CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 5 novembre 2002

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sFC380877 { width:58.4pt; display:inline-block } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s8ABE8D9A { width:93.49pt; display:inline-block } .s61E420C2 { font-family:Arial; font-variant:small-caps } .s27B43D73 { width:134.81pt; display:inline-block } .s13F94BDE { font-family:Arial; letter-spacing:-0.1pt } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s3964C3A3 { width:1.36pt; display:inline-block } .s901C2590 { width:56.7pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     548   5.11.2002   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENTS CONCERNING: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing the following 11 Chamber judgments, none of which is final. [1]   Section 2   (1)     Wynen v. Belgium (application no. 32576/96)   Violation Article 6 § 1 No violation Article 6 § 1 The applicants are Dr André Wynen, a Belgian national who was born in 1923 and lives in Braine-l’Alleud, and his employer, the Centre hospitalier interrégional Edith Cavell (CHIREC, formerly the Institut médical Edith Cavell – “IMEC”), a non-profit association based in Brussels.   In October 1990 a magnetic-resonance tomography machine with a built-in electronic calculator was installed at IMEC. According to a royal decree promulgated in 1989, a service in which such a machine is installed must be considered a “high-cost medico-technical service”, within the meaning of section 44 of the Hospitals (Consolidation) Act, and must be approved. As IMEC did not have the required approval, the Ministers of Public Health for the Brussels-Capital Region made a complaint against the applicant in March 1992 for installing high-cost medical equipment without prior authorisation from the relevant Minister.   The applicants were acquitted at first instance. However, on appeal by State Counsel’s office and the State, which was a civil party in the case, the Brussels Court of Appeal imposed a suspended fine on Dr Wynen under the Hospitals (Consolidation) Act. The applicants gave notice of an appeal on points of law, pleading the unlawfulness and unconstitutionality of section 44 of the Hospitals (Consolidation) Act, and asked the Court of Cassation to refer the matter to the Administrative Jurisdiction and Procedure Court for a preliminary ruling. They also filed a statement of the grounds of appeal. After the case had been placed on the list kept at the registry, the Court of Cassation held a hearing on 24 January 1996, at which it heard argument from the Advocate-General, among others. On the same day the applicants’ statement of the grounds of appeal was declared inadmissible as being out of time, and their appeal was dismissed. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to a fair trial) the applicants complained of the fact that their statement of the grounds of appeal had been declared inadmissible. They further alleged that they had not been given notice of the hearing in the Court of Cassation. In addition, they complained that they had not been given an advance copy of the Advocate-General’s submissions and that they had not been allowed to reply to them after they had been made. Lastly, the applicants contend that the Court of Cassation was required to refer the request for a preliminary ruling to the Administrative Jurisdiction and Procedure Court.   The Court noted that Article 420 bis of the Code of Criminal Investigation required those wishing to appeal on points of law to file any pleading within two months of the case being placed on the Court of Cassation’s general list, although respondents were not under any such obligation. As a result, appellants were unable to reply in writing to respondents’ pleadings. The Court accepted that it was necessary to ensure that proceedings were not prolonged unnecessarily by allowing successive replies to pleadings filed. This condition was not satisfied in the present case. It accordingly concluded by four votes to three that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the fact that the statement of the grounds of appeal had been declared inadmissible.   As to the fact that the applicants were not notified of the hearing in the Court of Cassation, the Court noted that the provisions governing the posting of notices giving the dates of hearings were accessible and sufficiently coherent and clear. The applicants’ lawyers, who were professionally concerned with judicial procedure, could not have been unaware of them. Moreover, as a matter of normal practice, they could have discovered the date of the hearing by making a telephone call or writing to the registry of the Court of Cassation. The Court accordingly held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1.   As regards the submissions of the Advocate-General, the Court noted that although he had made his submissions for the first time at the hearing, he had not previously divulged their content to the other party or to the reporting judge and the other judges. The applicants could not therefore validly argue that there had been an infringement of the principle of equality of arms in that respect. Moreover, they could have replied to the Advocate-General’s submissions if they had been present at the hearing. Consequently, there had been no violation of Article   6   § 1 on that account.   