CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 13 mars 2007

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4B8D41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sC7EAD8B { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   165 13.3.2007   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT HUOHVANAINEN v. FINLAND   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing its Chamber judgment [1] in the case of Huohvanainen v. Finland (application no. 57389/00).   The Court held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights. (The judgment is available only in English.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicant, Kauko Huohvanainen, is a Finnish national who was born in 1964 and lives in Liperi (Finland).   The case concerns the death of the applicant's 27-year-old brother, J., who was shot dead by the police.   On 1 December 1994 J’s home on the island of Ängeslandet in the municipality of Kirkkonummi was surrounded by the police, following an incident the previous day in which J. had threatened a taxi driver with a gun. The police were informed that J. had previously been involved in an armed siege, that he was paranoid and aggressive, that he had been admitted to a psychiatric institution and was considered especially hostile towards the police. The police and a psychologist tried several times to talk to J. on the telephone, without success.   By noon there were 32 police officers at the scene. They were joined, later in the afternoon, by 23 additional officers with special training. J. fired at the police and refused to negotiate.   The police were then informed that J. was an excellent shot and owned a 22 calibre small-bore rifle and a very heavy 45-70 calibre sporting gun. The police subsequently spotted J. carrying two long-barrelled weapons and, at around 10 p.m., J. fired several shots in the air and at the police.   In the early hours of Friday 2 December 1994 the police used audible flares to locate J. and keep him indoors, from where he fired repeatedly through the windows and the skylight. He aimed some of the shots at the police.   Around noon, when repeated negotiation attempts had failed, the officer in charge at the scene ordered the use of tear gas, which had no visible effect on J. The police also tried unsuccessfully to reach J. by telephone and by using a megaphone.   At about 6 p.m. J. fired shots, threw a gas canister, at least two “Molotov cocktails”. It appears that he set fire to the house.   It was decided that the only way to arrest J. in the dark and smoke-filled conditions before he could escape was to order a police officer to shoot at J.'s leg; J. was shot in the right hand and the upper part of the right thigh and instructed to surrender.   At about 7 p.m. J. crawled out of the house with two weapons. He was hit by two shots fired simultaneously from one of the armoured vehicles, at a range of six metres. Both shots were aimed at his shoulder and arm, but owing to his position, the firing angle through the porthole of the armoured vehicle and the short time available, he was hit in the head. J. died at 7.35 p.m.   During the siege a log was kept of the decisions made and actions taken. Afterwards, details collected concerning the bullet holes in and around the building. The investigation, which started immediately, was carried out by the National Bureau of Investigation.   At the request of J.'s family, certain additional lines of inquiry were followed during the pre-trial investigation. The autopsy report and the results of all the forensic and other investigations, as well as the reports on the siege, were included in the pre-trial documentation, together with a large number of witness statements.   The National Bureau of Investigation, on 8 February 1995, began to investigate whether anyone involved in the siege had acted in an unlawful manner.   In 1995 the operation was also studied by a permanent investigation team set up by the Ministry of the Interior, which submitted a report within a year of the operation.   Less than a year after the incident, the public prosecutor brought charges against the commander of the Special Task Force, Superintendent H. of negligent homicide and negligent breach of official duty. In the court proceedings against Superintendent H. the District Court took forensic and oral evidence. The officers involved appeared before the court and gave evidence. The District Court acquitted the defendant, following which the public prosecutor lodged an appeal. The acquittal is apparently now final.   The other officers involved in the siege were not prosecuted.   The family was legally represented throughout the proceedings by experienced counsel. The lawyer acting on behalf of the applicant was able to examine key-witnesses, including the police officers who had fired their guns and those who had been in charge of the operation, and to make the submissions he wished to make in the course of the proceedings.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 8 May 2000 and declared partly admissible on 14 March 2006.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Nicolas Bratza (British), President , Josep Casadevall (Andorran), Matti Pellonpää (Finnish), Rait Maruste (Estonian), Kristaq Traja (Albanian), Ljiljana Mijović (citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Ján Šikuta (Slovak), judges , and also Lawrence Early , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaint   Relying on Article 2, Mr   Huohvanainen complained that the lethal force used against his brother had not been absolutely necessary.   