CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 3 avril 2001

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s4060989B { margin-left:10.52pt; text-align:justify; padding-left:7.48pt; font-family:serif } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sCB27B9E { width:16.66pt; display:inline-block } .sC5412BEF { width:51.05pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     237   3.4.2001   Press release issued by the Registrar   JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF KEENAN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM     The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing judgment in the case of Keenan v. the United Kingdom (no.27229/95) [1] . The Court held:   unanimously, that there had been no violation of Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights; by five votes to two, that there had been a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the Convention; unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the Convention.   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicant 10,000 pounds sterling for non-pecuniary damage and 21,000 pounds sterling for legal costs and expenses.     1.     Principal facts   The applicant, Susan Keenan, a British national born in 1935, is the mother of Mark Keenan who died in HM Prison Exeter (England), at the age of 28, from asphyxia caused by self-suspension.   Mark Keenan had been receiving intermittent anti-psychotic medication from the age of 21 and his medical history included symptoms of paranoia, aggression, violence and deliberate self-harm.   On 1 April 1993, he was admitted to Exeter prison, initially to the prison health care centre, to serve a four-month prison sentence for assault on his girlfriend. Various attempts to move him to the ordinary prison were unsuccessful, as his condition deteriorated whenever he was transferred.   On 1 May 1993, after the question of being transferred to the main prison was raised with him, Mr Keenan assaulted two hospital officers, one seriously. He was placed the same day in a segregation unit of the prison punishment block. On 14 May, he was found guilty of assault and his overall prison sentence increased by 28 days, including seven extra days in segregation in the punishment block, effectively delaying his release date from 23 May 1993 to 20 June. At 6.35 p.m. on 15 May 1993, he was discovered by the two prison officers hanging from the bars of his cell by a ligature made from a bed sheet. At 7.05 p.m. he was pronounced dead. 2.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   The applicant alleged that her son had died from suicide in prison due to a failure to protect his life by the prison authorities, that he had suffered inhuman and degrading treatment due to the conditions of detention imposed on him and that she had no effective remedy in respect of her complaints. She relied on Articles 2, 3 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.   Decision of the Court   Article 2   In deciding whether there had been a violation of Article 2, the Court examined whether the authorities knew or ought to have known there was a real and immediate risk of Mark Keenan committing suicide and whether they did all that could be reasonably expected of them, having regard to the nature of the risk.   The Court noted that schizophrenics, suffered from a condition in which the risk of committing suicide was well-known and high. However, while   it was common ground that Mark Keenan was mentally ill, no formal diagnosis of schizophrenia provided by a psychiatric doctor had been submitted to the Court. It could not therefore be concluded that he was at immediate risk throughout the period of detention, although the variability of his condition required that he be monitored carefully.   Deciding whether the prison authorities did all that was reasonably expected of them, the Court found that, on the whole, the authorities made a reasonable response to his conduct, placing him in hospital care and under watch when he showed suicidal tendencies. He was subject to daily medical supervision by the prison doctors, who on two occasions had consulted external psychiatrists who had knowledge of his case. The prison doctors, who could have required his removal from segregation at any time, found him fit for segregation. There was no reason to alert the authorities on 15 May 1993 that he was in a disturbed state of mind rendering an attempt at suicide likely.   It was not therefore apparent that the authorities omitted any step which should have reasonably been taken.   Article 3   In deciding whether Mr Keenan had been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, within the meaning of Article 3, the Court was struck by the lack of medical notes concerning Mark Keenan, who was an identifiable suicide risk and undergoing the additional stresses that could be foreseen from segregation and, later, disciplinary punishment. From 5 May to 15 May 1993, there were no entries in his medical notes. Given that there were a number of prison doctors who were involved in caring for him, this showed an inadequate concern to maintain full and detailed records of his mental state and undermined the effectiveness of any monitoring or supervision process.   Further, while the prison senior medical officer consulted Mark Keenan’s doctor on admission and the visiting psychiatrist, who knew him, had been called to see him on 29 April 1993, the Court noted that there was no subsequent reference to a psychiatrist. Even though Dr Rowe had warned on 29 April 1993 that Mark Keenan should be kept from association until his paranoid feelings had died down, the question of returning to the main prison was raised with him the next day. When his condition proceeded to deteriorate, a prison doctor, unqualified in psychiatry, reverted to Mark Keenan’s previous medication without reference to the psychiatrist who had originally recommended a change. The assault on the two prison officers followed. Though Mark Keenan asked the prison doctor to point out to the governor at the adjudication that the assault occurred after a change in medication, there was no reference to a psychiatrist for advice either as to his future treatment or his fitness for adjudication and punishment.   The Court found the lack of effective monitoring of Mark Keenan’s condition and the lack of informed psychiatric input into his assessment and treatment disclosed significant defects in the medical care provided to a mentally-ill person known to be a suicide risk. The belated imposition on him in those circumstances of a serious disciplinary punishment – seven days’ segregation in the punishment block and an additional 28 days to his sentence imposed two weeks after the event and only nine days before his expected date of release – which may well have threatened his physical and moral resistance, was not compatible with the standard of treatment required in respect of a mentally-ill person.   Article 13   The Court observed that two issues arose under Article 13: whether Mark Keenan himself had available to him a remedy in respect of the punishment inflicted on him and whether, after his suicide, the applicant, either on her own behalf or as the representative of her son’s estate, had a remedy available to her.   Concerning Mark Keenan, the Court noted that the punishment of further imprisonment and segregation was imposed on him on 14 May 1993 and that he committed suicide on the evening of 15 May 1993. The Government, as the European Commission of Human Rights had found, could not be liable for failing to provide a remedy which would have been available to him within a period of 24 hours.   However, no remedy at all was available to Mark Keenan which would have offered him the prospect of challenging the punishment imposed within the seven-day segregation period or even within the period of 28 days’ additional imprisonment. Even assuming judicial review would have provided a means of challenging the Governor’s adjudication, it would not have been possible for Mark Keenan to obtain legal aid, legal representation and lodge an application within such a short time period. Similarly, the internal avenue of complaint against adjudication to the Prison Headquarters took an estimated six weeks.   If it were the case, as has been suggested, that Mark Keenan was not in a fit mental state to make use of any available remedy, this would point to the need for the automatic review of an adjudication. The Court moreover is not persuaded that effective recourse against the adjudication would not have influenced the course of events. Mark Keenan had been punished in circumstances disclosing a breach of Article 3 and he had the right, under Article 13, to a remedy which would have quashed that punishment before it had either been executed or come to an end.   Turning to the remedies available after Mark Keenan’s death, the Court noted that the inquest did not provide a remedy for determining the liability of the authorities for any alleged mistreatment, or for providing compensation.   The applicant should have been able to apply for compensation for her non-pecuniary damage and that suffered by her son before his death.   Moreover, no effective remedy was available to the applicant, which would have established where responsibility lay for her son’s death. In the Court’s view, this was an essential element of a remedy under Article 13 for a bereaved parent.         Judges Willi Fuhrmann and Pranas Kūris (judges elected in respect of Austria and Lithuania) expressed a partly dissenting opinion and Judge Jean-Paul Costa (elected in respect of France) and Sir Stephen Sedley (ad hoc judge appointed in respect of the United Kingdom) expressed concurring opinions, which are annexed to the judgment.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: (0)3 90 21 42 15) Fax: (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] The judgment is only available in English. [2] .     This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.