CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 24 avril 2007

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sC7EAD8B { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   255 24.4.2007   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT LOMBARDO AND OTHERS v. MALTA   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing its Chamber judgment [1] in the case of Lombardo and Others v. Malta (application no. 7333/06).   The Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights.   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicants 1,460   euros (EUR), in respect of pecuniary damage, and EUR 6,000 for costs and expenses. No claim was made for non-pecuniary damage. (The judgment is available only in English.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicants, Mark Lombardo, Charles Bonello, Alfred Debono and John Zammit, are Maltese nationals who were born in 1966, 1971, 1945 and 1963, respectively. They all live in Malta. Mr Lombardo, Mr Bonello and Mr Debono are Nationalist Party councillors elected to the Fgura Local Council. Mr Zammit is the editor of the local newspaper, “ In-Nazzjon Taghna ”.   In 2001 a dispute arose between the central government of Malta and the Fgura Local Council about the “Hompesch” Road Project in Fgura. The matter was brought before the domestic courts and gave rise to discussion in the Local Council and the local press. On 24 May 2001, during a Local Council meeting, the applicants tabled a motion calling for a public meeting to be held about the project. The motion was rejected.   On 7 August 2001 the first three applicants published an article in the “ In-Nazzjon Taghna ”. referring to the disagreement about the project and stating that the Local Council “did not consult the public and is ignoring public opinion on the matter”.   As a result, the Local Council sued the applicants, in their capacity as authors and editor of the article, for libel and defamation. The applicants challenged that claim, arguing that the article amounted to fair comment in view of the rejection of their motion to hold a public meeting. In their opinion, the Local Council’s efforts to examine the issues relating to the dispute had not involved public consultation.   On 12 November 2002 the Court of Magistrates found the article libellous and defamatory on the ground that the allegations of fact by the first three applicants had not been proved. On the contrary, public consultation had taken place from the outset: three public meetings had taken place between 1995 and 2001; an urban planner’s report had been made public; a questionnaire had been distributed to local residents and the Minister responsible for roads and the Director of the Department of Roads had spoken in public about their discussions with the Local Council. That court further noted that Mr Zammit was aware of the controversy, had believed the comments to be justified and had given the Council the opportunity to reply. The applicants were ordered to pay, in total, 2,000 Maltese Liri (Lm) (approximately EUR 4,800) damages.   That judgment was subsequently upheld on appeal. It was decided, however, to reduce the damages to Lm 600 (approximately EUR 1,440).   In October 2004, the Civil Court rejected the applicants’ constitutional complaint, referring, in particular, to the balance between the right to freedom of expression and the right to reputation, to the fact that the interference had a legal basis in law and that it was proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. That court also took particular account of the fact that the amount of damages had been reduced and had been ordered as a result of civil rather than criminal proceedings.   Ultimately, in October 2005, the Constitutional Court upheld the Civil Court’s judgment, finding that the law had been applied effectively and correctly by the previous courts and that, even though the limits of acceptable criticism were wider with respect to governments, that did not justify the use of false information.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 2 February 2006.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Nicolas Bratza (British), President , Giovanni Bonello (Maltese), Kristaq Traja (Albanian), Lech Garlicki (Polish), Ljiljana Mijović (citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Ján Šikuta (Slovak), Pâivi Hirvelä (Finnish), judges , and also Lawrence Early , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaint   Relying on Article 10, the applicants complained that their right to freedom of expression had been breached.   Decision of the Court   Article 10   The Court noted that it was common ground between the parties that the decisions against the applicants amounted to interference with their right to freedom of expression. However, the parties disagreed as to whether that interference had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others. The Court considered that the latter, in exceptional circumstances, could justify a measure banning statements which had criticised the acts or omissions of an elected body such as a council. In the present case, it was prepared to assume that that aim could be relied on.   The main issue was therefore whether the interference had been “necessary in a democratic society”, in other words, whether the interference had corresponded to a “pressing social need”, whether it had been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons given by the national authorities had been relevant and sufficient.   The Court recalled that, while freedom of expression was important for everyone, it was especially so for elected representatives, who drew attention to the electorate’s preoccupations and defended public interests. Accordingly, interference with the first three applicants’ freedom of expression needed to be examined with great care by the Court.   The Court, reiterating that the duty of the press was to provide accurate and reliable information on all matters of public interest whilst not overstepping certain limits regarding the reputation and rights of others, further observed that the Court of Magistrates had acknowledged that the fourth applicant believed the comments in the article to have been justified and had invited the Local Council to reply.   The Court recalled that the limits of permissible criticism, were wider for politicians than for a private citizen and were wider still with regard to a government. It followed that an elected political body such as a local council should also be expected to display a higher degree of tolerance to criticism.   In the same vein, the Court recalled that there was little scope for restricting political speech or debate on questions of public interest. It followed then that the subject matter of the applicants’ article, which was part of a political debate of general interest to the local community, had entitled them to bring it to public attention through the press.   Moreover, the Court found that political debate did not require unanimous agreement as to the interpretation of particular words. The Court considered that the rejection of the applicants’ motion provided a sufficient factual basis for the allegation that the Local Council had not consulted the public so as to allow that allegation to be construed as a value judgment. Even assuming it had not been a value judgment, the interpretation given by the applicants was not manifestly unreasonable. The allegation concerning public opinion having been ignored was clearly a value judgment. The Court recalled that the truth of value judgments was not susceptible of proof. Finally, the Court found that nothing showed that those value judgments had not been made in good faith.   In any case the Court observed that the distinction between statement of fact and value judgment was less important where the statements had been made in the course of a lively political debate.   The Court also found that it had to be taken into consideration that the damages involved represented a sanction likely to discourage the applicants from criticising the Local Council in the future.   In conclusion, the use of the sentence at issue had not exceeded the acceptable limits of criticism. The proceedings having been civil rather than criminal in nature and the final award having been relatively low should not detract from the fact that the courts had not put forward “relevant and sufficient” reasons to justify the interference. It followed that the domestic courts had overstepped the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to them to restrict discussion on matters of public interest and concluded that the interference had been disproportionate to the aim pursued and had not been “necessary in a democratic society” . There had, therefore, been a violation of Article 10.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Press contacts Emma Hellyer (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15) Stéphanie Klein (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Beverley Jacobs (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 54 21) Tracey Turner-Tretz (telephone : 00 33 (0)3 88 41 35 30)   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.     [1] Under Article 43 of the Convention, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.