Decision of the Court   Article 2   The shooting of J. The Court saw no reason to doubt that the police officers involved honestly believed that it was necessary to open fire to protect their colleagues who were without protection outside the armoured vehicles. The Court recalled that the use of force could be justified under Article 2 where it was based on an honest belief which was perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but subsequently turned out to be mistaken. To hold otherwise would be to impose an unrealistic burden on the State and its law-enforcement personnel in the execution of their duty, perhaps to the detriment of their lives and the lives of others.   The Court added that, detached from the events in issue, it could not substitute its own assessment of the situation for that of an officer who was required to react in the heat of the moment to avert an honestly perceived danger to his life or the lives of others. The officers found themselves confronted by a man who emerged in the doorway with two guns and who had shot at the police on several occasions during the two-day siege. J. emerged from the house heavily armed. He had ignored previous warnings to give himself up and, in defiance of those warnings, had fired numerous shots in the air and at the police officers. Further, the police officers intended, not to kill J., but to immobilise him.   For the Court, the use of fire arms in the circumstances of the case, albeit highly regrettable given the lethal consequences, was not disproportionate and did not exceed what was absolutely necessary to avert what was honestly perceived by the police officers to be a real and immediate risk to the lives of their colleagues.   The Court also evaluated whether in the circumstances the planning and control of the operation outside J.'s house showed that the authorities had taken appropriate care to ensure that any risk to his life had been minimised and that they were not negligent in their choice of action.   The Court noted that the conduct of that operation remained at all times under the control of senior officers and that the deployment of the armed officers was reviewed and approved by the officer in charge.   It could not be disputed that the police considered that they were involved in a tense situation with an armed man and that measures had to be taken to protect the public by preventing him from escaping.   The primary concern of the police had been to break the deadlock by persuasion. Numerous warnings were shouted and he was given ample opportunity to give himself up. These warnings were ignored, however. Nor did J. answer the phone in the later stages of the siege although the police tried to reach him repeatedly. The efforts of a trained negotiator also proved unsuccessful.   In the circumstances, the Court did not consider that those in charge could be faulted for not having withdrawn the armed police officers from around the house. Even though the applicant argued that the presence of police officers close to the house would have been provocative to J., that course of action was not lightly undertaken.   The use of firearms by the police as well as the conduct of police operations of the kind in question were regulated by domestic law and a system of adequate and effective safeguards existed to prevent arbitrary use of lethal force. All the key officers concerned were trained in the use of firearms and their movements and actions were subject to the control and supervision of experienced senior officers.   The Court concluded that the killing of J. resulted from the use of force which was no more than was absolutely necessary in defence of the lives of the personnel outside the armoured vehicles. There had, accordingly, been no violation of Article 2.   Effective investigation The Court noted that, during the siege, a log was kept. The investigation, which started immediately after the siege, was carried out by the National Bureau of Investigation which specialised in the investigation of serious crime. There was no indication that the investigators were not independent from those taking part in the police operation. On 8 February 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation began to investigate whether anyone involved in the siege had acted in an unlawful manner. The decisions made and the actions taken during the operation were also studied by a permanent investigation team set up by the Ministry of the Interior, whose report was finalised within one year of the operation.   The Court noted that the family had had at its disposal as much information as was commensurate with the defence of its interests in the national proceedings, namely clarifying the facts surrounding the death of J. and securing the accountability of the police officers involved for any alleged acts and omissions.   Having regard to the considerable number of witnesses who gave evidence at the pre-trial investigation, that the investigation included the appropriate forensic examinations, that the representative of the applicant was able to request additional investigations and that the essential witnesses who could help shed light on the events testified in the first set of criminal proceedings, the Court found that there has been no violation of Article 2 concerning the investigation into the death of J..   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Press contacts Emma Hellyer (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15) Stéphanie Klein (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Beverley Jacobs (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 54 21)   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.   [1] Under Article 43 of the Convention, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.