Lastly, as to whether the reference of a preliminary question to the Administrative Jurisdiction and Procedure Court should have been automatic, the Court observed that even where domestic law required the reference of a preliminary question to another court the court initially seised could check whether it was empowered or required to raise such a question. It noted that the Court of Cassation had duly taken account of the applicants’ complaints and had rendered a decision for which it had given sufficient reasons and which did not appear to be arbitrary. It further observed that it was primarily for the national authorities to interpret domestic law. Consequently, the Court held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 in that respect.   As regards the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction, the Court held unanimously that the finding of a violation in itself provided sufficient just satisfaction and awarded the applicants 5,000 euros (EUR) for costs and expenses. (The judgment is in French only.)   (2)     Yousef v. the Netherlands (no. 33711/96)                                          No violation Article 8 Ramzi Samir Yousef, born in 1959, was an Egyptian national at the time of the events complained of.   He first arrived in the Netherlands in 1985. The same year, he met Ms R., a Netherlands national. On 16 January 1987 a daughter, S., was born to the couple, who were not married and were not living together. The applicant did not then recognise S. At some time in or around August 1987, the applicant moved in with Ms R. and S. in the house of Ms R.’s mother. They lived together for about a year.   In July 1988 the applicant went to the Middle East and stayed there for around two-and-a-half years. During this time, contact between the applicant and Ms R. and S. was limited to the exchange of some letters. The applicant returned to the Netherlands in early 1991; he claims   he saw S. every two weeks until 1993. Despite his repeated requests, however, Ms R. refused to give him permission to recognise ( erkennen ) S.   After contracting a terminal illness, Ms R. made a will appointing her brother Mr H.R. as S.’s guardian.   In January 1994 the applicant unsuccessfully brought summary injunction proceedings seeking an order for Ms R. to give him permission to recognise S. The court found that recognition would entail a change in S.’s surname, which was not in her best interests. However, it was considered desirable that contact between the applicant and S. continue and that S. spend every other weekend with her father.   In a further, supplementary will Ms R. stated that, after her death, S. should be placed with another of her brothers, Mr J.R. and that she did not want the applicant to visit S. - or have access to her - as this would seriously disrupt S.’s new family life. According to Ms   R., the applicant had no fixed abode, no residence permit, no employment and no financial means; he would only use the right to care for his daughter as a pretext for obtaining a residence permit in the Netherlands and social-security benefits: prior to her illness, the applicant had not shown much interest in S., nor had he contributed financially to her upbringing.   When Ms R. died on 15 February 1994, her brother Mr H.R. was granted guardianship of S. and she was placed in Mr   J.R.’s family. The applicant saw S. once every three weeks under an arrangement with the R. family.   Following Ms R.’s death, the applicant made a number of unsuccessful attempts to have a deed of recognition drawn up and entered into the register of births. His appeals were unsuccessful.   The applicant is now a Netherlands national, has married and has a son.   He complained that he was prevented from recognising a child of whom he was the biological father. He relied on Article 8 (right to respect for family life).   The European Court of Human Rights reiterated that in judicial decisions where the rights under Article 8 of parents and those of a child were at stake, the child’s rights must be the paramount consideration. If any balancing of interests was necessary, the interests of the child must prevail. The Court noted that the domestic courts accepted that the applicant had the intention of disrupting his daughter’s family situation. He wanted recognition of his paternity so that he could have his daughter live with him instead of with her legal family.     The Court of Appeal had found that such a change would be detrimental to S.’s interests, which would be best served by allowing S. to be brought up as a member of the family in which she had lived since her mother’s death. It had also had regard to the harm that might result for S. from the automatic change after recognition of her surname, which would set her apart from the other members of the family with whom she was living.   Finding no indication that the domestic courts failed to take the applicant’s rights sufficiently into account or decided in an arbitrary manner, the Court held, unanimously, that there had been no violation of Article 8. (The judgment is in English only.)   (3)     Pincová and Pinc v. the Czech Republic (no. 36548/97)     Violation Article 1 Protocol 1 Blažena Pincová and her son Jiří Pinc are Czech nationals, who were born in 1921 and 1952 respectively and live in Hřímĕždice. Mrs Pincová’s husband died during the proceedings and the Court recognised her son’s standing to pursue the application.   In December 1967 Mrs Pincová and her husband bought a forester’s house with a barn and cowshed that they had been renting since 1953 from a State-owned undertaking which had itself acquired the property in 1948 after it had been confiscated without compensation under the Law on revision of the first land reform ( zákon o revizi první pozemkové reformy ). The sale price was fixed at 14,703 Czechoslovak crowns (CSK) by an expert appointed by the State undertaking. In June 1968 they signed an agreement giving them the right to use the land attached to the property for CSK 2,030.   