CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 9 janvier 2007

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sC7EAD8B { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   12 9.1.2007   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT KWIECIEŃ v. POLAND   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing its Chamber judgment [1] in the case of Kwiecień v. Poland (application no. 51744/99).   The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights.   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicant 5,600   euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage, EUR 2,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR   1,050 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicant, Leszek Kwiecień, is a Polish national who was born in 1949 and lives in Dzierżoniów (Poland).   In September 1998, just before local elections were to take place, the applicant circulated an open letter in which he alleged that the Head of Dzierżoniów District Office, Mr S.L., had carried out his duties ineptly and broken the law, and called on him to withdraw from standing for election.   His letter was based on the fact that the district office had issued several decisions finding against him in administrative proceedings regarding planning matters and disputes he had had with his neighbours. Since those decisions were subsequently quashed on appeal the applicant concluded that Mr S.L. had acted in bad faith and against his interests.   Subsequently, Mr S.L. issued summary proceedings against the applicant under the Local Elections Act, alleging that the statements included in his open letter were untrue and aimed at damaging his reputation. The domestic courts held that the impugned statements regarding Mr S.L. were untrue. On 12 October 1998 the Court of Appeal further held that the applicant had infringed Mr S.L.’s personal rights and had tried to prevent him from being elected. The applicant was ordered to retract his accusations and issue an apology. He was also ordered to pay PLN 10,000 to Mr S.L. for non-pecuniary damages and PLN 10,000 to a charity. 2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 7 April 1999 and declared partly admissible on 15 March 2005.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Nicolas Bratza (British), President , Josep Casadevall (Andorran), Giovanni Bonello (Maltese), Kristaq Traja (Albanian), Lech Garlicki (Polish), Ljiljana Mijović (citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Ján Šikuta (Slovakian), judges , and also Françoise Elens-Passos , Deputy Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   The applicant relied on Article 10 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.   Decision of the Court   Article 10   The Court observed that the general aim of the applicant’s open letter was to attract the voters’ attention to the suitability of Mr S.L. as a candidate for local public office and, as such, the statements contained in the letter were a matter of public interest for the local community. The Court reiterated its view that in respect of matters of public interest, restrictions on freedom of expression should be interpreted narrowly.   The Court found that the domestic authorities failed to recognise that the case involved a conflict between the right to freedom of expression and the protection of the reputation and the rights of others. They also gave no consideration to the fact that the limits of acceptable criticism of Mr S.L. as the head of the local administrative authority were wider than in relation to a private individual.   Furthermore, they unreservedly qualified all of the applicant’s comments as groundless statements of fact. The Court however, considered that the applicant’s open letter also included statements which could reasonably have been regarded as value judgments, such as the statement that the claimant “carried out his duties ineptly”. The applicant also provided in the letter specific examples of decisions issued by the District Office which were subsequently quashed on appeal. The Court therefore found that the applicant’s allegations that Mr S.L. did not run the District Office competently were not devoid of a factual basis. Moreover, the Court concluded that the applicant had not acted in bad faith and that his statements were not a gratuitous personal attack on Mr S.L., but part of a debate on matters of public interest.   The Court particularly noted the summary nature of the proceedings that were brought against the applicant under the Local Elections Act. It considered that neither the Regional Court nor the Court of Appeal sufficiently examined the evidence adduced by the applicant which, at least to some extent, could be considered as justifying his critical remarks about S.L. On that account, the Court found, the fairness of the proceedings might be called into question.   The Court also noted that the Court of Appeal’s judgment was given on 12 October 1998, one day after the local elections had taken place, by which time the proceedings had lost all relevance to the claimant’s electoral prospects.   Regarding the severity of the sanction imposed on the applicant, the Court noted that both awards were the maximum amounts which could be imposed under the Local Elections Act, as worded at the relevant time and that the combined total came to more than 16 times the average monthly wage at the time. The Court noted that the domestic courts failed to provide any reasons to justify the imposition of such heavy sanctions or to carry out any assessment of proportionality. The Court found the sanctions to be excessive.   In sum, the Court found that the interference complained of was not “necessary in a democratic society” and held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 10.   Article 6 § 1   The Court held unanimously that there was no need to examine the complaint under Article 6 § 1.     ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Press contacts Emma Hellyer (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15) Stéphanie Klein (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Beverley Jacobs (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 54 21)   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.   [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.