CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 15 novembre 2007

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s1C7BEF1E { margin-left:28.52pt; padding-left:7.48pt; font-family:serif } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sC7EAD8B { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   790 15.11.2007   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT GALSTYAN v. ARMENIA   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing its Chamber judgment [1] in the case of Galstyan v. Armenia (application no. 26986/03).   The Court held: unanimously, that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the applicant’s right to a fair and public hearing by an impartial tribunal; unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 taken together with Article 6 § 3 (b) (right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of one’s defence) of the Convention; by five votes to two, that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 taken together with Article 6 § 3 (c) (right to defend oneself in person or through legal assistance of own choosing); unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 11 (freedom of association and assembly); and, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (right of appeal in criminal matters)   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction, the Court awarded Mr Galstyan 3,000   euros   (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He made no claim for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicant, Arsham Galstyan, is an Armenian national who was born in 1958 and lives in Yerevan (Armenia).   Following the presidential elections in Armenia in February and March 2003, Mr Galstyan participated in a series of protest rallies in Yerevan organised by the opposition.   The case concerned his sentence to three days’ detention for taking part in a demonstration held on Mother’s Day in April 2003. This is the first in a series of cases dealing with the imposition of administrative sanctions concerning participation in demonstrations or other minor offences in Armenia.   On 7 April 2003, on his way home from the demonstration, which had apparently been organised to protest against the Government and the conduct of the elections and involved around 30,000 people (mostly women), he was arrested for “obstructing traffic and behaving in an anti-social way at a demonstration” and taken to Yerevan Central District Police Station for questioning. The applicant argued that he and most of the other men present did not participate in the demonstration; they were there to support and protect the women and prevent trouble breaking out.   At the police station he was charged with “minor hooliganism” under Article 172 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO). The police record was signed by the applicant. He also certified that he had been made aware of his rights under Article 267 of the CAO and added “I do not wish to have a lawyer”.   The applicant alleged that he initially refused to sign that record and requested a lawyer, but that he had been kept at the Police Station for five-and-a-half hours, during which time police officers pressurised him to sign the record and to refuse legal assistance. At 11 p.m. that day he was taken to a judge at Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, who examined the case.   According to the Government, the applicant was kept at the Police Station for only two hours and taken to the judge at 7.30 p.m. The police explained to him his right to have a lawyer and the applicant signed the record voluntarily, without objections.   The judge, after a brief hearing, sentenced the applicant under Article 172 of the CAO to three days’ administrative detention for “obstruction of street traffic” and “making a loud noise”. According to the court records, the hearing was held in public with the participation of the judge, a clerk and the applicant.   The applicant alleged, and the Government did not explicitly dispute, that the record of the hearing was drafted at some point after the hearing. In reality there was no clerk and the hearing was not recorded. The hearing lasted only about five minutes and was conducted in the judge’s office. Only the judge and applicant (with the accompanying police officer) were present.   On 14 April 2003 the applicant applied to a local human rights NGO, “February 22nd”, complaining that police officers had prompted him to sign a document refusing a lawyer. The NGO’s request to have criminal proceedings brought against the police officers and judge was rejected by the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Prosecutor.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 1 August 2003.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Boštjan M. Zupančič (Slovenian), President , Corneliu Bîrsan (Romanian), Elisabet Fura-Sandström (Swedish), Alvina Gyulumyan (Armenian), Egbert Myjer (Dutch), David Thór Björgvinsson (Icelandic), Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre (Monegasque), judges , and also Santiago Quesada , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   Mr Galstyan complained that his sentence violated his right to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. He also maintained that he did not have a fair and public hearing before an impartial tribunal, that he was not given time to prepare his defence and that he was tricked into refusing legal assistance.   He relied on Article 5 (right to liberty and security), Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial), Article   10 (freedom of expression), Article 11 (freedom of association and assembly) and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (right of appeal in criminal matters).   Decision of the Court   Article 6 § 1   Concerning the fairness of the applicant’s trial, the Court considered that the fact that the only evidence in the proceedings was the witness testimony of an arresting police officer was not in itself contrary to Article 6, because the applicant – even if at a very brief hearing – was able to make submissions in defence of his position. Although none of the arresting police officers were called and examined in court, the applicant had made no such request.   