Following the entry into force of Law no. 229/1991 – the Land Act ( zákon o půdĕ ) – the son of the former owners applied to the Příbram District Court ( okresní soud ) seeking recovery of the property, arguing that the first applicant and her husband had acquired it at a price lower than its true value. The expert appointed by the court surveyed both the inhabitable part of the property and the uninhabitable parts, namely the barn and the cowshed. The expert’s report revealed a difference in price on account of the new assessment of the uninhabitable parts and on the strength of that finding the court ordered restitution of the property to the plaintiff on 12 September 1994. The applicants appealed unsuccessfully. They then lodged a constitutional appeal, asked for a stay of execution of the judgment and requested a retrial, but all to no avail.   The Ministry of Agriculture reimbursed to the applicants the purchase price they had paid in 1967 plus the amount they had paid for the right to use the land, a total of CZK 16,733. To date they have still not obtained any sum in reimbursement of the costs of maintaining the property and have contested the Ministry’s estimate of that expenditure. Moreover, the applicants still live in the house because no substitute accommodation has been offered to them by the new owner. Although the latter has declined to offer them a tenancy agreement he is now claiming CZK 28,072 in rent and has taken the case to the domestic courts to secure payment.   Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property), the applicants complained that they had been deprived of a property they had acquired legally and in good faith, without being paid any appropriate compensation.   The Court considered that the applicants had acquired their possessions in good faith, unaware that they had been confiscated and without being able to influence the sale conditions or the purchase price. It reiterated that it was not its task to take the place of the authorities in determining the base date for valuation of the property or the value itself, but noted that reimbursement of the purchase price paid in 1967 could not reasonably reflect its value thirty years later. Moreover, when restitution of the house was ordered the applicants had been living in it for 42 years, including 28 as its owners. Furthermore, the sum reimbursed to them was not sufficient to enable them to buy alternative accommodation and although they still lived in the house the new owner seemed to be taking advantage of his position of strength in relation to them by demanding rent in the absence of a tenancy agreement.   The “compensation” awarded to the applicants had not taken account of their personal and social situations, or the non-pecuniary damage they had suffered. In addition, they had still not been paid the sums they had spent on maintenance of the house even though seven and a half years had gone by since the judgment ordering its restitution. Consequently, the Court considered that the applicants had had to bear an individual and excessive burden which had upset the fair balance required to be struck between the general interest and protection of the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. It accordingly held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and awarded the applicants EUR 35,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 9,227.28 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is in French only.)   (4)     Demuth v. Switzerland (no. 38743/97)   No violation Article 10 Walter Michael Demuth, a Swiss national, was born in 1949 and lives in Zurich, Switzerland.   On 10 August 1995 he filed a request, in the name of the company Car Tv AG , for a licence ( Konzessionsgesuch ) to broadcast a television programme, to be produced in close co-operation with industry, automobile associations and the specialised media. The programme, to last two hours initially, would include news on cars, car accessories, traffic and energy policies, traffic security, tourism and relations between the railways and road traffic and environmental issues. It was to be distributed on cable television in German in the German-speaking areas of Switzerland, and in French in the French-speaking areas.   The Federal Office for Communication replied on 16 August 1995, pointing out the lack of prospects of success of such a request. By letter of 7 September 1995 the applicant informed the Federal Office that he wished to pursue his request, while submitting further documents, stating that Car Tv AG would now include in its programme matters concerning the traffic needs of non-motorists and set up an independent programme commission. On 16 June 1996 the Swiss Federal Council ( Bundesrat ) dismissed the request. The Federal Council noted that there was no right, either under Swiss law or Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to obtain a broadcasting licence.   The applicant complained, under Article 10 (freedom of expression), of the authorities’ refusal to authorise him to broadcast a programme on cars on cable television.   The European Court of Human Rights observed that the Federal Council’s decision of 16 June 1996 was not categorical and did not definitively exclude the possibility of providing a broadcasting licence for the programme if certain modifications were made to the programme contents. The Court also noted the Swiss Government’s assurance before the Court that a licence would be granted to Car T v AG if the programme included, among other things, cultural elements. It could not, therefore, be said that the Federal Council’s decision – guided by the policy that television programmes should to a certain extent also serve the public interest – went beyond the margin of appreciation left to the national authorities in such matters. The Court therefore held, by six votes to one, that there had been no violation of Article 10. (The judgment is in English only.)   (5)     Serghides and Christoforou v. Cyprus (no. 44730/98) Violation Article 1 Protocol No. 1 Violation Article 6 § 1 Loukia Serghides and her daughter, Amaryllis Christoforou, are both Cypriot nationals.   The case concerns a plot of land (no. 565) in Nicosia, measuring 23,488 square feet, of which Ms Serghides had been the freeholder since 1959. On 8 December 1992 she transferred the ownership of 21,428 square feet of the land, with a half share to each to her two children – Ms Christoforou and Dr G.A. Serghides.   On 30 March 1973 notice no. 612 was published identifying plots to be expropriated for a street-widening scheme, without mentioning plot 565, requiring any objections to be filed within 75 days.   At some time between 1978 and 1979, the District Land Registry Office of Nicosia registered part of the plot, measuring 2,060 square feet, as part of the new scheme.     Ms Serghides claimed that the first time she became aware that 2,060 square feet of her land was to be expropriated was after receiving a Government Survey Plan on 4 September 1989 which she had requested from the Land Registry to file an objection to taxes imposed on some of her property.   On 17 November 1989 she asked the Supreme Court of Cyprus to declare the decisions to take away part of her land and to use that piece of land for the construction of a public road, void and without any legal effect. On 2 February 1993, the Supreme Court rejected the application as out of time, it having been filed more than 75 days after publication of notice no.   612.   On 9 March 1993 she filed an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on 27 February 1998 on the ground that she no longer had locus standi in respect of the disputed property because of the transfer of her property to her children in 1992   The applicants alleged a violation of Article   6 §   1 (right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time) and Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 (protection of property).   Concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the European Court of Human Rights observed that the applicant became aware of the situation affecting her property accidentally in 1989 and on 17 November 1989 lodged an application with the Supreme Court. On 27 February 1998 the Supreme Court dismissed her appeal on the basis that she had transferred her property to her children in 1992. However, the applicant had only transferred the undisputed part of her property. Consequently, the transfer could not entail a loss of her legal interest in respect of the disputed area for the purposes of Article   1 of Protocol No.   1. The Court, therefore, held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol   No.   1.   Concerning the length of the proceedings, the Court noted that the period to be taken into consideration lasted eight years, three months and 10 days, over two levels of jurisdiction. The case was not at all complex and the Supreme Court, in both proceedings, dismissed the applicant’s claims on procedural grounds. Moreover, the proceedings at first instance were adjourned eight times. Although the applicant appealed on points of law on 9   March 1993, the hearing commenced on 3 April 1997 and the proceedings were then adjourned twice. The Court, therefore, held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article   6 §   1 with respect to the length of the proceedings.   Regarding the applicant’s access to a court, the Court observed that she was not personally notified of the fact that the Municipality of Nicosia had expropriated a part of her land. Yet the Supreme Court at first instance dismissed her claim as being out of time through no fault of her own and, on appeal, held that she had no locus standi in respect of the disputed property as she had transferred her property to her children in the meantime. The Supreme Court failed in this respect to take account of the fact that the disputed part of the applicant’s property could not have been transferred by the applicant due to the expropriation in question. Considering that this amounted to a violation of the applicant’s right of effective access to court, the Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article   6 §   1.   The Court reserved the question of the application of Article 41 (just satisfaction) as not being ready for decision. (The judgment is in English only.)   Section 4   (6)     Demir v. Austria (no. 35437/97)                                                       Violation Article 6 § 2 Musa Demir, a Turkish national, was born in 1959 and lives in Vienna.   On 29 November 1992 he was arrested on suspicion of attempted blackmail and unlawful possession of a firearm. Subsequently, he was taken into detention on remand.   On 3   August 1993, he was released.   On 31 March 1995 Vienna Regional Criminal Court acquitted the applicant, giving him the benefit of the doubt.   The applicant’s compensation claim concerning his detention was dismissed, however. On 25 March 1996, 30 August 1996 and 15 September 2000, the court again dismissed the applicant’s compensation claim, stating that the suspicion against him had not been “entirely dispelled”.   The applicant alleged, in particular, that the court decisions in compensation proceedings for his detention on remand violated the presumption of innocence. He relied on Article 6 § 2 (presumption of innocence).   