CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 6 juillet 2010

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sA678F94A { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right; font-size:11pt } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s598389F8 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:11pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s11AD46B1 { font-family:Arial; font-size:7.33pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sE202B2ED { font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .s1F6AC3E7 { font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic } .sE0D34C67 { font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s2E932ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt } .s99A63BFE { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left; font-size:11pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4BAE41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt } .sBACB3E60 { font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; text-decoration:underline; color:#800080 } .s92A5AB2 { font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .sC7EAD8B { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline } .s7C768949 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0000ff } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9FE28126 { margin-top:0pt; margin-right:42.5pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left; font-size:11pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .sB853CD26 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt } .s52B1583 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .sD66075BF { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic } 543 06.07.2010   Press release issued by the Registrar   Two Chamber judgments Not Final [1] Grönmark v. Finland (application no. 17038/04) Backlund v. Finland (application no. 36498/05)     TIME-LIMIT FOR JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED AUTOMATICALLY   Unanimously in both cases   Violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights     Principal facts   The applicants in both cases are Finnish nationals who were born out of wedlock, Maarit   Grönmark in 1968 and Sven Backlund in 1937. Their requests to have their respective fathers’ paternity established were dismissed by the national courts on the basis of the 1976 Paternity Act, which requires that paternity proceedings concerning a child born before the Act came into force would have had to be started within five years, before October 1981, and that no claim could be examined after the death of the father. Among other things, the applicants were not therefore considered to be their fathers’ legal heirs.   When her father R.J. died in 1999, Maarit Grönmark found out that he had never been legally recognised as her father. Because he had paid child support until she had reached majority, she and her mother had been under the impression that paternity had been established when the courts ordered him to pay. In the civil proceedings which she brought in October 2000 against R.J’s legal heir (her half-sister) to have R.J’s paternity confirmed, the district court ordered DNA tests, which established with 99.8% certainty that R.J was her father. The court stated that the provision in the Paternity Act concerning the death of the father was no longer relevant given the possibility of DNA testing. Nonetheless the court dismissed Ms Grönmark’s claim because she had brought it after the expiry of the time-limit. The Supreme Court eventually upheld that decision in November 2003.   In May 2002, Sven Backlund applied to the district court to establish the paternity of N.S., the man he and his mother had always considered to be his father and who had been placed under guardianship in 2000. DNA tests ordered by the court established with 99.4% certainty that N.S was Mr Backlund’s biological father. In April 2003, the court ruled that Mr   Backlund’s claim was time-barred. He appealed, claiming in particular that a court decision would be the only way to have the paternity of his biological father legally recognised, as, given his state of health, N.S. could no longer make a legally valid acknowledgement of his paternity. The appeal was dismissed and the Supreme Court eventually refused leave to appeal in April 2005.     Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court   Both applicants complained that the time-limit for establishing the paternity of children born before the entry into force of the Paternity Act gave rise to a violation of their rights, in particular under Article 8, as they could not have their fathers’ paternity legally confirmed, despite conclusive DNA tests.   The first application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 13 May 2004, and the second, on 11 October 2005.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Nicolas Bratza (United Kingdom), President, Lech Garlicki (Poland) Giovanni Bonello (Malta), Ljiljana Mijović (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Päivi Hirvelä (Finland), Ledi Bianku (Albania), Nebojša Vučinić (Montenegro), judges, and also Lawrence Early, Section Registrar.     Decision of the Court   The Court first recalled that it had accepted in other cases [2] that the introduction of a time ‑ limit for the institution of paternity proceedings was justified, in that it ensured legal certainty and finality in family relations. It further observed that there was no uniform approach to judicial recognition of paternity in European States, but there was a tendency towards a greater protection of the right of the child to have her or his paternal affiliation established.   While the Finnish Paternity Act adequately secured the interests of people born out of wedlock who had been acknowledged by their fathers, as well as those born after the Act’s entry into force, and those born before who had been able to initiate paternity proceedings within the time-limit, it did not make any allowance for people in the applicants’ situation.   Once Ms Grönmark had become an adult, the limitation period for bringing paternity proceedings had already elapsed. She was thus unable to have the legal status of her biological father established, even though she had not had any realistic opportunity to go to court during the relevant period. The Court could accept that Mr Backlund, as an adult, should have brought those proceedings during the limitation period. However, the Court had difficulties in accepting the inflexible limitation period with time running irrespective of a child’s ability to provide reliable evidence.   Moreover, the Court found it difficult to accept that the national authorities had allowed the legal constraints to override biological facts by relying on the absolute nature of the time-limit even though the applicants had put forward conclusive evidence through DNA tests. In addition, national legislation did not provide any alternative means of redress, as the time ‑ limit could not be restored by seeking extraordinary remedies. Nor had the domestic courts agreed to any exceptions to the application of the time-limit in question except in one exceptional case.   It was clear from the Finnish Supreme Court’s judgment in Ms Grönmark’s case that the general interest and the interests both of R.J. and his family were accorded greater weight than the applicant’s right to have her origins legally confirmed. In Mr Backlund’s case, the domestic courts had not made any attempt to balance the competing interests. The Court considered that such a radical restriction of the right to institute proceedings for the judicial determination of paternity was not proportionate to the aim of ensuring legal certainty. Applying a rigid time-limit for the exercise of paternity proceedings, regardless of the circumstances of an individual case impaired the very essence of the right to respect for one’s private life The Court therefore unanimously held that there had been a violation of Article   8.   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court held that Finland had to pay 6,000 euros respectively to each applicant for non-pecuniary damage.   ***   The judgments are available only in English. This press release is a document produced by the Registry. It does not bind the Court. Decisions, judgments and further information about the Court can be found on its Internet site . To receive the Court’s press releases, you can subscribe to the Court’s RSS feeds .   Press contacts [email protected] / +33 3 90 21 42 08   Nina Salomon (tel: + 33 (0)3 90 21 49 79) or Emma Hellyer (tel: + 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15) Tracey Turner-Tretz (tel: + 33 (0)3 88 41 35 30) Kristina Pencheva-Malinowski (tel: + 33 (0)3 88 41 35 70) Céline Menu-Lange (tel: + 33 (0)3 90 21 58 77) Frédéric Dolt (tel: + 33 (0)3 90 21 53 39)   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. [1] Under Article 43 of the Convention, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. All final judgments   are transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for supervision of their execution. Further information about the execution process can be found here: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution . [2] In particular Mizzi v. Malta (No. 26111/02, 12 January 2006)