CEDH · PRESS;FORTHCOMINGHEARINGS;ENG — 30 octobre 2006

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sBF11BE31 { width:22.68pt; display:inline-block } .sF6C3BEA1 { width:7.1pt; display:inline-block } .sCD3585DE { width:49.6pt; display:inline-block } .sE33C80B4 { width:394.65pt; display:inline-block } .s2D8BAFF { width:209.21pt; display:inline-block } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s8D7F9308 { width:175.25pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sC7EAD8B { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4BAE41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   644 30.10.2006   Press release issued by the Registrar   HEARINGS IN NOVEMBER   The European Court of Human Rights will be holding the following hearings in November 2006 :   Wednesday 8 November 2006   Grand Chamber [1]   9 a.m.   J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. United Kingdom (application no. 44302/02) The applicants are two United Kingdom companies, J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd.   J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd was the registered owner of a plot of 23 hectares of agricultural land in Berkshire (United Kingdom) valued at 21 million pounds sterling (approximately 31 million euros). J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd is the former owner of the land. The owners of property adjacent to the land, Mr. and Mrs. Graham (“the Grahams”) occupied the land under a grazing agreement until 31 December 1983. On 30 December 1983 the Grahams were instructed to vacate the land as the grazing agreement was about to expire. They did not do so.   In January 1984 the applicants refused a request for a further grazing agreement for 1984 because they anticipated seeking planning permission for the development of all or part of the land and considered that continued grazing might damage the prospects of obtaining such permission. From September 1984 onwards until 1999 the Grahams continued to use the land for farming without the applicants’ permission.   In 1997, Mr Graham registered cautions (official warnings) at the Land Registry against the applicant companies’ title on the ground that he had obtained title by adverse possession (occupation of property contrary to the rights of the real owner).   The applicant companies sought the cancellation of the cautions before the High Court and issued further proceedings seeking possession of the disputed land.   The Grahams contested the applicant companies’ claims under the Limitation Act 1980, which provides that a person cannot bring an action to recover any land after the expiration of 12 years of adverse possession by another. They also relied on the Land Registration Act 1925, which provided that, after the expiry of the 12-year period, the registered owner held the land in trust for the squatter.   On 4 February 2000 the High Court held that, since the Grahams enjoyed factual possession of the land from January 1984 and adverse possession took effect from September 1984, the applicant companies had lost their title to the land under the 1980 Act, and the Grahams were entitled to be registered as the new owners.   The applicant companies appealed successfully, but their appeal was overturned by the House of Lords, which, on 4 July 2002, restored the order of the High Court.   The Land Registration Act 2002 – which does not have retroactive effect – now enables a squatter to apply to be registered as owner after ten years’ adverse possession and requires that the registered owner be notified of the application. The registered proprietor is then required to regularise the situation (for example, by evicting the squatter) within two years, failing which the squatter is entitled to be registered as the owner.   The applicants allege that the United Kingdom law on adverse possession, by which they lost land with development potential to a neighbour, operated in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to the European Convention on Human Rights in their case.   In its Chamber judgment of 15 November 2005 (press release no. 616, 2005), the Court held, by four votes to three, that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Court considered that the question of the application of Article 41 (just satisfaction) was not ready for decision.   The case was referred to the Grand Chamber (under Article 43 of the Convention and Rule 73 of the Rules of Court) on 12 April 2006 at the Government’s request.     Wednesday 15 November 2006   Grand Chamber       9 a.m.   Behrami v. France (no. 71412/01)       Saramati v. France, Norway and Germany (no. 78166/01)   Behrami v. France The applicants are Agim Behrami, born in 1962, and his son, Bekir Behrami, born in 1990. Both live in the municipality of Mitrovica, Kosovo, in the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (now the Republic of Serbia). Agim Behrami also applied on behalf of another of his sons, Gadaf Behrami, born in 1988, who is now deceased.   At the relevant time (March 2000) Mitrovica was within the sector of Kosovo for which a multinational brigade led by France was responsible; it was one of four brigades making up the international security force (KFOR) presence in Kosovo, mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 1999 [2] .   On 11 March 2000 Gadaf and Bekim Behrami were playing with some other boys in the hills in the Sipolje area of Mitrovica. They found a number of undetonated cluster bombs, which had been dropped during the bombardment of FRY by NATO in 1999, and began playing with them. One of the children threw a bomb into the air; it detonated and killed Gadaf Behrami. Bekim Behrami was also seriously injured and later had numerous eye operations.   The UN Interim Administration for Kosovo (UNMIK) - mandated by the same Resolution 1244 – investigated the incident and reported, on 18 March 2000, that Gadaf Behrami had died from numerous injuries following a cluster bomb explosion and that the incident amounted to “an unintentional homicide committed by imprudence”.   On 22 May 2000 Agim Behrami was informed that no criminal prosecution was to be brought because the bomb did not explode during the NATO bombardment. He was also informed that he had the right to pursue a criminal prosecution within eight days.   