CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 21 mai 2002

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s6DC52DAD { width:93.46pt; display:inline-block } .s913F377E { width:252.91pt; display:inline-block } .s26696003 { width:136.79pt; display:inline-block } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .sCD53468E { width:46.82pt; display:inline-block } .s672BE378 { width:310.89pt; display:inline-block } .sB79B62EA { width:60.85pt; display:inline-block } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s37CDBE05 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sCB27B9E { width:16.66pt; display:inline-block } .sC5412BEF { width:51.05pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     271   21.5.2002   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENTS CONCERNING Finland, France, Romania and the United Kingdom   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing the following six Chamber judgments of which only Downie v. the United Kingdom is final [1] :   SECTION 2   (1)     Vasiliu v. Romania (application no. 29407/95) (2)     Hodoş and others v. Romania (no. 29968/96) (3)     Surpaceanu v. Romania (no. 32260/96)   Violation Article 6 § 1   Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1   Vasiliu v. Romania – Maria Vasiliu is a Romanian national who was born in 1919 and lives in Bucharest. In September 1993, as her father’s heir, she brought proceedings in the Bucharest Court of First Instance to establish her title to a property which had belonged to him. She asserted that, because her father had been a civil servant, under the terms of Decree no. 92/1950 his property should not have been nationalised. By a judgment which subsequently became final, the Court of First Instance gave judgment in the applicant’s favour and ordered the property in question to be returned to her. On appeal by Principal State Counsel, the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the judgment of the Court of First Instance and dismissed the application for confirmation of title on the ground that the courts did not have jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of Decree no. 92/1950. The State then sold part of the property to third parties.   Hodoş and Others v. Romania – The applicants are Romanian nationals living in Bucharest. In May 1990, as their father’s heirs, they brought proceedings in the Bucharest Court of First Instance to establish their title to a property which had belonged to him. They asserted that, because their father had been a civil servant, under the terms of Decree no. 92/1950 his house should not have been nationalised. The Court of First Instance held, in a judgment which subsequently became final, that the applicants were the rightful owners of the property concerned. On appeal by Principal State Counsel, the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the judgment establishing their title to the property on the ground that the court below had exceeded its powers, and dismissed a plea of unconstitutionality by the applicants. The State then sold the property. Surpaceanu v. Romania – The applicants, Constantin Surpaceanu and Train-Victor Surpaceanu (the latter pursuing an application originally lodged by his mother, now deceased) are two Swedish nationals resident in Malmö. A property in Romania belonging to them was confiscated after they emigrated to Sweden. They brought proceedings in the Bucharest Court of First Instance to establish their title to the property. The Court of First Instance declared the confiscation decisions null and void. In a judgment which subsequently became final, the Provincial Court upheld the judgment of the Court of First Instance and the applicants took possession of the house in February 1994. On appeal by Principal State Counsel, the Supreme Court of Justice, in a judgment of February 1996, quashed the judgment of the court below and dismissed the application for confirmation of title. In the end, Bucharest City Council returned the property to the applicants in March 2001 by an administrative decision.   In these three cases the applicants complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right of access to a court), of the Supreme Court of Justice’s refusal to recognise the courts’ jurisdiction to determine disputes over property ownership. They further relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property), complaining that as the judgments of the Supreme Court of Justice had quashed judgments that had become final their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions had been infringed. In the Hodoş and Others case the applicants further complained under Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the Supreme Court of Justice’s refusal to stay the proceedings in order to refer to the Constitutional Court the plea of unconstitutionality they had entered.   Pointing out that setting aside a final judgment is contrary to the principle of the certainty of legal relations, the Court held that by applying the provisions on applications to set aside in such a way the Supreme Court of Justice had infringed the applicants’ right to a fair hearing. It further held that the Supreme Court’s ruling that the courts did not have jurisdiction to hear applications to establish title was in itself contrary to the right of access to a court. Consequently, the Court held unanimously that in these three cases there had been violations of Article 6 § 1 on account of the lack of a fair hearing and denial of the right of access to a court.   As regards the complaints concerning interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, the Court observed that in each case the applicants’ title to the property in issue had been established by final judgments making such title irrevocable. It accordingly held that the applicants had had possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The effect of the judgments by which the Supreme Court of Justice had set aside the final judgments and declared the State the rightful owner of the property in issue had been to deprive the applicants of their possessions. The Court noted that the applicants had been deprived of their property for more than fifty years in the Vasiliu and Hodoş cases and more than five years in the Surpaceanu case. In those circumstances, even supposing that the deprivation of possessions could be shown to have served some public interest, the Court considered that the fair balance to be maintained between the requirements of the general interest of the community and those of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights had been upset, and that the applicants had borne and continued to bear an individual and excessive burden. It accordingly held unanimously that in these three cases there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It further held that it was not necessary to examine the subsidiary complaints in the Hodoş case.   The Court held that, failing restitution to Mrs Vasiliu within three months from the date on which the judgment became final of the price she paid in 1974 for the flat she occupies and the remainder of the building, Romania was to pay her the sum of 186,000 euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage and EUR 19,000 for non-pecuniary damage.   In the Hodoş case the Court held that, failing restitution of their property to the applicants within three months of the date when the judgment became final, Romania was to pay them jointly the sum of EUR 195,000 for pecuniary damage and EUR 19,500 for non-pecuniary damage.   Lastly, in the Surpaceanu case, the Court awarded the applicants the sum of EUR 8,000 for pecuniary damage. (These judgments are available only in French.)   (4)     Peltier v. France (no. 32872/96)   Violation Article 6 § 1 Jean Peltier, a French national resident in Verrières-le-Buisson, was fined in October 1995 for breaking a speed limit. He asked to be permitted not to pay the fine on the ground that he had not committed the offence. That request was refused by the Rheims public prosecutor’s office and the amount of the fine was increased to cover the costs of enforcing payment. A further complaint by Mr Peltier, accompanied by a request to appear before a court, was likewise refused and he was informed that three points were to be deducted from his licence. On an application to set aside, the Versailles Administrative Court quashed the decision to deduct points from the applicant’s licence on the ground that it had not been established that the offence had been committed. In the meantime, the applicant had paid the fine.   Relying on Article 6 § 1, the applicant complained of an infringement of his right of access to a court and of the fact that he had been unable to contest the charge of exceeding the speed limit. Relying on Article 6 § 2, he further complained of an infringement of the principle of the presumption of innocence.   With regard to the complaint concerning the impossibility of contesting the speeding charge in a court of law, the Court noted that the respondent Government themselves accepted that the applicant’s complaint had been declared inadmissible on a ground not provided for in the relevant legislation and that the decision in question had been the result of a misapplication of the law by an official of the public prosecutor’s office, whose decisions had thus prevented the applicant from bringing his case before the competent court and had unlawfully deprived him of judicial scrutiny to determine in fact and in law whether he had actually committed the offence for which he was fined. That had resulted in an excessive restriction of his right of access to a court. As regards the alleged violation of Article 6 § 2, the Court held that no separate issue arose in that respect.   The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 and that the finding of a violation in itself constituted sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant. It awarded him EUR 381.12 for pecuniary damage and EUR 3,500 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)   SECTION 4   (5)     Jokela v. Finland (no. 28856/95)   Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1     No violation Article 6 § 1 The applicants Barbro, Heidi, Jussi and Petri Jokela are the wife and children of Timo Jokela who died on 19 September 1992.   In June 1990 Turku District Road Authority requested the expropriation of about half of Timo Jokela’s land and property - covering 1.53 hectares in the centre of the municipality of Nakkila - in order to build an overpass. He was initially compensated for the removal of buildings, equipment and vegetation but not for the land itself. After Timo Jokela’s death, the price per square metre was eventually fixed at 7,50 Finnish marks (FIM). The applicants appealed unsuccessfully to the Land Court against this decision, submitting written evidence indicating the current value to be between FIM 20 and FIM 114. On 27 May 1993, inheritance tax on Timo Jokela’s land - a tax which is based on the market value of the land or property at the time of the owner’s death - was fixed at approximately FIM 20 per square metre.   The applicants claimed that their property rights had been violated, given the discrepancy between the assessment of the market value of expropriated land and land subject to inheritance tax. They also complained that they were denied a fair hearing in the expropriation proceedings because the Land Court did not provide adequate reasons for dismissing their appeal and because two witnesses were not examined before the Land Court.   The Court considered that the applicants could legitimately expect a reasonably consistent approach from the relevant authorities and the courts in determining the market value of the land or, in the absence of such consistency, an adequate explanation for the different valuations. However, there was neither consistency nor an explanation for the lack of consistency. The outcome of the various proceedings was therefore incompatible with the applicants’ general right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. Accordingly, the Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   Concerning the complaints raised under Article 6 § 1, the Court noted that the applicants were legally represented throughout the expropriation proceedings and had ample opportunity to request that the two witnesses be examined before the Land Court. The Court did not find it established that the applicants’ counsel made such a request in an unambiguous and unconditional manner calling for a reasoned decision by the Land Court, had it chosen to refuse it. Neither did the Court find an arbitrary failure to consider the applicants’ arguments regarding the criteria to be applied when fixing the market value of the expropriated land. The Court therefore concluded that the requirement under Article 6 § 1 that a court must provide sufficient reasons for its decision was satisfied. The Court held, unanimously, that Article 6 § 1 had not been violated in either respect.   The Court awarded each applicant EUR 1,600 for pecuniary damage, EUR 1,300 for non-pecuniary damage and jointly to all applicants EUR 11,000 for legal costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)   (6)     Downie v. the United Kingdom (no. 40161/98)   Friendly settlement The applicant, Nicholas Downie, a British national, married in 1978 and had three daughters, born in 1980, 1981 and 1986. His wife died in 1993, leaving him as the administrator of her estate.   The applicant’s wife was employed as a private caterer for at least three years and, while working, contributed to the joint income of the marriage. She paid social security contributions as an employed earner until her death. The applicant, a solicitor, continues in full-time work and has to meet the expense of childcare from the existing family income.   In July 1997 the applicant applied for social security benefits equivalent to those to which a widow   - whose husband had died in similar circumstances to his wife - would have been entitled, namely a Widow’s Payment and a Widowed Mother’s Allowance, payable under the Social Security and Benefits Act 1992. He was informed that his claim was invalid because the regulations governing the payment of widows’ benefits were specific to women.   When he lodged his application, the applicant received weekly Child Benefit payments at the Lone Parent rate. His income precluded him from qualifying for means-tested benefits such as Income Support or Family Credit. A widow in a similar situation could have claimed Widow’s Payment and Widowed Mother’s Allowance, which were payable regardless of income and savings. If the applicant had been entitled to receive those social security benefits, he calculated that he would have been around GBP 80 per week better off. He would also have received a one-off Widow’s Payment of GBP 1,000.   On 9 April 2001 the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 came into force, making bereavement benefits available to both men and women.   The applicant complained that British social security and tax legislation discriminated against him on grounds of sex, in breach of Article   14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention, taken in conjunction with both Article 8 (right to respect for family life) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property).   The case has been struck out following a friendly settlement in which 21,084.22 pounds sterling is to be paid for any non-pecuniary and pecuniary, costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: (0)3 90 21 42 15) Fax: (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17-member Grand Chamber of the Court.   In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.