CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 16 juin 2009

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sC7EAD8B { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt }   469 16.06.2009   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT RUOTSALAINEN v. FINLAND   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing its Chamber judgment [1] in the case of Ruotsalainen v. Finland (application no. 13079/03).   The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No 7 (right not to be tried or punished twice) of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the applicant’s complaint that he was punished twice for the same motor vehicle fuel tax offence.   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicant 1,500   euros   (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR   8,000 for costs and expenses. ( The judgment is available only in English .)   1.     Principal facts   The applicant, Jukka Ruotsalainen, is a Finnish national who was born in 1969 and lives in Lapinlahti (Finland).   Stopped by the police in January 2001 during a road check, Mr   Ruotsalainen was found to be driving with more leniently taxed fuel than the diesel oil his van should have been running on. Summary penal order proceedings were brought against him and he was fined 720   Finnish marks ((FIM); the equivalent of EUR 121) for petty tax fraud. It was also noted that, the applicant having admitted to refuelling the van himself, there had been a notion of intent behind his offence. The applicant did not contest the fine and it therefore became final in March 2001.   Administrative proceedings were also brought against Mr   Ruotsalainen and in September 2001 he was charged the difference in tax. It was found that he had used his van in 2001 with fuel more leniently taxed than diesel oil and that, as he had failed to give the Vehicle Administration or Customs prior notification of that usage, the normal difference in tax charge was trebled to FIM   90,000 (the equivalent of EUR   15,137).   The domestic authorities subsequently rejected both the applicant’s request for a reduction of the tax charge and his appeal to have the decision overturned.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 16 April 2003.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Nicolas Bratza (the United Kingdom), President , Lech Garlicki (Poland), Giovanni Bonello (Malta), Ljiljana Mijović (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Ján Šikuta (Slovakia), Päivi Hirvelä (Finland), Mihai Poalelungi (Moldova), judges , and also Lawrence Early , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaint   Relying on Article 4 of Protocol No 7, the applicant complained that he was punished twice for the same motor vehicle fuel tax offence.   Decision of the Court   The Court reiterated that the aim of Article 4 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 was to prohibit the repetition of criminal proceedings that had been concluded by a final decision.   The Court decided that both sanctions imposed on the applicant had been criminal in nature: the first set of proceedings having been “criminal” according to the Finnish legal classification; and, the subsequent set of proceedings, although classified as part of the fiscal regime and therefore administrative, could not just be considered compensatory given that the difference in tax charge had been trebled as a means to punish and deter re-offending, which were characteristic features of a criminal penalty.   Furthermore, the facts behind both sets of proceedings against the applicant had essentially been the same: they both concerned the use of more leniently taxed fuel than diesel oil. The only difference had been the notion of intent in the first set of proceedings. In sum, the second sanction had arisen from the same facts as the former and there had therefore been a duplication of proceedings. Nor did the second set of proceedings contain any exceptions, such as new evidence or facts or a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings which could affect the outcome of the case, as envisaged by the second paragraph of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. Accordingly, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.     ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Press contacts Stefano Piedimonte (telephone : 00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 04) Tracey Turner-Tretz (telephone : 00 33 (0)3 88 41 35 30) Paramy Chanthalangsy (telephone : 00 33 (0)3 88 41 28 30) Kristina Pencheva-Malinowski (telephone : 00 33 (0)3 88 41 35 70) Céline Menu-Lange (telephone : 00 33 (0)3 90 21 58 77)   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. [1] Under Article 43 of the Convention, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.