On 25 October 2001 Agim Behrami complained to the Kosovo Claims Office that France had not respected the provisions (concerning de-mining) of Resolution 1244. The claim was ultimately rejected on the ground that mine clearance had been the responsibility of the UN since 5 July 1999.   The applicants allege that Gadaf Behrami’s death and Bekir Behram’s injuries were caused   by the failure of the French KFOR troops to mark and/or defuse the un-detonated cluster bombs which KFOR knew to be present on the site in question. They rely on Article 2 (right to life) of the Convention   Saramati v. France, Norway and Germany The applicant, Ruzhdi Saramati, was born in 1950. He is from Kosovo and of Albanian origin.   In April 2001 the applicant was arrested by UNMIK police and later detained. On 23 May 2001 a prosecutor filed an indictment accusing the applicant of attempted murder, causing serious bodily harm, unlawful possession of weapons or exploding substances, causing minor bodily injury and violent behaviour. He appealed successfully against a further detention order and was released.   On 13 July 2001 he was arrested by two UNMIK police officers (German). A German KFOR officer orally issued the arrest order and informed the applicant that he was being arrested by order of the KFOR Commander (COMKFOR), a Norwegian officer at that time. He was taken to a KFOR camp under escort by American KFOR soldiers. On 14 July 2001 the COMKFOR authorised the applicant’s further detention for 30 days.   On 26 July 2001, and in response to a letter from the applicant’s representatives taking issue with the legality of his detention, the KFOR Legal Adviser advised that KFOR had the authority to detain under Resolution 1244 as it was necessary “to maintain a safe and secure environment” and to protect KFOR troops. KFOR had information concerning the applicant’s involvement with armed groups operating in the border region between Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and was satisfied that the applicant represented a threat to the security of KFOR and to those residing in Kosovo.   On 11 August 2001 the applicant’s detention was again extended.   On 6 September 2001 the applicant’s case was transferred to the district court for trial. During each trial hearing from 17 September 2001 to 23 January 2002 the applicant’s representatives requested his release and the trial court responded that his detention was the responsibility of KFOR. On 3 October 2001 a French General became the COMKFOR.   On 23 January 2002 the applicant was convicted of attempted murder under Article 30 § 2(6) of the Criminal Code of Kosovo in conjunction with Article 19 of the Criminal Code of the FRY. On 26 January 2002 he was transferred by KFOR to the UNMIK detention facilities in Pristina.   On 9 October 2002 the Supreme Court of Kosovo quashed the applicant’s conviction and his case was sent for re-trial to Pristina District Court. His release from detention was ordered. A re-trial has yet to be fixed.   The applicant complains under Article 5 (right to liberty and security) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the Convention, about his detention by KFOR between 13 July 2001 and 26 January 2002. He further complains under Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial) that he did not have access to court and, under Article 1 (obligation to respect human rights), that France, Germany and Norway failed to guarantee the Convention rights of individuals living in Kosovo.   Both cases were referred to the Grand Chamber by the Court.   Wednesday 22 November 2006   Grand Chamber   9 a.m.   Evans v. United Kingdom (no. 6339/05)   The applicant, Natallie Evans, is a 34-year-old British national who lives in Wiltshire (United Kingdom).   On 12 July Ms Evans and her partner J started fertility treatment at the Bath Assisted Conception Clinic. On 10 October 2000, during an appointment at the clinic, Ms Evans was diagnosed with a pre-cancerous condition of her ovaries and was offered one cycle of in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment prior to the surgical removal of her ovaries. During the consultation held that day with medical staff, Ms Evans and her partner J were informed that they would each need to sign a form consenting to the treatment and that, in accordance with the provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (“the 1990 Act”), it would be possible for either of them to withdraw his or her consent at any time before the embryos were implanted in the applicant’s uterus.   Ms Evans considered whether she should explore other means of having her remaining eggs fertilised, to guard against the possibility of her relationship with J ending. J reassured her that that would not happen.   On 12 November 2001 the couple attended the clinic for treatment, resulting in the creation of six embryos which were placed in storage and, on 26 November 2001, Ms Evans underwent an operation to remove her ovaries. She was told she would need to wait for two years before the implantation of the embryos in her uterus.   In May 2002 the relationship between the applicant and J ended and subsequently, in accordance with the 1990 Act, he withdrew his consent to the continued storage of the embryos or use of them by the applicant.   The applicant brought proceedings before the High Court seeking, among other things , an injunction to require J. to restore his consent. Her claim was refused on 1 October 2003, J having been found to have acted in good faith, as he had embarked on the treatment on the basis that his relationship with Ms Evans would continue. On 1 October 2004, the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s judgment. Leave to appeal was refused.   On 26 January 2005 the clinic informed the applicant that it was under a legal obligation to destroy the embryos, and intended to do so on 23   February 2005.   On 27 February 2005 the European Court of Human Rights, to whom the applicant had applied, requested, under Rule 39 (interim measures) of the Rules of Court, that the United Kingdom Government take appropriate measures to prevent the embryos being destroyed by the clinic before the Court had been able to examine the case. The embryos were not destroyed.   