of preventing disorder and the applicant’s interest in protection of her rights under Article 8.     Accordingly, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8.   Judge Spielmann expressed a partly concurring opinion, in which he was joined by Judge Kovler, and Judge Vajić expressed a dissenting opinion. The texts of those opinions are annexed to the judgment.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Emma Hellyer (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54)   Beverley Jacobs (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 54 21)   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. More detailed information about the Court and its activities can be found on its Internet site. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.