CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 25 septembre 2001

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .sEDF00F56 { margin-left:18pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; font-family:serif; list-style-position:inside } .s90404E59 { width:6.48pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s48F8B750 { font-size:8pt; display:none } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sCB27B9E { width:16.66pt; display:inline-block } .sC5412BEF { width:51.05pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 } .s23A41E03 { width:36pt; display:inline-block }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     663   25.9.2001   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF P.G. AND J.H. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM   In a judgment [1] notified in writing in the case of P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom (no. 44787/98), the European Court of Human Rights held:       unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private life) of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the use of a covert listening device at a flat;     unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 8 concerning obtaining   information about the use of a telephone;     unanimously that there had been a violation of Article   8 concerning the use of covert listening devices at a police station;     unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) concerning the non-disclosure of part of a report to the applicants at trial or the hearing of evidence from a police officer in the absence of the applicants or their lawyers;     by six votes to one that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 concerning the use at trial of the materials obtained by the covert listening devices;     unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) concerning the use of covert listening devices.   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded each applicant 1,000 pounds sterling (GBP) for non-pecuniary damage and a total of GBP 12,000 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English)     1.     Principal facts   The applicants are both British nationals.   On 28 February 1995, D.I. Mann received information that an armed robbery of a Securicor cash collection van was going to be committed on or around 2 March 1995 by the first applicant and B. at one of several possible locations. Visual surveillance of B.’s home began the same day. No robbery took place.   By 3 March, however, the police had been informed the robbery was to take place ‘somewhere’ on 9 March 1995. In order to obtain further details, D.I. Mann prepared a report applying for authorisation to install a covert listening device in B.’s flat.   On 4 March 1995, the Chief Constable gave oral authorisation and a listening device was installed in a sofa in B.’s flat the same day; the Deputy Chief Constable gave retrospective written authorisation on 8 March 1995. On 14 March 1995, the police requested itemised billing for calls from the telephone in B.’s flat. On 15 March 1995, B. and others who were with him in his home discovered the listening device and abandoned the premises. The robbery did not take place.   The applicants were arrested on 16 March 1995 in a stolen car containing two black balaclavas, five black plastic cable ties, two pairs of leather gloves, and two army kitbags.   As they wished to obtain speech samples to compare with the tapes, the police applied for authorisation to use covert listening devices in the applicants’ cells and to attach listening devices to the police officers who were to be present when the applicants were charged. Written authorisation was given by the Chief Constable and samples of the applicants’ speech were recorded without their knowledge or permission. An expert concluded it was ‘likely’ the first applicant’s voice featured on the taped recordings and ‘very likely’ the second applicant’s voice featured on them.   B. and the applicants were charged with conspiracy to rob. During their trial, evidence derived from the use of the covert listening devices was deemed admissible and some documents, including parts of D.I. Mann’s report, were withheld from the applicants and their lawyers. Oral evidence was also taken from D.I. Mann in the absence of the applicants or their lawyers. The applicants were convicted on 9 August 1996 of conspiracy to rob and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Their application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal was rejected.     2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 7 May 1997. The case was transmitted to the European Court of Human Rights on 1 November 1998 and declared admissible on 24 October 2000.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Jean-Paul Costa (French), President , Willi Fuhrmann (Austrian), Pranas Kūris (Lithuanian), Françoise Tulkens (Belgian), Karel Jungwiert (Czech), Nicolas Bratza (British), Kristaq Traja (Albanian), judges , [Note1]   and also Sally Dollé , Section Registrar .   Judge Tulkens expressed a dissenting opinion, which is annexed to the judgment. 3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   The applicants complained, relying on Article 8, about the use of covert listening devices to monitor and record their conversations at B’s flat, the monitoring of calls from B’s telephone and the use of listening devices to obtain voice samples while they were at the police station.   Relying on Article 6 § 1, they complained that part of the evidence relating to the authorisation of a listening device was not disclosed to the defence during the trial, that part of the police officer’s oral evidence was heard by the judge alone and that information obtained from the listening device at B’s flat and the voice samples were used in evidence at their trial.   They also relied on Article 13.     Decision of the Court   Article 8   Use of a covert listening device at B.’s flat Noting that the UK Government had conceded that the police surveillance of B’s flat was not in accordance with the law existing at the time in question, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8.   Obtaining information about the use of B.’s telephone Observing that the information about the use of B.’s telephone was obtained and used in the context of an investigation and trial concerning a suspected conspiracy to commit armed robberies, the Court found that the measure was necessary in a democratic society.   There had therefore been no violation of Article 8.   Use of covert listening devices at the police station Noting that, at the relevant time, there existed no statutory system to regulate the use of covert listening devices by the police on their own premises, the Court found the interference with the applicants’ right to a private life was not in accordance with the law. There had therefore been a violation of Article 8.   Article 6 § 1   Non-disclosure of evidence during the trial The Court was satisfied that the defence were kept informed and permitted to make submissions and participate in the decision-making process as far as was possible without revealing to them the material which the prosecution sought to keep secret on public interest grounds. The questions which the defence counsel had wished to put to the witness D.I. Mann were asked by the judge in chambers. The Court also noted that the material which was not disclosed in the present case formed no part of the prosecution case whatever, and was never put to the jury. The fact that the need for disclosure was at all times under assessment by the trial judge provided a further, important safeguard in that it was his duty to monitor throughout the trial the fairness or otherwise of the evidence being withheld. In conclusion, therefore, the Court found that, as far as possible, the decision-making procedure complied with the requirements of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and incorporated adequate safeguards to protect the interests of the accused. It followed that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1.   Use of taped evidence obtained by covert surveillance devices The Court observed that the taped evidence at the trial was not the only evidence against the applicants. Furthermore, they had had ample opportunity to challenge both the authenticity and the use of the recordings. It was also clear that, had the domestic courts been of the view that the admission of the evidence would have given rise to substantive unfairness, they would have had a discretion to exclude it. The Court further considered that there was no unfairness in leaving it to the jury, on the basis of a thorough summing-up by the judge, to decide where the weight of the evidence lay.   Insofar as the applicants complained that the way in which the voice samples were obtained infringed their right not to incriminate themselves, the Court considered that the voice samples, which did not include any incriminating statements, might be regarded as akin to blood, hair or other physical or objective specimens used in forensic analysis, to which the right did not apply. There had therefore been no violation of Article 6 § 1.   Article 13   The Court observed that the domestic courts were not capable of providing a remedy because it was not open to them either to deal with the complaint that the interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private lives was not in accordance with the law or to grant appropriate relief in connection with the complaint.   The Court further found that the system of investigation of complaints did not meet the standards of independence necessary to constitute sufficient protection against the abuse of authority and to provide an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13. There had therefore been a violation of Article 13.   *** The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: (0)3 90 21 42 15) Fax: (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17-member Grand Chamber of the Court.   In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.   [2] .     This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. [Note1]   Titles to be added in appropriate place. Line returns – and not paragraph returns – should be used (Shift+Enter).