The European Court of Human Rights observed that both Vienna Regional Criminal Court and Vienna Court of Appeal made statements in the compensation proceedings, after the applicant’s final acquittal, expressing the view that there was a continuing suspicion against him, thus casting doubt on his innocence. The Court, therefore held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 2. The applicant was awarded 5,100 euros (EUR) for costs and expenses. (The judgment is in English only.)       (7)     Pietiläinen v. Finland (no. 35999/97)                                               Violation Article 6 § 1 Aaro Pietiläinen, a Finnish national, was born in 1943 and lives in Laukaa. On 5 January 1987 a criminal investigation was instituted against him in relation to alleged tax fraud. The proceedings ended on 26 November 1996 when the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s judgment. The applicant alleged, in particular, that the criminal proceedings against him were unreasonably lengthy. He relied on Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time).   The European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 and awarded the applicant EUR 1,700 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 10,000 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is in English only.)   (8)     Lisiak v. Poland (no. 37443/97)                                                        Violation Article 6 § 1 Maciej Lisiak a Polish national, was born in 1968 and lives in Bielsko-Biała (Poland). The case concerns criminal proceedings brought against him, which began on 10 August 1991, when he was charged with murder and uttering threats. The proceedings still appear to be pending before Bielsko-Biała Regional Court. The total length of the applicant’s trial therefore amounts to 11   years, one month and 28 days, of which the Court can take into consideration nine years and five months and seven days [2] . The applicant relied on Article 6   §   1 (right to a fair trial within a reasonable time).   The European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 and awarded the applicant EUR 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. (The judgment is in English only.)   (9)     Laidin v. France (no. 43191/98)   Violation Article 5 § 4 Monique Laidin, a French national, was born in 1935 and lives in Bellegarde.   On 21 November 1997 she was detained at the Mental Health Centre of the département of Ain at the request of a third party. The public prosecutor, to whom she wrote on 3 December 1997 complaining of the conditions of her detention and asking the courts to order her release, received her complaint on 8 December and asked to see the applicant’s medical certificate the following day .   He received it on 2 January 1998 and applied on the same day to the tribunal de grande instance for her immediate release.   The applicant was allowed out for a trial period on 14 January 1998 and her release was made permanent on 26 February 1998. The President of the tribunal de grande instance , who on 25   February 1998 had appointed an expert to examine the applicant, closed the case on 20   March 1998.   Relying on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (right to a speedy decision on the lawfulness of detention), the applicant complained of the length of time taken to consider her application for immediate release. The Court noted that in writing to the public prosecutor the applicant had not applied to the authority empowered to order her release. However, the public prosecutor could himself apply for her release, and indeed had done so on 2 January 1998. The Court considered that the proceedings should be taken to have begun on 8 December 1997, when the public prosecutor received the applicant’s request, and to have ended on 14 January 1998, when she was released for a trial period. They had therefore lasted more than five weeks.   The Court noted that, although the public prosecutor had applied to the tribunal de grande instance as soon as he received the medical certificate, a month had elapsed between the day when the applicant’s request was sent and the day on which he made that application. Moreover, the hearing had taken place more than one-and-a-half months after the applicant had been released for a trial period and on the day before the order for her detention was due to lapse. Consequently, the purpose of the proceedings having been to secure an immediate decision on a request for release from detention in a mental institution, the Court considered that the authorities had not decided the matter speedily. It held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention and awarded the applicant EUR 6,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,000 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is in French only.)   (10)     Pisaniello and 3 others v. Italy (no. 45290/99)                          No violation Article 6 § 1 Augusto Pisaniello, Rezziero Pisaniello, Giovanni Clemente and Costantino Iollo, all Italian nationals, were born respectively in 1953, 1940, 1950 and 1961. Rezziero Pisaniello lives in Rozzano (Milan) and the others, in San Martino Valle Caudina (Avellino). In 1988, Mr Iollo was a member of the San Martino Valle Caudina Town Council Technical Committee ( Commissione tecnica comunale ), a body responsible for expressing opinions on the issuing of building permits and on the granting of public subsidies.   On 19 November 1993 Avellino Public Prosecutor requested that the applicants be committed for trial on charges of aggravated abuse of public authority ( abuso d’ufficio ). In particular, Augusto and Rezziero Pisaniello and Mr Clemente were accused of having induced Mr Iollo to unlawfully grant them a public subsidy. Augusto and Rezziero Pisaniello and Mr Clemente were also accused of having built a cottage without complying with the conditions contained in the building permit.   