CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 19 septembre 2000

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s21B97EC1 { width:25.99pt; display:inline-block } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s3F6263AE { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-28.35pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s767420C5 { width:17.01pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s42340EA { width:16.35pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sCB27B9E { width:16.66pt; display:inline-block } .sC5412BEF { width:51.05pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     613   19.9.2000   Press release issued by the Registrar   JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF I.J.L., G.M.R. AND A.K.P. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM   In a judgment [1] delivered at Strasbourg on 19 September 2000 in the case of I.J.L., G.M.R. and A.K.P. v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights as regards the use made by the prosecution at the applicants’ trial of statements which they had been compelled under statute to give to inspectors appointed by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The Court further held, unanimously, that there had been no breach of Article 6 §   1 as regards the applicants’ other complaints about the fairness of their trial.   The Court made no award of damages under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention but reserved the question of the application of Article 41 as regards costs and expenses.   1.   Principal facts   On 28 November 1986 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry appointed inspectors to investigate the acquisition of the Distillers company by Guinness following allegations and rumours to the effect that certain persons had engaged in an unlawful share support operation to ensure that Guinness’ bid would be successful.   In the first half of 1987 the applicants were interviewed separately by the inspectors on various occasions. They were required by law to answer the questions put to them. Failure to do so could lead to a determination by a court that they were in contempt and the imposition of a fine or a prison sentence of up to two years. Already in January 1987, the DTI inspectors notified the Secretary of State that they had found evidence of possible criminal offences. The Secretary of State required the inspectors to inform him of any matters coming to their knowledge as a result of their investigations. The transcripts and documents obtained as a result of the interviews with the inspectors were passed on to the Crown Prosecution Service after receipt and consideration by the Department of Trade and Industry. In the first week of May 1987 the police were formally asked by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions to carry out a criminal investigation. The transcripts of the interviews were then passed on to the police.   The first applicant was charged on 8 October 1987 with nine offences relating to invoices he had caused to be submitted for advice he had given during the Guinness bid. On 13 October 1987 the second applicant was charged with eight offences relating to invoices which two companies, both wholly owned subsidiaries of the company of which he was director, had submitted for the loss on the sale of Guinness shares and for the success fee paid after the successful outcome of the Guinness bid. The third applicant was arrested in America on 30   September 1987 and was charged on his return to the United Kingdom with six offences relating to two invoices and the success fees which he had charged to Guinness following its takeover of Distillers. In total, seven persons were charged with offences in relation to the takeover including the Chairman of Guinness at the material time, Ernest Saunders.   The applicants and their co-defendants were sent for trial at the Crown Court in April 1989.   At a preliminary stage of the proceedings in the Crown Court, the third applicant requested that the interviews contained in the DTI transcripts be ruled inadmissible. The court refused his request.   At their trial the applicants, who were tried with Mr Saunders, denied any involvement in wrongdoing. The prosecution sought to prove the case against them by using the transcripts of the statements they made to the inspectors. At one stage in the trial the prosecution read out to the jury over a three-day period transcripts of the applicants’ interviews.   In August 1990 the Crown Court convicted the applicants on various counts of conspiracy, false accounting and theft and sentenced them accordingly. In May 1991 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicants’ appeals.   On 22 December 1994 the Secretary of State decided to refer the case of the applicants and their co-defendants back to the Court of Appeal in the light of evidence which had not been disclosed at their trial. This evidence related to City of London takeover practices and had been disclosed to other defendants who had faced separate criminal proceedings arising out of the Guinness bid. On 27   November 1995 the Court of Appeal again rejected the applicants’ appeal and on 6 December 1995 refused to certify a point of law of general public importance for appeal to the House of Lords.   2.   Procedure and composition of the Court   The applications were lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights by the applicants, respectively, on 30   November, 18 December and 8 December 1995. The applications were joined by the Commission and were declared partly admissible on 9   April 1997.   Under the transitional provisions of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the case was transmitted to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on 1 November 1998, the date on which the Protocol entered into force.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Jean-Paul Costa (French), President , Willi Fuhrmann (Austrian), Loukis Loucaides (Cypriot), Françoise Tulkens (Belgian), Karel Jungwiert (Czech), Nicolas Bratza (British), Kristaq Traja (Albanian), judges ,   and also Sally Dollé , Section Registrar .   3.   Summary of the judgment [1]   Complaints   The applicants complained that their right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights had been breached in a number of respects, namely: the use made by the prosecution at their trial of statements which they had been compelled to supply to DTI inspectors at the pre-trial stage; the refusal of the prosecution to disclose documents of relevance to their defence; improper collusion between the prosecution and other agencies; and the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings.   Decision of the Court   Article 6 § 1 of the Convention   A.   Use by the prosecution of transcripts of applicants’ interviews with DTI inspectors.   