CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 16 octobre 2001

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .sEDF00F56 { margin-left:18pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; font-family:serif; list-style-position:inside } .s90404E59 { width:6.48pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s127C7598 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s75AF5381 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; display:none } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sD227234A { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify } .sF741ECC3 { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify } .sF7195C3B { width:12.45pt; display:inline-block } .s1C40E3A1 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify } .s1B6AF0FA { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sCB27B9E { width:16.66pt; display:inline-block } .sC5412BEF { width:51.05pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     739   16.10.2001 Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENTS IN THE CASES OF O'HARA v. THE UNITED KINGDOM & BRENNAN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM     The European Court of Human Rights has notified today in writing judgments [1] in the cases of O’Hara v. the United Kingdom (application no. 37555/97) and Brennan v. the United Kingdom (no. 39846/98).   In O’Hara v. the United Kingdom, the Court held:     By six votes to one, that there had been no violation of Article 5 § 1 (right to liberty and security) of the European Convention on Human Rights, concerning whether the applicant had been arrested on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence;     Unanimously, that there had been no violation of Article 5 § 5 (right to compensation), in relation to the complaint raised under Article 5 §   1;     Unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 5 § 3 (right to be brought promptly before a judge);     Unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 5 , in relation to the complaint raised under Article 5 § 3.   In Brennan v. the United Kingdom, the Court held, unanimously, that there had been:     no violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) and Article 6 §   3(c) in respect of the deferral of access to the applicant’s solicitor;     no violation of Article   6 § 1 and Article 6 §   3(c) in respect of the police interviews;     a violation of Article 6 § 3(c) in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 in respect of the presence of police officer within hearing during the applicant’s first consultation with his solicitor after his arrest.   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court held, unanimously, that these findings of violations constituted in themselves sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants and awarded Mr O’Hara 11,000 pounds sterling (GBP) and Mr Brennan GBP 6,920 for costs and expenses. (Both judgments are available only in English.)          O’HARA v.   THE UNITED KINGDOM   1.     Principal facts   Gerard O'Hara, an Irish national and prominent member of Sinn Fein, was arrested in 1985, under the 1984 Prevention of Terrorism Act (the 1984 Act) , by Detective Constable S. on suspicion of having committed a terrorist offence, namely the murder of Kurt Konig. He was held in Castlereagh Detention Centre, a holding centre for terrorist investigations in Belfast, for six days and 13 hours, where he was questioned by the police without making any reply. He was subsequently released.   He challenged the lawfulness of his arrest in domestic proceedings, where the courts rejected his complaints.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 20 May 1997 and transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998. It was declared partly admissible on 14 March 2000. The admissibility decision is available on the Court’s Internet site.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Jean-Paul Costa (French), President , Loukis Loucaides (Cypriot), Pranas Kūris (Lithuanian), Françoise Tulkens (Belgian), Karel Jungwiert (Czech), Nicolas Bratza (British), Hanne Sophie Greve (Norwegian), judges , and also Sally Dollé , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   Mr O’Hara alleged he was not arrested on reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence, that he was not brought promptly before a judge or other judicial officer and that he did not have an enforceable right to compensation in respect of these matters. He relied on Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 5.   Decision of the Court   Article 5 § 1 The Court noted that evidence was given by the arresting officer, Detective Constable S., concerning the circumstances of the arrest and the applicant was given the opportunity to cross-examine, which must be regarded per se as providing a significant safeguard against arbitrary arrest. Regarding the basis for the applicant’s arrest, Detective Constable S. gave evidence that he had been given information by a superior officer, at a briefing prior to the arrest, that the applicant was suspected of involvement in the murder of Mr Konig. No further questions were asked by the applicant’s counsel as to what information passed at the briefing. Nor were any steps taken to have other officers involved in the arrest and detention, such as the briefing officer, called to give evidence. Furthermore, the applicant did not make any requests for discovery in relation to the existing documentary evidence concerning the arrest.   The Court recalled that no challenge was made in the domestic proceedings by the applicant as to the good faith of any of the officers involved in the arrest or detention. It was never suggested, for example, that the arrest had been motivated by malice or was an arbitrary abuse of power.   The Court did not find that the approach of the domestic courts to the standard of suspicion in this case removed the accountability of the police for arbitrary arrest or conferred on the police any impunity with regard to arrests conducted on the basis of confidential information. In the circumstances, the suspicion against the applicant reached the required level as it was based on specific information that he was involved in the murder of Mr Konig and the purpose of the deprivation of liberty was to confirm or dispel that suspicion. The applicant could accordingly be said to have been arrested and detained on “reasonable suspicion” of having committed a criminal offence. There had, therefore, been no violation of Article 5 § 1(c).   