The proceedings at issue began on 29   March 1994 for Rezziero Pisaniello and on 7 April 1994 for the others. They ended on 14   June 1998, when Avellino District Court’s judgment became final. They therefore lasted more than four years and two months.   The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial within a reasonable time) about the length of the criminal proceedings against them.   The European Court of Human Rights held, by five votes to two, that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1. (The judgment is in English only.)   (11)     Allan v. the United Kingdom (no. 48539/99)                                        Violation Article 8 Violation Article 6 Violation Article 13 Richard Roy Allan is a United Kingdom national. On or about 20 February 1995, an anonymous informant told the police that Mr Allan had been involved in the murder of David Beesley, a store manager, who was shot dead in a Kwik-Save supermarket in Greater Manchester on 3 February 1995.   On 8 March 1995, the applicant was arrested for the murder. In the police interviews which followed, the applicant availed himself of his right to remain silent.   Around this time, recordings were made of the applicant’s conversations with his female friend while in the prison visiting area and with his co-accused in the prison cell they shared.   On 23 March 1995, H., a long-standing police informant with a criminal record, was placed in the applicant’s cell for the purpose of eliciting information from the applicant. The applicant maintains that H. had every incentive to inform on him. Telephone conversations between H. and the police included comments by the police instructing H. to “push him for what you can” and disclosed evidence of concerted police coaching. After 20 April 1995, he associated regularly with the applicant, who was remanded at Strangeways Prison.   On 25 July 1995, in a 59-60 page witness statement, H. claimed that the applicant had admitted his presence at the murder scene. This asserted admission was not part of the recorded interview and was disputed. No evidence, other than the alleged admissions, connected the applicant with the killing of Mr Beesley.   On 17 February 1998 the applicant was convicted of murder before the Crown Court at Manchester by a 10-2 majority and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed unsuccessfully.   The applicant complained of the use of covert audio and video surveillance within his cell, the prison visiting area and upon a fellow prisoner and of the use of materials gained by these means at his trial. He relied on Articles 6 (right to a fair trial), 8 (right to respect for private life) and 13 (right to an effective remedy).   Recalling that, at the relevant time, there existed no statutory system to regulate the use of covert recording devices by the police, the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been violations of Article 8 concerning the use of these devices.   The Government having accepted that the applicant did not enjoy an effective remedy in domestic law at the relevant time in respect of the violations of his right to private life under Article 8, the Court also held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 13.   Concerning the complaint under Article 6, the Court noted that, in his interviews with the police following his arrest, the applicant had, on the advice of his solicitor, consistently availed himself of his right to silence.   H., who was a longstanding police informer, had been placed in the applicant’s cell and later at the same prison for the specific purpose of eliciting from the applicant information implicating him in the offences of which he was suspected. The evidence adduced at the applicant’s trial showed that the police had coached H. The admissions allegedly made by the applicant to H. were not spontaneous and unprompted statements volunteered by the applicant, but were induced by the persistent questioning of H., who, at the instance of the police, had channelled their conversations into discussions of the murder in circumstances which could be regarded as the functional equivalent of interrogation, without any of the safeguards of a formal police interview, including the attendance of a solicitor and the issuing of the usual caution.   The Court considered that the applicant would have been subject to psychological pressures which impinged on the “voluntariness” of the disclosures that he had allegedly made to H.: he was a suspect in a murder case, in detention and under direct pressure from the police in interrogations about the murder, and would have been susceptible to persuasion to take H., with whom he shared a cell for some weeks, into his confidence. In those circumstances, the information gained by the use of H. in this way might be regarded as having been obtained in defiance of the will of the applicant and its use at trial to have impinged on the applicant’s right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination. The Court, therefore, held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6 concerning the admission at the applicant’s trial of the evidence obtained through the informer H.   The Court awarded the applicant EUR 1,642 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 12,800 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is in English only.)   ***   These summaries by the Registry do not bind the Court. The full texts of the Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] .     Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] From 1 May 1993, the date Poland recognised the right of individual petition.