CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 26 septembre 2002

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s2AF5138B { width:114.14pt; display:inline-block } .s18645E97 { width:16.56pt; display:inline-block } .s23A41E03 { width:36pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s3964C3A3 { width:1.36pt; display:inline-block } .s901C2590 { width:56.7pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     455   26.9.2002   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENTS CONCERNING Belgium, Greece and the United Kingdom   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing the following three Chamber judgments, none of which is final [1] .   Section 1   (1)   Grisez v. Belgium (no. 35776/97)   No violation Article 5 § 3   The applicant, Gilbert Grisez, is a Belgian national. He was born in 1955 and is currently being held at Forest Prison (Belgium).   On 16 July 1995 the body of the applicant’s wife, Mrs Francine Rossel, was found in the Charleroi-Brussels Canal. The applicant was suspected of being one of the murderers and was arrested the same day. On 21 September 1995 a medical report was issued in which he was diagnosed as suffering from, among other things, paranoia and a psychopathic disorder, making him a danger to both himself and society. After receiving social-enquiry reports on the applicant, the investigating judge made an order on 5 March 1996 for the prosecution to proceed.   In March 1996 the public prosecutor requested medical and psychiatric reports concerning the deceased in order to verify allegations by the applicant that his wife had been depressive and had displayed suicidal tendencies. A provisional medical report was filed with the court in September 1996. The judge continued the investigation and took evidence from witnesses. On 19 December 1996 he made a further order for the prosecution to proceed.   The indictment division dismissed a bail application by the applicant noting, among other things, that there was a strong case against him and that he was suffering from a personality disorder.   On 4 November 1997 the applicant was convicted by the Assize Court and sentenced to thirty-years’ imprisonment.   Relying on Article 5 § 3 (right to liberty and security) of the Convention, the applicant complained of the length of time he had spent in detention pending trial (two years, three months and nineteen days).   The Court noted that the reasons given by the domestic courts for remanding the applicant in custody were the strength of the case against him and the fact that he had been diagnosed in the psychiatric report as suffering from a serious psychopathic disorder that made him dangerous.   The Court found that, although the medical examinations had caused delays in the proceedings, other steps had been taken in the investigation during that period. Furthermore, the total length of the detention pending trial did not appear unreasonable in view of the seriousness of the charges and the number of matters requiring investigation.   Consequently, the Court held by four votes to three that there had been no violation of Article   5 § 3. (The judgment is in French only.)   (2)   Vasilopoulou v. Greece (no. 47541/99)             Just satisfaction Margarita Vasilopoulou, a Greek national complained, relying on Articles 6 § 1, 13 (right to an effective remedy), 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property), about the refusal by the Greek administration to comply with a decision of the Court of Audit granting her a supplementary widow’s pension.   In its principal judgment of 21 March 2002 the Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and no violation of Article 14. It also held unanimously that it was unnecessary to rule on the complaint based on Article 13 and that the question of the application of Article 41 (just satisfaction) was not ready for decision.   In today’s judgment, the Court awarded the applicant, unanimously, EUR 7,161 for pecuniary damage and EUR 2,935 for non-pecuniary damage. (The judgment is available only in English.)   Section 4   (3)   Benjamin and Wilson v. the United Kingdom (no. 28212/95)      Violation of Article 5 § 4 Patrick Benjamin and Hueth Wilson, both British nationals, were detained in hospital after being sentenced to terms of discretionary life imprisonment. They complained that they did not have access to a procedure by which they could challenge the lawfulness of their continued detention.   Mr Benjamin was sentenced to life imprisonment for rape in 1983. His tariff period (the minimum period of detention satisfying the requirements of retribution and deterrence) was set at six years and expired in April 1989.   While in prison, Mr Benjamin suffered delusions and had behavioural problems and, in August 1989, was transferred to Broadmoor Special Hospital. In October 1993 he was made a “technical lifer” (a person suffering from a mental disorder which influenced him to a significant extent at the time of the offence although the court had not made a hospital order on sentencing).   Mr Wilson was sentenced to life imprisonment for buggery of a young girl in 1977. Psychiatric experts gave evidence during his trial that he suffered from a mental illness and should be made subject to a hospital order coupled with a restriction order with no time limit. No beds in hospitals providing the required level of security being available, the judge passed, instead, a discretionary life sentence, adding that Mr Wilson could later be transferred to hospital if necessary. His tariff period was set at eight years and expired in 1984.   From August 1977 onwards Mr Wilson was transferred several times between hospital and prison and, in October 1992 he was transferred to Rampton Special Hospital. In June 1993 he was made a technical lifer.   The Secretary of State refused to certify the applicants as eligible for review by the discretionary lifer panels empowered by section 34 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 to order their release on licence. Leave to apply for judicial review of the decisions was granted on 17 May 1993. On 22 October 1993 the High Court, granting the application, made a declaration that the Secretary of State’s policy not to certify discretionary life prisoners under paragraph 9 of Schedule 12 to the Criminal Justice Act 1991 on the ground that they had been transferred to hospital under the 1983 Act was unlawful. On appeal, on 19 July 1994, the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court’s decision in part.   It considered that, although the applicants were existing life prisoners within the meaning of the paragraph 9 of Schedule   12, their discharge nevertheless remained subject to the procedure laid down in section 50 of the 1983 Act. The rights to a hearing under the 1991 Act were conferred only on persons who were solely subject to that Act, and not on those who were mental patients.   The applicants were refused leave to appeal.   On 1 July 1996, Mr Benjamin’s case for discharge was considered and rejected by the Mental Health Review (MHR) Tribunal. On 9 January 2001, following a recommendation by the MHR Tribunal, he was discharged by the Secretary of State. On 6 July 1996 the MHR Tribunal rejected Mr Wilson’s case for discharge and again on 13 June 2000.   The Court observed that, although the applicants had the possibility of having their continued detention reviewed by the MHR Tribunal, it did not have the power to order release, which lay with the Secretary of State. The ability of an applicant to challenge a refusal by the Secretary of State to follow his previous policy in the courts would not remedy the tribunal’s lack of decision-making powers. Also, the decision to release would be taken by a member of the executive and not by the tribunal.   This was not a matter of form, but an issue which impinged on the fundamental principle of separation of powers and detracted from a necessary guarantee against possible abuse. The Court therefore held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 5 § 4 (right to have lawfulness of detention decided speedily by a court). (The judgment is available only in English.)   ***   These summaries by the Registry do not bind the Court. The full texts of the Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: (0)3 90 21 42 15) Fax: (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] .     Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.