Article 5 § 3 The Court noted that the Government had not disputed that the applicant was held for six days and thirteen hours before his eventual release and that this was not in compliance with requirement to bring an arrested person promptly before an appropriate judicial officer. Noting that it had already found that detention periods exceeding four days for terrorist suspects were not compatible with the requirement of prompt judicial control, the Court found a violation of Article 5 § 3.   Article 5 § 5 As the Court found no violation of Article 5 § 1   - concerning the existence of reasonable grounds of suspicion to justify the applicant’s arrest - no issue arose under Article 5 § 5 concerning this complaint.   Concerning its finding of a breach of Article 5 § 3, the Court observed that it was not disputed that, as this detention was in accordance with domestic law, no enforceable right to compensation existed. In this regard, therefore, there had been a breach of Article 5 § 5.     Judge Loucaides expressed a partly-dissenting opinion, which is annexed to the judgment.     ***           BRENNAN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM   1.     Principal facts   Thomas Brennan, an Irish national, was arrested on 21 October 1990, under the 1984 Act, in relation to the murder of a former member of the Ulster Defence Regiment. He was held in Castlereagh Detention Centre from 21 to 25 October and saw his solicitor for the first time on 23 October, during which meeting a police officer was present. The applicant was ultimately found guilty of murder.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 27 January 1998 and transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998. It was declared admissible on 9 January 2001. The admissibility decision is available on the Court’s Internet site.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Jean-Paul Costa (French), President , Willi Fuhrmann (Austrian), Loukis Loucaides (Cypriot), Nicolas Bratza (British), Hanne Sophie Greve (Norwegian), Kristaq Traja (Albanian), Mindia Ugrekhelidze (Georgian), judges , and also Sally Dollé , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [3]   Complaints   Mr Brennan complained of the circumstances in which he was questioned by the police after his arrest, alleging, among other things, that he had been denied the right to consult his solicitor during the initial period in police custody, that he made admissions prior to receiving any legal advice, that he was not permitted to have his solicitor present during police interviews or in private and that he was, as a result, deprived of a fair trial due to the reliance on his admissions to convict him. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(c).   Decision of the Court   Article 6   Deferral of access to the applicant’s solicitor The Court noted that the applicant was denied access to his solicitor for 24 hours. The fact that the solicitor did not arrive to see his client until a day later was not attributable to any measure imposed by the authorities. Furthermore, while the applicant was interviewed by the police during the 24 hour deferral period, he made no incriminating admissions. The first admissions made by him occurred during the interview on the afternoon of 22 October 1990, when he was no longer being denied access to a solicitor. Nor was it the case that any inferences were drawn from any statements or omissions made by the applicant during the first 24 hour period. The Court accordingly found no violation the applicant’s rights under Article 6 §§ 1 or 3(c) in this regard.   The police interviews The Court noted that the circumstances in which the confession evidence was obtained were subjected to strict scrutiny. The applicant was represented both at his trial and on appeal by experienced counsel. The trial judge heard the applicant in person as well as the police officers who had questioned him. The trial judge, whose findings were upheld by the Court of Appeal, was satisfied as to the reliability and fairness of admitting the evidence. The Court also noted that the applicant did not complain that the decision of either court was in any way arbitrary, or that there was an inadequate inquiry into the circumstances in which the confession evidence had been obtained such that neither court could have reached a properly informed assessment as to its reliability or fairness.   The Court considered that the adversarial procedure conducted before the trial court at which evidence was heard from the applicant, psychological experts, the various police officers involved in the interrogations and the police doctors who examined him during his detention, was capable of bringing to light any oppressive conduct by the police. In the circumstances, the lack of additional safeguards against possible police misconduct (ie. video or audio recordings of the interviews) had not been shown to render the applicant’s trial unfair. The Court concluded, therefore, that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 or Article 6 § 3 (c) regarding the police interviews.   Presence of a police officer during the applicant’s consultation with his solicitor     The Court concluded that the presence of the police officer would have inevitably prevented the applicant from speaking frankly to his solicitor and given him reason to hesitate before broaching questions of potential significance to the case against him. Both the applicant and the solicitor had been warned that no names should be mentioned and that the interview would be stopped if anything were said which was perceived as hindering the investigation. It was immaterial that it was not shown that there were particular matters which the applicant and his solicitor were thereby stopped from discussing. The ability of an accused to communicate freely with his defence lawyer was subject to express limitation. The applicant had already made admissions before the consultation, and made admissions afterwards. It was indisputable that he was in need at that time of legal advice, and that his responses in subsequent interviews, which were to be carried out in the absence of his solicitor, would continue to be of potential relevance to his trial and could irretrievably prejudice his defence. The Court found, therefore, that the presence of the police officer within hearing during the applicant’s first consultation with his solicitor infringed his right to an effective exercise of his defence rights and that there had been, in that respect, a violation of Article 6 § 3(c) read in conjunction with Article 6 § 1.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: (0)3 90 21 42 15) Fax: (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17-member Grand Chamber of the Court.   In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] .     This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. [3] .     This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.