CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 17 décembre 2002

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .sA3022B31 { margin-left:10.52pt; padding-left:17.83pt; font-family:serif } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s3964C3A3 { width:1.36pt; display:inline-block } .s901C2590 { width:56.7pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     644   17.12.2002   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF A. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of A. v. the United Kingdom (application no. 35373/97). The Court held:   by 6 votes to 1, that there had been no violation of 6 §   1 (right to a fair hearing) of the European Convention on Human Rights; by six votes to one, that there had been no violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private life); unanimously, that there had been no violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken in conjunction with Article 6; by six votes to one, that there had been no violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy).   (The judgment is available only in English.)   1.     Principal facts   A. is a United Kingdom national, born in 1971, who lives in Bristol. She is a young black woman with two children.   During a parliamentary debate on municipal housing policy in July 1996, A.’s Member of Parliament (MP) named her, stated that her brother was in prison, gave her precise address and made derogatory remarks about the behaviour of both her and her children. He mentioned verbal abuse, truancy, vandalism and drug activity and called the family the “neighbours from hell”, a phrase which was subsequently quoted in local and national newspapers.   A. states that none of the allegations referred to by her MP had ever been substantiated or upheld by the investigating authorities and that many of them came from neighbours motivated by racism and spite. Following the MP’s speech and the ensuing adverse publicity, she received racist hate-mail. The responsible housing association was advised that she and her children should be moved as a matter of urgency three weeks after the speech was given. They were eventually re-housed in October 1996 and the children were obliged to change schools.   The MP’s statement was protected by absolute parliamentary privilege under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. The press reports, to the extent that they reported the parliamentary debate, were protected by qualified privilege. This privilege requires the reports to be fair and accurate and is only lost if they are published for improper motives or with “reckless indifference” to the truth.     2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 13 January 1997 and transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998. A hearing was held on 5 March 2002 and on the same day the Chamber unanimously declared the application admissible. Third party interventions were submitted by the Austrian, Belgian, Netherlands, Finnish, French, Irish, Italian and Norwegian Governments.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Jean-Paul Costa (French), President , András Baka (Hungarian), Nicolas Bratza (British), Gaukur Jörundsson (Icelandic), Loukis Loucaides (Cypriot), Corneliu Bîrsan (Romanian), Mindia Ugrekhelidze (Georgian), judges , and also Sally Dollé , Section Registrar .     3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints A. complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that, given the absolute nature of parliamentary privilege, she was denied access to a court to defend her reputation and that legal aid was not available for defamation proceedings. She also relied on Articles 8, 13 and 14 in that she was disadvantaged, compared to a person about whom equivalent statements had been made in an unprivileged context.   Decision of the Court   Article 6 § 1   Parliamentary Immunity The Court observed that the parliamentary immunity enjoyed by the MP in the present case pursued the legitimate aims of protecting free speech in Parliament and maintaining the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary.   The Court maintained that a rule of parliamentary immunity, which was consistent with and reflected generally-recognised rules within Member States of the Council of Europe and the European Union, could not in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to court as embodied in Article 6 § 1. Just as the right of access to court was an inherent part of the fair trial guarantee in that Article, so some restrictions on access had likewise to be regarded as inherent.   The immunity afforded to MPs in the United Kingdom appeared to be in several respects narrower than that afforded to members of legislatures in certain other European States. In particular, the immunity concerned only statements made in the course of parliamentary debates on the floor of the House of Commons or House of Lords and not to statements made outside Parliament, even if they amounted to a repetition of statements made during the course of Parliamentary debates on matters of public interest. Nor did any immunity attach to an MP’s press statements published prior to parliamentary debates, even if their contents were repeated subsequently in the debate itself.   The absolute immunity enjoyed by MPs was moreover designed to protect the interests of Parliament as a whole as opposed to those of individual MPs, as illustrated by the fact that the immunity did not apply outside Parliament. In contrast, the immunity which protected those engaged in the reporting of parliamentary proceedings, and that enjoyed by elected representatives in local government, were qualified in nature.   The Court observed that victims of defamatory misstatement in Parliament were not entirely without means of redress. In particular, they could, where their own MP had made the offending remarks, petition the House through any other MP with a view to securing a retraction. In extreme cases, deliberately misleading statements might be punishable by Parliament as a contempt. General control was exercised over debates by the Speaker of each House. The Court considered all these factors to be of relevance to the question of proportionality of the immunity enjoyed by the MP in the present case.   It followed that the application of a rule of absolute Parliamentary immunity could not be said to exceed the margin of appreciation allowed to States in limiting an individual’s right of access to court.   The Court agreed with the applicant’s submissions to the effect that the allegations made about her in the MP’s speech were extremely serious and clearly unnecessary in the context of a debate about municipal housing policy. The MP’s repeated reference to her name and address was particularly regrettable. The Court considered that the unfortunate consequences of the MP’s comments for the lives of the applicant and her children were entirely foreseeable. However, those factors could not alter the Court’s conclusion as to the proportionality of the parliamentary immunity at issue, since the creation of exceptions to that immunity, the application of which depended upon the individual facts of any particular case, would seriously undermine the legitimate aims pursued.     There had, accordingly, been no violation of Article 6 § 1 regarding the parliamentary immunity enjoyed by the MP.   Legal Aid The Court noted that the applicant was entitled to an initial two hours’ free legal advice under the “Green Form” scheme and, after July 1998, could have engaged a solicitor under conditional fee arrangements. Although she would have remained exposed to a potential costs order in the event that any legal proceedings were unsuccessful, she would have been able to evaluate the risks in an informed manner before deciding whether or not to proceed had she taken advantage of the “Green Form” scheme. The Court concluded that the unavailability of legal aid for the purposes of bringing defamation proceedings in respect of the unprivileged press statement did not prevent the applicant from having effective access to court. There had, therefore, been no violation of Article 6 § 1 regarding the unavailability of legal aid.   Article 8 Having found that the central issues that arose in relation to the applicant’s Article 8 complaint were the same as those arising in relation to her Article 6 § 1 complaint about the parliamentary immunity enjoyed by the MP, the Court found no violation of Article 8.   Article 14 The Court considered that the applicant’s Article 14 complaint raised issues which were identical to those already examined in relation to Article 6 § 1. In any event, no analogy could be drawn between what was said in parliamentary debates and what was said in ordinary speech so as to engage Article 14. There had therefore been no violation of Article 14.   Aticle 13 The Court recalled that Article 13 did not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State’s primary legislation to be challenged before a national authority on grounds that it was contrary to the Convention. The Court therefore held that there had been no violation of Article 13.     Judges Costa and Loucaides expressed a concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion respectively, both of which are annexed to the judgment.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] .     Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] .     This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.