CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 22 octobre 2002

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s23A41E03 { width:36pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s83BE5C30 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s560DCDD3 { margin-left:10.52pt; padding-left:7.48pt; font-family:serif } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s3964C3A3 { width:1.36pt; display:inline-block } .s901C2590 { width:56.7pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     518   22.10.2002 Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENTS CONCERNING Romania, Turkey and the United Kingdom   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing the following six Chamber judgments, none of which is final [1] .   Section 2 Violation Article 6 § 1 Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (1)     Curutiu v. Romania (application no. 29769/96) (2)     Mateescu and Others v. Romania (no. 30698/96)   Curutiu v. Romania The applicants, Alexandru and Mihail Curutiu, are brothers born in 1941 and 1942 respectively. They are Romanian nationals and live in Bucharest.   Property belonging to their father, consisting of two flats and a plot of land, was nationalised by the State in 1950 pursuant to Decree no. 92/1950 on nationalisation. In 1993 the applicants brought an action to establish title with a view to recovering the property. On 1 September 1993 the Bucharest Court of First Instance held that their father’s house had been nationalised in error, as he had been a craftsman and had thus been expressly excluded from the scope of the decree, and ordered the restitution of the property to the applicants. In the absence of an admissible appeal, that judgment became final and binding.   In a speech given in July 1994 the President of Romania requested the authorities not to execute court decisions declaring null and void acts by which property had been nationalised under the communist regime. On 17 November 1995 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the judgment given at first instance, on the grounds that the State had become the owner of the property in issue and that the courts did not have jurisdiction to review the application of the decree on nationalisation.   In 1997 part of the building and part of the land was sold by the State to the sitting tenants. After applying to the Administrative Board responsible for implementing Law no. 112/1995, the applicants obtained the restitution of one of the flats and part of the land and were awarded 60,401,458 lei in compensation. They subsequently lodged a further action to establish title and an application to have the contract of sale to the tenants set aside, but were unsuccessful.   Mateescu and Others v. Romania The applicants, Mircea Mateescu, Maria Mateescu and Lully Georgeta Bianco, are Romanian nationals born in 1960, 1933 and 1935 respectively. Mr Mateescu lives in Paris and the other two applicants live in Bucharest.   In their capacity as heirs, the applicants brought an action to establish title with a view to recovering property situated in Bucharest, consisting of a building and a plot of land, which had been nationalised in 1950 pursuant to Decree no. 92/1950. On 30 March 1994 the Bucharest Court of First Instance held that the property had been nationalised in error, as the former owners had been a housewife and a labourer and had thus been expressly excluded from the scope of the decree. No appeal was lodged and the judgment became final.   Principal State Counsel applied to have the judgment quashed, and on 28 June 1995 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the judgment given at first instance, on the grounds that the State had become the owner of the property in issue and that the courts did not have jurisdiction to review the application of the decree on nationalisation. It also dismissed a plea of unconstitutionality by the applicants.   The applicants brought a further action to establish their title to the property, and the Court of First Instance found in their favour in a judgment of 16 October 1997 which, in the absence of an appeal, became final. In the meantime, the State had sold part of the building and part of the appurtenant land to the sitting tenants. An application by the applicants to have the contract of sale set aside is still pending.   ____________   In these two cases the applicants complained, under Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing), of the Supreme Court of Justice’s refusal to recognise the courts’ jurisdiction to determine an action to establish title to property, and of the resulting lack of access to a court. In the Curutiu case the applicants also complained that the Supreme Court of Justice had not been independent or impartial. Moreover, in the Mateescu case the applicants also complained that the Constitutional Court had refused to stay the proceedings and refer their plea of unconstitutionality to the Constitutional Court. Lastly, on the basis of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property), the applicants submitted that the Supreme Court of Justice’s judgment had infringed their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.   The Court held that in quashing a judgment which had become final, the Supreme Court of Justice had infringed the principle of legal certainty and, in so doing, the applicants’ right to a fair trial. Furthermore, their refusal to recognise that the courts had jurisdiction to deal with the applicants’ action to establish title was in itself contrary to the right of access to a court. Accordingly, the Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the lack of a fair trial (because final judgments had been quashed) and on account of the refusal of the right of access to a court.   With regard to the complaint raised in the Curutiu case of the Supreme Court’s lack of independence, the Court held that the President of Romania’s statements had been addressed to the authorities and that there was nothing to suggest that they had influenced the judges of that court who had ruled in the applicants’ case. Moreover, merely applying the case-law of an authority such as the Supreme Court did not, in the Court’s view, infringe the rights and duties of the lower courts to examine in all independence a case submitted to them. Accordingly, the Court held unanimously that there had not been a violation of Article 6 § 1 with regard to the court’s independence and impartiality.   The Court also held unanimously that there was no need to examine the complaint about the Supreme Court of Justice’s failure to refer to the Constitutional Court the plea of unconstitutionality raised by the applicants in the Mateescu case.   