Regarding the applicant’s allegation that the trial judge was politically biased, the Court noted that, although the period surrounding the presidential election of 2003 was a period of increased political sensitivity, it was not possible to conclude from that alone that the trial judge was personally biased.   The Court also considered that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the hearing in question was not held in public; the applicant cited only the alleged time and location of the hearing in support of his allegation.   There had therefore been no violation of Article 6 § 1 concerning the applicant’s right to a fair and public hearing before an impartial tribunal.   Article 6 § 3 (b)   The Court considered that the mere fact that the applicant signed a paper in which he stated that he did not wish to have a lawyer did not mean that he did not need adequate time and facilities to prepare himself effectively for trial. Nor did the fact that the applicant did not lodge any specific requests during the short pre-trial period necessarily imply that no further time was needed for him to be able – in adequate conditions – to properly assess the charge against him and consider his defence. Nothing suggested that his signing of the record pursued any other purpose than to confirm that he was familiar with it and aware of his rights and the charge against him.   The parties disagreed as regards the exact length of the pre-trial period but, in any event, it was evident that that period was not longer than a few hours. The Court further noted that, during that time, the applicant was either in transit to the court or was being held at the police station without contact with the outside world. Furthermore, during his short stay at the police station, he was also questioned and searched. The Court doubted that the circumstances in which the applicant’s trial was conducted enabled him to familiarise himself properly with and to assess adequately the charge and evidence against him, and to develop a viable legal strategy for his defence. The Court therefore concluded that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 3 taken together with Article 6 § 1.   Article 6 § 3 (c)   The Court noted that all the materials before it indicated that the applicant expressly waived his right to be represented by a lawyer both before and during the court hearing. There was no evidence to support his allegation that he was “tricked” into refusing a lawyer. Noting that the applicant was accused of a minor offence and the maximum possible sentence could not have exceeded 15 days’ detention, mandatory legal representation was not required in the interests of justice. Having concluded that it was the applicant’s own choice not to have a lawyer, the Court considered that the authorities could not be held responsible for the fact that he was not legally represented in the course of the administrative proceedings against him. There had therefore been no violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c).   Article 11   The Court observed that the interference with the applicant’s right of freedom of association was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim, the prevention of disorder.   Concerning whether it was necessary in a democratic society, the Court recalled that freedom to take part in a peaceful assembly was of such importance that a person could not be subjected to a sanction – even one at the lower end of the scale of disciplinary penalties – for participation in a demonstration which had not been prohibited, so long as that person had not committed a reprehensible act on such an occasion.   The applicant was subjected to three days’ deprivation of liberty for “obstruction of street traffic” and “making a loud noise”. It was apparent from the police report that the street where the demonstration took place was packed with people and the Government did not dispute that the traffic had been suspended by the traffic police prior to the start of the demonstration. Neither did the authorities make any attempt to disperse the participants on account of unlawful obstruction of traffic. It followed that the “obstruction of street traffic”, of which the applicant was found guilty, amounted to his physical presence at a demonstration held on a street where traffic had already been suspended. As to the “loud noise” he had made, there was no suggestion that it involved any obscenity or incitement to violence. The Court, however, found it hard to imagine a huge political demonstration, at which people expressed their opinion, not generating a certain amount of noise. The Court concluded that the applicant was sanctioned merely for being present and proactive at the demonstration in question.   The Court observed that the very essence of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly was impaired, where a State, while not prohibiting a demonstration, imposed sanctions, especially such severe ones, on those participating who had done nothing reprehensible, as in the applicant’s case.   The Court therefore concluded that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly was not “necessary in a democratic society”, in violation of Article 11.   Article 2 of Protocol No. 7   The Court found that the review procedure prescribed by Article 294 of the CAO did not provide an individual with a clear and accessible right to appeal; it lacked any clearly-defined procedure or time-limits or consistent application in practice. There had therefore been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7.   Other articles   The Court held unanimously that there was no need to examine the applicant’s complaint under Article   10 and his complaint under Article 5 was declared inadmissible.     Judges Fura-Sandström and Zupančič expressed a joint dissenting opinion, which is annexed to the judgment.     ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Press contacts Emma Hellyer (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15) Stéphanie Klein (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Tracey Turner-Tretz (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 88 41 35 30) Paramy Chanthalangsy (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 54 91)   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. [1] Under Article 43 of the Convention, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.