CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 17 octobre 2002

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sDD8B7D40 { width:92.77pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s331C3E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:6pt } .s7E99EE1A { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:12pt } .s6F57788 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt } .s47E2B0C6 { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sDB00410C { width:132.14pt; display:inline-block } .s9B09180 { width:195.51pt; display:inline-block } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .sB932CAE9 { width:10.56pt; display:inline-block } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s75E6A93A { width:13.33pt; display:inline-block } .s901C2590 { width:56.7pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     506   17.10.2002   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENTS CONCERNING Turkey, Austria, France and Italy   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing the following four Chamber judgments, of which only the friendly-settlement judgment is final: [1]   Section 1   (1)     N.Ö. v. Turkey (application no. 33234/96)     Friendly settlement The applicant, a Turkish national, was born in 1960 and lives in Altınakar, Diyarbakır, Turkey.   She claims that on 21 June 1993 gendarmes searched her home in the hamlet of Dikmetaş (“ Kırkat ” in Kurdish) in Ortaşar (Çınar). She alleges that both she and her children were mistreated and that her husband, M.S.Ö., was taken away in a jeep by gendarmes who had arrived by helicopter. He was taken to a wooded area outside the village, stripped naked and strung up by his arms using the form of torture known as Palestinian hanging. The gendarmes fastened a rope to his genitals and pulled on it. Electric shocks were administered to his body and he was tortured until 5 p.m. He was then taken to Çınar Gendarmerie.   According to the Government, on 21 June 1993 the security forces from Diyarbakır Gendarmerie carried out an operation in Dikmetaş. M.S.Ö. was arrested while trying to flee and had to be forcibly apprehended using a rifle butt. After his arrest he made a statement concerning the discovery of a shelter, a gun and ammunition.   On 22 June 1993 M.S.Ö. was taken to the emergency unit of Diyarbakır State Hospital. A medical report dated 22 June 1993 referred to bruising on his body. He was released from the hospital and taken to Diyarbakır Gendarmerie Headquarters, where questioning continued under medical control. His health deteriorated and he had to be transferred back to the hospital. A report drawn up on 5 July 1993 indicated that he could not speak and that he had traces of blood around his mouth. He died the same day.   An autopsy revealed, among other injuries, fractures with bruising on three of M.S.Ö.’s ribs, bruises on his arms and buttocks as well as slight bruising and lesions to his right foot and blood in his mouth. An examination of his skull and brain revealed internal bleeding. In a report dated 17 September 1993, the Forensic Medicine Institute stated that M.S.Ö. had died from a brain haemorrhage resulting from a blow to the head.   On 22 July 1993 the case was referred to Diyarbakır public prosecutor, who charged the two gendarmes who had taken M.S.Ö. into custody with having caused the death of a third person through professional negligence. In application of Article 96 of the Penal Code which provides that “the death of a suspect brings an investigation to an end”, however, the public prosecutor, on 6 April 1994, issued a decision not to bring charges against the two gendarmes, as they had since died. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully.   The applicant complained under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights that her husband, M.S.Ö., had died after being tortured by members of the security forces.   The case has been struck out following a friendly settlement in which 100,000 euros (EUR) is to be paid to the applicant for any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, costs and expenses. Turkey has, moreover, made the following declaration:   “The Government regret the occurrence of individual cases of death resulting from the use of force inflicted in contravention of Article 2 of the Convention as in the circumstances of M.S.Ö.’s death notwithstanding existing Turkish legislation and the resolve of the Government to prevent such actions. It is accepted that the use of such force and/or the failure to protect the lives of the detainees resulting in death such as in the instant case constituted a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. The Government undertake to issue appropriate instructions and adopt all necessary measures to ensure that the right to life - including the obligation to carry out effective investigations - is respected in the future. It is noted in this connection that new legal and administrative measures have been adopted which have resulted in a reduction in the occurrence of deaths in circumstances similar to those of the instant application as well as more effective investigations. “...The Government consider that the supervision by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of the execution of Court judgments concerning Turkey in this and similar cases is an appropriate mechanism for ensuring that improvements will continue to be made in this context. To this end, necessary co-operation in this process will continue to take place.” (The judgment is available only in English.)     (2)     Vostic v. Austria (no. 38549/97)   Violation Article 6 § 2 Snjezana Vostic, an Austrian national, was born in 1966 and lives in Austria.   On 12 April Wels 1996 Regional Court ( Landesgericht ) remanded her in custody on suspicion of murder. Her repeated requests for release were unsuccessful. On 13 December 1996, she was acquitted by six votes to two. In the record of its deliberations, the jury explained: “The evidence produced at the trial is not sufficient to convict the accused. As the incriminating witnesses were partly not credible – acquittal in dubio ”. The applicant was released.   The applicant requested compensation for her detention on remand, but Wels Regional Court, with the same composition as above, dismissed her claim. It found that, apart from the fact that the jury’s verdict had not been unanimous, the suspicion against her had not been dispelled. Thus the requirements of section 2 (1)(b) of the Compensation (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1969 ( Strafrechtliches Entschädigungsgesetz 1969 - “ the 1969 Act”) were not met. In particular, the statement of the applicant’s parents that she had spent the night of the murder at their home was not credible. In addition, she had owned a weapon which could have been the one used for the murder and her defence that she had had no contact with the victim shortly prior to the crime had been disproved by witnesses. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully.   The applicant alleged that the court decisions in compensation proceedings for detention on remand violated the presumption of innocence.   The European Court of Human Rights observed that both Wels Regional Court and Linz Court of Appeal made statements in the compensation proceedings following the applicant’s final acquittal, expressing the view that there was a continuing suspicion against her, thus, casting doubt on her innocence.   Accordingly, the Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 2 (presumption of innocence) and awarded the applicant EUR 5,000 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)   (3)     Pinson v. France (no. 39668/98)   Struck out   Yvon Pinson is a French national who was born in 1950. He was arrested on 3 August 1993 on suspicion of armed robbery at a post office in Ingré. On 5 August 1993 he was charged and an order was made for his detention pending trial. While in police custody he requested a lawyer to be assigned to him by the court, but the custody officer informed him that the local bar council had decided to suspend assistance under the scheme. Further charges were brought against the applicant on 6 April 1994, 20 January 1995 and 21 February 1995 in respect of similar offences allegedly committed at Thenezay, Mery sur Oise and Marcilly en Villete.   The applicant made several applications for bail while on remand, all of which were refused, notably on the grounds that he had previous convictions for similar offences. On 14   November 1996 the applicant was committed to stand trial before the Assize Court of the   Loiret. On 15 October 1997 he was sentenced, inter alia , to twelve years’ imprisonment for the offence committed at Ingré.   Relying on Article 5 § 3 (right to be brought promptly before a judge) the applicant complained of the length of his pre-trial detention. He also complained under Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial within a reasonable time) of the length of the criminal proceedings. Lastly, he alleged a violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) (right to legal assistance) on the ground that he had not had a lawyer while in police custody.   The Court noted that, since his letter of 16 May 2001, the applicant’s lawyer had not renewed contact with the court registry and that, since the applicant’s release on 17 February 2002, the registry had received no details of his new personal address, despite taking steps to ascertain it. It concluded that the applicant did not intend to pursue his application and, accordingly, decided unanimously to strike it out of the list. (The judgment is available only in French.) (4)     Terazzi srl v. Italy (no. 27265/95)   Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1   The applicant is a limited liability company called Terazzi, formed under Italian law. It owns 50,000 square metres of land in Rome which in 1961 and 1963 became subject to statutory provisions on land preservation ( vincolo archeologico e paesaggistico ). In December 1965 a notice was issued prohibiting building on the land which was due to be expropriated under the general urban-development plan ( piano regolatore generale ), mainly for conversion into a public park. The prohibition was renewed after it had expired under the regime established by Law no. 10 of 1977. In June 1990 the Rome Municipality issued a further notice prohibiting building on the land pending expropriation. The applicant company’s appeals against that decision were unsuccessful. However, the municipal decision renewing the expropriation permit expired in 1995 as it had not been approved by the Regional Authority. The prohibition on building on the land remained in force, however, under Law no. 10 of 1977.   Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (protection of property) the applicant company alleged that the restrictions on the use of its land for a lengthy period without compensation had infringed its right to respect for its property.   The Court noted that the parties both agreed that there had been an interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. The land had become subject to building prohibitions combined with expropriation permits, but title to it had not been transferred. These measures had reduced the availability of the property, limited the right of ownership and had affected its value. However, the Court held that there could not be considered to have been a de facto expropriation in the present case since the applicant company had not lost access to or control of the land, and could still in theory have sold it.   The Court found that the interference in question had lasted for over 36 years since the approval of the general urban-development plan and for over 39 years since the municipal deliberation adopting it. It found it to have been established that the interference had satisfied the requirements of the general interest. The Court also noted that the applicant had been in a state of total uncertainty throughout the period concerned. During that period its land could have been expropriated or made subject to an expropriation permit. The land had also been subject to building prohibitions, which had interfered with the full enjoyment of the right of ownership by greatly reducing the chances of selling it. Furthermore, the Court noted that there did not appear to be a remedy under Italian law by which to challenge the inertia of the authorities where they delayed in using land for the urban-planning purposes for which it had been earmarked. Lastly, it noted that the applicant had been unable to obtain any compensation.   Accordingly, the Court considered that the applicant had had to bear an individual and excessive burden which had upset the fair balance between the requirements of the general interest and the protection of the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. It therefore held by six votes to one that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and held unanimously that the question of the application of Article 41 of the Convention was not ready for decision.   (The judgment is available only in French.)   ***   These summaries by the Registry do not bind the Court. The full texts of the Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F - 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts :   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] .     Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.