CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 30 avril 2009

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sC7EAD8B { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt }   360 30.4.2009   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT GLOR v. SWITZERLAND   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing its Chamber judgment [1] in the case of Glor v. Switzerland (application no. 13444/04). The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), taken in conjunction with Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), of the European Convention on Human Rights as regards the obligation for the applicant to pay a tax to be exempted from military service on medical grounds, despite having been willing to perform his service.   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicant 3,650 euros (EUR) for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicant, Sven Glor, is a national of the Swiss Confederation who was born in 1978 and lives in Dällikon (canton of Zurich). He is a lorry driver.   On 14 March 1997 he was declared unfit for military service as he was suffering from diabetes (diabetes mellitus type 1). He was subsequently discharged from the Civil Protection Service in 1999.   On 9 August 2001 the applicant received an order to pay the military-service exemption tax (EUR 477), which he challenged.   On 20 September 2001 the Federal Tax Administration recommended that additional examinations be carried out to ascertain whether the applicant was at least 40% disabled, the threshold for a “major disability” as defined in the Federal Court’s case-law and for non-liability to the exemption tax.   On 15 July 2003 the authorities in charge of the exemption tax found on the basis of two expert reports – by a university hospital and an army doctor – that the applicant could not be exempted from the tax as his degree of disability was lower than 40%.   On 9 March 2004 the Federal Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant, who again alleged that he had been subjected to discriminatory treatment by being required to pay the exemption tax, and that he had been prevented from performing his military service despite having always stated his willingness to do so.   The Federal Court noted that, although the applicant’s type of diabetes could not prevent him from carrying on a normal professional activity, the particular demands of military service meant that he had to be declared unfit for that purpose. It held that the authorities had simply applied the provisions in force as appropriate, with the aim of ensuring equality between those who performed their military service and those who were exempted.     2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 22 March 2004.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Nina Vajić (Croatia), President , Anatoly Kovler (Russia), Elisabeth Steiner (Austria), Khanlar Hajiyev (Azerbaijan), Sverre Erik Jebens (Norway), Giorgio Malinverni (Switzerland), George Nicolaou (Cyprus), judges , and also André Wampach , Deputy Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaint   Relying on Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, the applicant complained that he had been discriminated against in that he had been prevented against his will from performing his military service, while being obliged to pay the exemption tax as his disability was not considered a major one by the authorities.   Decision of the Court   Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8   The Court observed that the notion of private life within the meaning of Article 8 included a person’s physical integrity and that a State tax based on unfitness to serve in the armed forces for medical reasons indisputably fell within the ambit of that Article.   The Court considered that the Swiss authorities had treated persons in similar situations differently in two respects: firstly, the applicant was liable to the exemption tax, unlike persons with more severe disabilities, and secondly, he was unable to perform alternative civilian service, which by Swiss law was reserved for conscientious objectors.   The first difference in treatment, according to the Swiss Government, was designed to restore equality between those who performed their military service and those who were exempted, as the tax was a substitute for the efforts of those who performed their service.   The Court was not satisfied that it was in the interests of the community to require the applicant to pay an exemption tax to substitute for the efforts of military service, which he had been prevented from performing on medical grounds, a factual situation outside his control. The Court also pointed out that the deterrent role of the tax was only slight, seeing that the Swiss armed forces had a sufficient number of people available who were fit for military service, and noted that the financial revenues from it were probably not insignificant. It further observed that a tax of this kind did not exist in most other countries.   From the applicant’s point of view, the sum of EUR 477 he was required to pay in respect of the tax in question could not be described as insignificant, particularly as his income was modest and the tax was levied annually throughout the period of compulsory service, amounting to at least eight years.   With regard to the assessment of the applicant’s degree of disability, the Court considered that the Swiss authorities had not taken sufficient account of his personal circumstances. They had relied on the case-law of the Federal Court and on a precedent that scarcely bore comparison – the case of an amputee – in finding that the applicant was less than 40% disabled. The Court further noted that the legislation did not provide for any exemption from the tax in question for those who were below the 40% disability threshold and who had only a modest income.   The Court suggested that people in the applicant’s case might be offered the possibility of alternative forms of service in the armed forces that entailed less physical effort and were compatible with the constraints of a partial disability – in his case, insulin injections four times a day – or of civilian service, without that option being reserved for conscientious objectors alone.   The Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, finding that the applicant had been the victim of discriminatory treatment as there had been no reasonable justification for the distinction made by the Swiss authorities between, in particular, persons who were unfit for service and not liable to the tax in question and those who were unfit for service but were nevertheless obliged to pay the tax.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Press contacts Stefano Piedimonte (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 04) Tracey Turner-Tretz (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 88 41 35 30) Paramy Chanthalangsy (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 88 41 28 30) Kristina Pencheva-Malinowski (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 88 41 35 70) Céline Menu-Lange (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 58 77)   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.   [1] Under Article 43 of the Convention, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.