CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 26 novembre 2002

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s3964C3A3 { width:1.36pt; display:inline-block } .s901C2590 { width:56.7pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     591   26.11.2002   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF BUCHEŇ v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of Bucheň v. the Czech Republic (application no. 36541/97). The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights, taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property).   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicant 20,000 euros for pecuniary damage. The Court further held that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant.   (The judgment is in French only.)   1.     Principal facts   Anton Bucheň is a Czech national who was born in 1951 and lives in Príbram. He was a regular soldier and was appointed as a military judge in 1982.   The Czech Constitution, which came into force on 1 January 1993, abolished military courts. By a decision of the Minister for Defence dated 28 September 1993, the applicant was dismissed from the regular armed forces with effect from 31 December 1993 under Law no.   76/1959 on certain conditions of military service ( zákon o některých služebních poměrech vojáků ). Under that law, the applicant was entitled to a military pension ( výsluhový příspěvek ) and a severance allowance ( odchodné ). In December 1993 he agreed to be transferred to the Ostrava Regional Court with effect from 1 January 1994.   By section II-2 of Law no. 304/1993, which came into force on 1 January 1994, payment of the pensions of former military judges who had agreed to be transferred to the ordinary courts was suspended until the end of their terms of office as judges. While acknowledging the applicant’s entitlement to a pension, Prague Military Social Security Office ( vojenský úřad sociálního zabezpečení ) decided on 27 January 1994 that payment of the pension should be suspended until the end of his term of office as a judge. The Ministry of Defence dismissed an appeal by the applicant against that decision.   The applicant and nine former military judges who were in a similar position applied to the national courts to have the relevant decisions of the Ministry of Defence set aside. On an application by one of them, a bench of the Constitutional Court held that the provision was discriminatory and did not apply to those who had left the armed forces at the time of its entry into force. It asked the full Constitutional Court to abrogate the provision, but in a judgment of 8 October 1996 the full court refused that request. Consequently, the applicant’s application to set aside, whose examination had been stayed pending the full Constitutional Court’s decision, was dismissed by the High Court, and a number of constitutional appeals by others concerning the same issue were likewise unsuccessful.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 16 May 1997. It was referred to the Court on 1 November 1998. In a decision of 27 April 2000 it was declared partly admissible.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Jean-Paul Costa (French), President , András Baka (Hungarian), Gaukur Jörundsson (Icelandic), Loukis Loucaides (Cypriot), Viera Strážnická (Slovakian), Corneliu Bîrsan (Romanian), Mindia Ugrekhelidze (Georgian), judges , and also Lawrence Early , Deputy Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   Relying on Article 14 of the Convention (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of propriety), the applicant submitted that the suspension of payment of his pension had interfered with his right of property in a manner that was discriminatory in relation to former members of the armed forces whose position was the same as his own, yet who were in receipt of a pension without there being any objective or reasonable basis for such a distinction.   Decision of the Court   Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 The Court noted that the Government had acknowledged that at least two categories of former members of the regular armed forces continued to receive a pension: former military judges who had become ordinary judges during 1994 and former military prosecutors who had become ordinary judges. In the case of the former military prosecutors, the Court was not persuaded by the Government’s argument that their redeployment as ordinary judges was a radical change. The legal qualifications and knowledge needed to carry on an occupation as a prosecutor and as a judge were, in the Court’s opinion, identical.   The Court considered that there had indisputably been a difference in treatment between various categories of former members of the armed forces as regards payment of their pensions. The Government argued that such a difference was justified by the fact that some former soldiers had encountered problems in changing jobs, considerable effort and personal initiative having been required, whereas former members of the armed forces who were in the applicant’s position had had the benefit of job security and automatic redeployment. In the Court’s opinion, the criteria relating to effort and initiative in seeking employment were by definition subjective and could not justify differential treatment in relation to persons in a similar position. Even if the State’s margin of appreciation in controlling property was taken into account, the Government had not justified the distinction made in the present case. The Court therefore considered that the difference in treatment between various categories of former members of the armed forces had no objective or reasonable justification. Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   The Court further held that it was not necessary to examine the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken alone.     ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] .     Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] .     This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.