The applicant, for whom the embryos represent her only chance of bearing a child to which she is genetically related, has undergone successful treatment for her pre-cancerous condition and is medically fit to continue with implantation of the embryos. It was understood that the Bath clinic was willing to treat her, subject to J’s consent.   The applicant complains that requiring the father’s consent for the continued storage and implantation of the fertilised eggs is in breach of her rights under Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and the rights of the embryos, under Article 2 (right to life).   In its Chamber judgment of 7 March 2006 (press release No. 125, 2006), the Court held unanimously, that there had been no violation of Article 2 concerning the applicant’s embryos; by five votes to two, that there had been no violation of Article 8 concerning the applicant; and, unanimously, that there had been no violation of Article 14, concerning the applicant. The Court also decided to continue to indicate to the United Kingdom Government under Rule 39 that it take appropriate measures to ensure the preservation of the applicant’s embryos until the Court’s judgment became final or pending any further order. The case was referred to the Grand Chamber at the applicant’s request.       Thursday 30 November 2006   Chamber   9 a.m.   Riad and Idiab v. Belgium (no. 29787/03)   The applicants, Mohamad Riad and Abdelhadi Idiab, are Palestinian nationals who were born in 1980 and 1981 respectively and live in Lebanon.   The application concerns in particular the conditions in which the applicants were detained in the transit zone of Brussels-National airport following their unlawful entry into Belgian territory.   The applicants both arrived in Belgium at Brussels-National airport on flights from Freetown (Sierra Leone), Mr Riad on 27 December 2002 and Mr Idiab on 24 December of the same year. They declared that they had left Lebanon, where their lives were in danger, had travelled via the Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone, and wished to go on to the United Kingdom where they intended to seek political asylum.   As neither applicant possessed a visa, they were refused entry into Belgium and as a result each of them was placed on the day of arrival in “Centre 127”. They submitted applications for asylum, which were refused by the Aliens Office in decisions which were subsequently upheld by the Commissioner for Refugees and Stateless Persons.   Following an attempted collective break-out from Centre 127, the applicants were transferred on 22 January 2003 to the Closed Detention Centre for Illegal Aliens in Bruges. In the meantime the applicants’ lawyer had lodged an application for their release, which the chambre du conseil of the Brussels Court of First Instance allowed on 20 January 2003. However, the applicants’ detention continued pending their repatriation. The orders for their release were upheld on appeal, on 30 January 2003 in Mr Riad’s case and on 3 February 2003 in Mr Idiab’s case. In both cases the applicants were transferred on the very same day to the transit zone of Brussels-National airport pending their removal from Belgium.   The applicants complain of the conditions in which they were detained in the transit zone. They assert that it does not have bedrooms or beds and that they were housed in the mosque which is located there; that they went several days without being given anything to eat or drink and received food only from the cleaning staff or the company which ran the airport; that they were not able to wash themselves or launder their clothes; that they were repeatedly subjected to security checks by the airport police; that on a number of occasions they were taken to the cells and left there for several hours without being given anything to eat or drink, in an attempt to force them to leave the country voluntarily, before being taken back to the transit zone; and, that they were violently struck and beaten inside the mosque by certain members of the federal police.   On 14 February 2003, on an application by the applicants, the President of the Brussels Court of First Instance ordered the Belgian State to permit the applicants to leave the transit zone freely and without restriction, subject to a coercive fine of EUR 1,000 per hour of default, commencing with service of the order. On the following day the Aliens Office received the instruction to permit the applicants to leave the transit zone.   They accordingly left the transit zone on 15 February 2003, but, following an identity check soon after they were served with an order to leave Belgian territory and were taken in handcuffs to the Merksplas Detention Centre for Illegal Aliens.   Mr Idiab and Mr Riad were repatriated under police escort on 5 and 8 March 2003 respectively, on flights to Beirut via Moscow; their hands remained bound with cloth restraints until embarkation.   Relying on Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) and 8 (right to respect for private and family life), the applicants complain of the way they were treated in the transit zone and while being deported. They further complain, under Article 5 (right to liberty and security), of their detention in the transit zone after the judgments of 30   January and 3 February 2003 and at Merksplas after the order of 14 February 2003.       ***   Decisions, judgments and further information about the Court can be found on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Press contacts Emma Hellyer (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15) Stéphanie Klein (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Beverley Jacobs (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 54 21)   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.   [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.   [2] Resolution No. 1244 provided for the establishment of KFOR under UN auspices with “substantial NATO participation” under “unified command and control”. Each multinational brigade had a national commander, with disciplinary powers over the troops, who applied national rules of engagement. However, KFOR command retained operational control and command of the brigades.