With regard to an alleged violation of the applicants’ right of property, the Court reiterated that their right to the property in question had been recognised by final judgments and had therefore been irrevocable. The judgments of the Supreme Court had had the effect of depriving them of their possessions. In the Curutiu case they had been deprived of part of their possessions without receiving compensation commensurate with the value of the property and in the Mateescu case without receiving any compensation. Accordingly, the Court considered that the fair balance that had to be struck between the demands of the general interest and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights had been upset and that the applicants had borne and continued to bear an individual and excessive burden. The Court accordingly held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in both these cases.   In the Curutiu case the Court held that the State should restore the entire house and appurtenant land to the applicants within three months of the date on which the judgment became final. Failing that, the State should pay them 40,000 euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage. The Court also awarded them EUR 4,000 for non-pecuniary damage.   In the Mateescu case the Court held that the State should restore the part of the house which had not yet been restored to the applicants within three months of the date on which the judgment became final. Failing this, the State should pay them EUR 26,000 for pecuniary damage. The Court also awarded them EUR 2,500 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR   467.53 for costs and expenses.   (The judgments are in French only.)   (3)     Taylor-Sabori v. the United Kingdom (no. 47114/99)                            Violation Article 8 & Violation Article 13   Sean-Marc Taylor-Sabori is a United Kingdom national. Between August 1995 and the applicant’s arrest on 21 January 1996, he was kept under police surveillance. Using a “clone” of the applicant’s pager, the police were able to intercept messages sent to him.   The applicant was arrested and charged with conspiracy to supply a controlled drug. The prosecution alleged that he had been a principal organiser in the importation to the United Kingdom from Amsterdam of over 22,000 ecstasy tablets worth approximately GBP   268,000. He was tried, along with a number of alleged co-conspirators, at Bristol Crown Court in September 1997.   Part of the prosecution case against the applicant consisted of the contemporaneous written notes of the pager messages, which had been transcribed by the police. The applicant’s counsel submitted that these notes should not be admitted in evidence because the police had not had a warrant under section 2 of the Interception of Communications Act 1985 for the interception of the pager messages. However, the trial judge ruled that, since the messages had been transmitted via a private system, the 1985 Act did not apply and no warrant had been necessary.   The applicant pleaded not guilty. He was convicted and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.   The applicant appealed against conviction and sentence. One of the grounds was the admission in evidence of the pager messages. The Court of Appeal, dismissing the appeal on 13 September 1998, upheld the trial judge’s ruling that the messages had been intercepted at the point of transmission on the private radio system, so that the 1985 Act did not apply and the messages were admissible despite having been intercepted without a warrant.   The applicant complained, principally, under Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and 13 (right to an effective remedy) that the interception of his pager messages by the police and subsequent reference to them at his trial amounted to an unjustified interference with his private life and correspondence which was not “in accordance with the law” and in respect of which there was no remedy under English law.   The European Court of Human Rights noted that, at the time of the events in question, there was no statutory system to regulate the interception of pager messages transmitted via a private telecommunication system. It followed, as the Government had accepted, that the interference was not “in accordance with the law”. The Court, therefore, held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 8.   Concerning Article 13, the Court recalled that in its finding in the case Khan v. the United Kingdom (application no. 35394/97, judgment 12/5/2000), in circumstances similar to those in the applicant’s case, the courts in the criminal proceedings were not capable of providing a remedy because, although they could consider questions of the fairness of admitting the evidence in the criminal proceedings, it was not open to them to deal with the substance of the Convention complaint that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life was not “in accordance with the law”; still less, to grant appropriate relief in connection with the complaint.     As it did not appear that there was any other effective remedy available to Mr Taylor-Sabori for his Article 8 complaint, the Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 13.   The Court further held unanimously that the finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant and awarded him EUR 4,800 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is in English only.)   Section 4 Violation Article 5 §§ 3and 4   (4)     Satık, Çamlı, Satık and Maraşlı v. Turkey (nos. 24737/94, 24739/94, 24740/94 and 24741/94)   The applicants, Recep Maraşlı, his wife Nuran Çamlı, Murat Satık and Fahriye Satık, are Turkish nationals born in 1956, 1961, 1962 and 1967 respectively. They are political refugees and currently live abroad. At the material time Mr Maraşlı, a political writer, was the publisher and a co-founder of Komal , a publishing firm, publishing a review called Stêrka Rizgari, of which the three other applicants were employees.   In the course of an investigation into the organisation Rızgari-Kürdistan Kurtuluş Partisi (Kurdistan Liberation Party – “the   PRK”), the applicants were arrested at their homes on 8   July 1994 and were taken into custody by officers from the anti-terrorist branch of the Istanbul security police. The police seized a number of items at the time of the arrests, including false identity papers and several documents about the activities and structure of the PRK.   Their detention in police custody was extended until 21 July 1994, when they were interviewed by the public prosecutor and brought before a judge of the National Security Court. The judge ordered Mr Maraşlı to be detained and the other three applicants to be released pending trial. On 1 September 1994 the public prosecutor committed the applicants for trial in the National Security Court. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, Mr Maraşlı was charged with being a leader of an illegal organisation (the PRK) and the three others with assisting the organisation.   Relying on Article 5 § 3 (right to be brought promptly before a judge), the applicants complained of the length of their detention in police custody (thirteen days). They also complained under Article 5 § 4 (right to have the lawfulness of detention decided speedily by a court) that they did not have a remedy by which they could challenge their detention.   The Court reiterated that it acknowledged that investigations into terrorist offences posed special problems for the authorities. However, that did not give them a free hand to arrest and detain suspects with no judicial scrutiny every time they claimed that a terrorist offence had been committed. The Court found in the present case that, even supposing that the applicants’ activities had been connected with terrorist activities, thirteen days in police custody was incompatible with the concept of promptness required by Article 5 § 3. Accordingly, the Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of that provision.   With regard to the issue whether the applicants had had a remedy by which to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, the Court stated that a remedy available before the public prosecutor’s office did not provide guarantees of independence from the executive for the purposes of Article 5 § 4, since a member of the public prosecutor’s office was answerable to the Ministry of Justice. The Court also reiterated that the Commission had already had occasion to note that at the material time there was no adequate and effective means of testing the lawfulness of detention in police custody in proceedings before a national security court.   The Court accordingly held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 5 § 4 and awarded each of the applicants 4,573 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 700 to all of them for costs and expenses.   (The judgment is in French only.)   (5)     Perkins and R. v. the United Kingdom (nos. 43208/98 and 44875/98) Violation Article 8   (6)     Beck, Copp and Bazeley v. the United Kingdom (nos. 48535/99, 48536/99 and 48537/99)                                                                                           Violation Article 8 and 13, No violation Article 3   Terence Perkins and Ms R . were born in 1969 and 1972 and live in London and Surrey respectively. John Beck , Howard Copp and Kevin Bazeley were born in 1959, 1957 and 1967 and live in Lancashire, Tyne and Wear and Worcester respectively. The applicants, all United Kingdom nationals, were all British armed forces personnel, discharged from the forces on the basis of their homosexuality.   Mr Perkins joined the Royal Navy as a medical assistant in 1991. At the time of his discharge, he was a leading medical assistant. He was described as being “for advancement” and his naval character as “very good”. He admitted to being homosexual during an interview after the naval authorities had received information concerning his sexual orientation.   Ms R. joined the Royal Navy in 1990 and trained as a radio operator. In 1992 she passed a professional qualifying examination to be a radio operator “first class” and her naval character was described as “very good”. After a colleague, in whom she had confided that she had had a brief lesbian relationship with a civilian, informed the authorities, she was interviewed and then discharged.      Mr Beck joined the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1976. At the time of his discharge, he was a communications systems analyst at the rank of Sergeant with an exemplary conduct record and highly recommended for promotion. He declared himself to be a celibate homosexual in 1993 while he was studying theology and considering ordination.   Mr Copp joined the Army Medical Corps in 1978. At the time of his discharge, he was a Private, training as a pupil nurse. An assessment in 1982 recommended him for promotion. On receiving a posting to Germany in 1981 he revealed his homosexuality in order not to be separated from his partner, a civilian. Mr Bazeley joined the RAF in 1985. At the time of his discharge, he was a Flight Lieutenant considered to have good potential. He admitted to being homosexual during an interview, after his wallet was found containing membership cards made out in his name for two homosexual clubs.   On 24 January 1996 Mr Perkins applied to the High Court to take judicial review proceedings on the ground that the Ministry of Defence policy was “irrational” and contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Union Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC). The High Court referred the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which found that the directive did not apply to discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. The High Court withdrew the question from the ECJ and refused leave to appeal. Following this decision, Mr Beck , Mr Copp , Mr Bazeley and Ms R. withdrew claims they had made before an industrial tribunal for unfair dismissal and sexual discrimination.   The applicants all alleged that the investigations into their sexuality and their discharge as a result of the absolute ban on homosexuals in the armed forces that existed at the time, violated their rights under Articles 8 (right to respect for private life) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention. The applicants in     Beck, Copp and Bazeley also complained under Articles 3 (prohibition of degrading treatment) and 13 (right to an effective remedy).   Finding no material difference between the two cases and the cases of Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. the United Kingdom (nos 31417/96 & 32377/96, judgment 27/9/1999) and Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom (nos 33985/96 & 33986/96, judgment 27/9/1999), the Court held, unanimously, that there had been: in both cases, a violation of Article 8 concerning each applicant and that no separate issue arose under article 14; in Beck, Copp and Bazeley , a violation of Article 13, no violation of Article 3, and that it was not necessary to consider the complaints raised under Article 10.   The Court awarded: for non-pecuniary damage, EUR 30,300 to each applicant; for pecuniary damage EUR 43,000 to Ms R., EUR 131,400 to Mr Beck, EUR 87,300 to Mr Copp and   EUR 145,100 to Mr Bazeley; for costs and expenses, EUR 4,300 to Mr Perkins and a total of EUR 6,200 to Ms R., EUR 6,383 to Mr Beck, EUR   7,544 to Mr Copp and EUR 8,632 to Mr Bazeley.     (The judgments are in English only.)   ***   These summaries by the Registry do not bind the Court. The full texts of the Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] .     Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.