CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 2 mai 2000

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s21B97EC1 { width:25.99pt; display:inline-block } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s127C7598 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sCB27B9E { width:16.66pt; display:inline-block } .sC5412BEF { width:51.05pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     306   2.5.2000   Press release issued by the Registrar   JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF CONDRON v. the UNITED KINGDOM     In a judgment [1] delivered at Strasbourg on 2 May 2000 in the case of Condron v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to a fair trial). Under Article   41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicants GBP   15,000 for legal costs and expenses.   1.   Principal facts   The applicants, William Condron, an Irish citizen, and Karen Condron, a British citizen, were respectively born in 1965 and 1963 and were living in London at the time of the events giving rise to their application.   The applicants stood trial between 16 October 1995 and 2 November 1995 on charges of supplying heroin and possession of heroin with intent to supply. The prosecution case relied, among other things, on the fact that a police surveillance team had observed the applicants passing various items to their neighbour and co-accused from the balcony of their flat.   At the time of their interview with the police, the applicants’ solicitor considered that they were not fit to be questioned since they were suffering from heroin withdrawal symptoms; the doctor who examined them at the police station disagreed with their solicitor’s assessment. Before the start of their interview the applicants were cautioned. During the interview the applicants remained silent and did not reply to questions concerning the above-mentioned items. The applicants gave evidence at their trial and offered an explanation as to why certain items were seen to be exchanged over their balcony. The applicants also declared that they had not answered police questions because their solicitor had advised that they were not in a fit condition to be interviewed. With reference to section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (“the   1994 Act”) the trial judge gave the jury the option of drawing an adverse inference from the applicants’ silence during interview. The applicants were found guilty. Although the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's direction to the jury on the question of the applicants' silence deficient, it was satisfied that the convictions were safe.   2.   Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 13 November 1996. On 1 November 1998, the case was transmitted to the Court, which declared the application admissible on 7 September 1999.   A hearing was held on 25 January 2000.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven   judges, composed as follows:   Jean-Paul Costa (French), President , Sir   Nicolas Bratza (British), Loukis Loucaides (Cypriot), Pranas Kūris (Lithuanian), Willi Fuhrmann (Austrian), Hanne Sophie Greve (Norwegian), Kristaq Traja (Albanian), Judges,   and also Sally Dollé , Section Registrar .   3.   Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaint   The applicants complained that their right to a fair trial, guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was violated on account of the decision of the trial judge to leave the jury with the option of drawing an adverse inference from their silence when interviewed by the police.   Decision of the Court   Article 6 § 1 of the Convention   The Court observed with reference to its earlier judgment in the case of John Murray v. United Kingdom [3] that the right to silence cannot be considered an absolute right. Whether the drawing of inferences from an accused’s silence during police interview infringed Article 6 was a matter to be determined in the light of all the circumstances of the case. For the Court, the fact that the question of an accused’s silence was left to the jury could not, of itself, be considered incompatible with Article 6. However, given that the right to silence lay at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure guaranteed by that Article, the Court stressed, in line with its John Murray judgment, that particular caution was required before a domestic court could invoke an accused’s silence against him. It reiterated in this connection that it would be incompatible with the right to silence to base a conviction solely or mainly on the accused’s silence or on a refusal to answer questions or to give evidence himself. This being said, it was obvious that the right cannot and should not prevent that the accused’s silence, in situations which clearly call for an explanation from him, be taken into account in assessing the persuasiveness of the evidence adduced by the prosecution.   The Court noted that the domestic law of the respondent State provided a number of safeguards in order to ensure that a proper balance was struck between an accused’s exercise of his right to silence and the drawing of an adverse inference from that fact at a jury trial. It observed that the applicants in the instant case were not exposed to any penal sanction on account of their decision to remain silent and were cautioned in clear terms about the possible consequences of their decision.   Notwithstanding the presence of these safeguards, the Court found fault with the manner in which the trial judge directed the jury on the issue of the applicants’ silence. In its opinion, the terms of the direction could not be said to reflect the balance which the Court in its John Murray judgment sought to strike between the right to silence and the circumstances in which an adverse inference may be drawn from silence. It noted that the applicants put forward an explanation at their trial for their failure to mention during the police interview why certain items were exchanged between them and their co-accused. They testified that they remained silent on their solicitor’s advice. Although the trial judge drew the jury’s attention to the applicants’ explanation for their silence, the Court considered that he did so in terms which left the jury at liberty to draw an adverse inference notwithstanding that it may have been satisfied as to the plausibility of the explanation. In the Court’s opinion, as a matter of fairness, the jury should have been directed that if it was satisfied that the applicants’ silence at the police interview could not sensibly be attributed to their having no answer or none that would stand up to cross-examination it should not draw an adverse inference.   The Court considered that a direction to that effect was more than merely “desirable”, as found by the Court of Appeal. It noted that the responsibility for deciding whether or not to draw an inference rested with the jury and it was impossible to ascertain what weight, if any, was given to the applicants’ silence since a jury did not provide reasons for its decisions.   The Court did not accept the Governments’ submission that the fairness of the applicants’ trial was secured in view of the appeal proceedings. It stated in this connection that the Court of Appeal had no means of ascertaining whether or not the applicants’ silence played a significant role in the jury’s decision to convict. It noted that the Court of Appeal was concerned with the safety of the applicants’ conviction, not whether they had in the circumstances received a fair trial. Since the jury was not properly directed the imperfection in the direction could not be remedied on appeal.   In view of the above considerations the Court concluded that the applicants were denied a fair hearing, in violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.   Article 6 § 2 of the Convention   The Court held that the applicants’ complaint under this head gave rise to no separate issue.   Article 6 § 3 of the Convention   Having regard to its finding on the applicants’ complaint under Article 6 § 1, the Court considered that it was not necessary to examine their complaints from the standpoint of paragraph 3 (b) and (c) of Article 6.   Article 41 of the Convention   The Court held that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article   44   §   2 of the Convention, for costs and expenses, 15,000 (fifteen thousand) pounds sterling, in addition to any value-added tax that may be chargeable.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: (0)3 90 21 42 15) Fax: (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17-member Grand Chamber of the Court.   In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.   [2] This summary by the registry does not bind the Court. [3] Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I