The Court observed that the Government conceded that there had been a violation of Article   6 § 1 having regard to the Court’s finding in the Saunders v. the United Kingdom judgment of 17 December 1996 in respect of a similar complaint. The Court saw no reason in the instant case to reach a different conclusion. As with their co-defendant, Mr Saunders, the prosecution read out to the jury over a three-day period the transcripts of the applicants’ interviews with the DTI inspectors in a manner intended to incriminate them. It accordingly found that there had been an infringement of the applicants’ right not to incriminate themselves and Article 6 § 1 had been violated in consequence.   Having regard to that finding, the Court further ruled that the applicants’ complaint under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention gave rise to no separate issue.   B.   Alleged improper collusion between DTI inspectors and other agencies   The applicants maintained that the material which the inspectors obtained from them under compulsory powers was provided directly to the Department of Trade and Industry and then passed to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions in furtherance of carefully worked out arrangements. The applicants further maintained that this strategy was kept hidden from them so as to ensure their continued co-operation with the inspectors and in order to postpone, intentionally, the intervention of the police, the benefit of pre-trial safeguards and the formal preferment of criminal charges.   The Court did not accept the applicants’ allegations that there had been improper collusion. It noted that the Court of Appeal carefully examined the allegations and rejected them on the facts following lengthy adversarial argument and in the light of all supporting material. With reference to its own examination of the material relied on by the applicants in support of their claim, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeal’s decision could not be considered manifestly unreasonable or in any other way arbitrary.   The Court, with reference to its case law, did not accept the applicants’ submission that the inspectors were in effect determining “criminal charges” against them within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. For the Court, the central issue raised by the applicants’ complaint under this head was the use made at the applicants’ trial of the evidence which they were obliged to give to the inspectors. On that point the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the applicants’ claim that Article 6 guarantees should have applied already at the stage of the proceedings before the inspectors did not alter that conclusion. Although the applicants maintained that, in the absence of the transcripts, a prosecution could never have been mounted against them, the Court observed that it could not speculate as to the other means which the prosecuting authorities may have deployed in order to put them on trial.   The Court therefore found that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1.   C.   Alleged non-disclosure of material of relevance to applicants’ defence   The applicants alleged that the prosecution deliberately withheld material which would have allowed them to prove at their trial that their conduct at the time of the Guinness bid was compatible with City of London takeover practices. They further submitted that the authorities failed to supply material which confirmed, in their view, that there was improper collusion between DTI inspectors and other agencies.   The Court observed that all the material relied on by the applicants was disclosed to them before the start of the second Court of Appeal proceedings and the applicants had a full opportunity to persuade the Court of Appeal that their convictions were unsafe on account of the prosecution’s failure to disclose this material. It further noted that the Court of Appeal extensively reviewed the material and considered the possible prejudice its non-disclosure may have had on the applicants’ trial. The Court of Appeal concluded that the material did not bear out their allegations of improper collusion between DTI inspectors and other agencies and that even though the prosecution should have disclosed the materials concerning City of London takeover practices, this particular omission did not occasion them any prejudice.   The Court reiterated that, having studied the materials relied on by the applicants in support of their claim of improper collusion, it was not persuaded that this allegation had been substantiated. As to the defect identified by the Court of Appeal in respect of the prosecution’s failure to disclose material relating to takeover practices in the City of London, the Court considered that this shortcoming was remedied by the Court of Appeal’s extensive review of the issue.   Accordingly, the Court held that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1.   D.   Alleged unreasonableness of length of criminal proceedings   The Court observed that the period to be considered for assessing the reasonableness of the   length of the proceedings ran from the dates when the first and second applicants were charged (8 and 13 October 1987) and the third applicant was arrested (30   September 1987). The period ended with the delivery of the Court of Appeal’s second judgment on 25   November 1995 to the exclusion of the period between 16 May 1991 and 22 December 1994 which, in the Court’s opinion, did not involve the determination of criminal charges against the applicants. For the Court, the period to be assessed was therefore about four-and-a-half years.   Having regard to its established criteria for assessing the reasonableness of the length of the criminal proceedings (the complexity of the case and the conduct of the parties), the Court concluded that the criminal charges against the applicants were determined within a reasonable time and that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 on that account.   Article 41   The Court dismissed any claims which the applicants might wish to recover by way of pecuniary damages and held that a finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 as regards the use made by the prosecution of their interviews with DTI inspectors constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage which they may have sustained.   As to costs and expenses, the Court reserved the question and invited the applicants to lodge within two months written submissions on this matter. It also invited the Government to submit their written comments on the applicants’ claim within two months of receipt of the applicants’ claim and, in particular, to notify the Court of any agreement reached between them and the applicants.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: (0)3 90 21 42 15) Fax: (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17-member Grand Chamber of the Court.   In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.   [1] .     This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.