CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 6 juin 2000

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s21B97EC1 { width:25.99pt; display:inline-block } .s13F94BDE { font-family:Arial; letter-spacing:-0.1pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sCB27B9E { width:16.66pt; display:inline-block } .sC5412BEF { width:51.05pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85016119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s7A5A2521 { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   405   6.6.2000   Press release issued by the Registrar   JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF MAGEE v. UNITED KINGDOM   In a judgment [1] 1 notified in writing on 6 June 2000 in the case of Magee v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 in conjunction with Article 6 § 3(c) (right to a fair trial; right to legal assistance) of the European Convention on Human Rights. It further held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 6. Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicant 10,000 pounds sterling in respect of legal costs and expenses, minus the amount he received under the Council of Europe’s legal aid scheme.   1.   Principal facts   The applicant, Gerard Magee, an Irish citizen, was born in 1964 and lives in Belfast, Northern Ireland .   On 16 December 1988 the applicant was arrested under section 12 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1984 in connection with an attempted bomb attack on military personnel. He was taken to Castlereagh Police Office. He was refused access to a solicitor until 1 p.m. on 18   December 1988. During that period he was questioned intensely by rotating teams of detectives about his part in the bombing incident. He admitted to his involvement at the 6th interview which took place between 9.30 a.m. and 1 p.m. on 17 December 1988 and signed a lengthy confession statement.   The applicant was convicted on 21 December 1990 by a judge sitting alone. The applicant did not give evidence at his trial.   2.   Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 6 June 1994. The case was transmitted to the European Court of Human Rights on 1   November 1998 and declared partly admissible on 14 September 1999. Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows: Jean-Paul Costa (French), President , Willi Fuhrmann (Austrian), Loukis Loucaides (Cypriot), Pranas Kūris (Lithuanian), Sir Nicolas Bratza (British), Hanne Sophie Greve (Norwegian), Kristaq Traja (Albanian), judges ,   and also Sally Dollé , Section Registrar .   3.   Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   The applicant complained that his right to fair trial guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights taken in conjunction with Article 6 § 3 (c) had been breached. He further complained that he had been discriminated against in breach of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 6 § 1.   Decision of the Court   Articles 6 § 1 and 6 § 3(c)   The Court observed that no adverse inferences were drawn by the trial judge from the applicant’s failure to testify at his trial. It confined itself therefore to the central issue raised by the applicant’s case, namely that he had been prevailed upon in the coercive environment of Castlereagh Police Office to incriminate himself without the benefit of legal advice.   The Court noted that the applicant had made a specific request to see a solicitor on arrival at Castlereagh Police Office. However, a decision was taken to delay access and he was questioned for more than forty-eight hours without having the benefit of legal advice. During this time he was to all intents and purposes kept incommunicado and intensively questioned by teams of police officers operating in relays. In the Court’s view, the austerity of the conditions of the applicant’s detention and his exclusion from outside contact were intended to be psychologically coercive and conducive to breaking down any resolve he may have manifested at the beginning of his detention to remain silent. As a matter of procedural fairness the applicant should have been given access to a solicitor at the initial stages of his interrogation as a counterweight to the intimidating atmosphere specifically devised to sap his will and make him confide in his interrogators. The Court further noted that the caution administered to him at the start of the bouts of interrogation was an additional form of pressure which argued in favour of allowing him to consult a lawyer.   The Court did not dispute the findings of the domestic courts that the applicant had not been subjected to ill-treatment during his interrogation. However, it remained the case that the applicant was deprived of legal assistance for over forty-eight hours and the incriminating statements which he made at the end of the first twenty-four hours became the central platform of the prosecution’s case and the basis for his conviction.   The Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 taken in conjunction with Article 6 § 3(c) as regards the denial of access to a solicitor.   Article 14   The Court rejected the applicant’s arguments that he was unfairly discriminated against since people arrested under prevention of terrorism legislation in England and Wales are entitled to immediate access to a solicitor. In the Court’s opinion, the difference in treatment between people arrested and detained in Northern Ireland and those arrested and detained in other parts of the United Kingdom under such legislation is to be explained in terms of geographical location and not personal characteristics of the type referred to in Article 14.   Accordingly there had been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 6.   Article 41   The Court awarded the applicant GBP 10,000 in respect of costs and expenses, minus the amount he received by way of legal aid from the Council of Europe.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: (0)3 90 21 42 15) Fax: (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. 1 Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17-member Grand Chamber of the Court.   In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.