CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 4 février 2003

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s560DCDD3 { margin-left:10.52pt; padding-left:7.48pt; font-family:serif } .s539AFE2E { margin-left:21.3pt; text-indent:-21.3pt; font-family:serif; list-style-position:inside } .s4849110A { width:3.68pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .sF1664B87 { margin-left:28.35pt; text-indent:-28.35pt; font-family:serif; list-style-position:inside } .s90404E59 { width:6.48pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sD3427EA2 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline } .s3964C3A3 { width:1.36pt; display:inline-block } .s901C2590 { width:56.7pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     068   4.2.2003 Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENTS IN THE CASES OF VAN DER VEN v. THE NETHERLANDS and LORSÉ AND OTHERS v. THE NETHERLANDS   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing two judgments [1] in the cases of Van der Ven v. the Netherlands (application no. 50901/99) and Lorsé and others v. the Netherlands (no. 52750/99). The Court held unanimously that there had been:   In the case of Van der Ven v. the Netherlands a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the European Convention on Human Rights; no violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention.   In the case of Lorsé and others v. the Netherlands    a violation of Article   3 in respect of Mr   Lorsé    no violation of Article   3 in respect of the other applicants;     no violation of Article   8 ;     no violation of Article   13 (right to an effective remedy).   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction), the Court awarded Mr van der Ven 3,000 euros (EUR) and Mr Lorsé EUR 453.78 for non-pecuniary damage. The Court also awarded EUR 2,195 to Mr Lorsé for costs and expenses. (Both judgments are available only in English.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicants, all Netherlands nationals, are: Franciscus Cornelis van der Ven, born in 1949; Jacobus Lorsé, born in 1945; Mr Lorsé’s wife Everdina   Lorsé-Quint, born in 1961; their three children; and, four other children born to the applicant from previous relationships. Mr van der Ven and Mr Lorsé are currently in prison in Maastricht and Dordrecht respectively and the other applicants are all resident in Maastricht or Rotterdam.   The cases concerned the treatment of Mr van der Ven and Mr Lorsé while being detained in extra-security institutions ( Extra Beveiligde Inrichting - EBI) within the Nieuw Vosseveld Penitentiary Complex in Vught, the Netherlands. Mr Lorsé was the longest-serving prisoner in a maximum-security regime in the Netherlands.   Mr van der Ven was detained on remand on 11   September 1995 and, on 29 October 1997, transferred to the EBI. Mr Lorsé was taken into police custody on 24   July   1994 and subsequently placed in detention on remand. On 27 September 1994 he was detained in the temporary EBI and, after 30 June 1998, the EBI.   The applicants complained, in particular, about the lack of human contact in the EBI. Among other things, visits were generally only authorised with a glass partition in place. Visits without the partition (“open visits”) were allowed only once monthly with spouses, parents and children and the only physical contact permitted was a handshake at the beginning and end of the visit.   Inmates were also strip-searched prior to open visits as well as visits to the clinic, hairdresser or dentist and subjected to strip search once a week, including an anal inspection, even where they had had no contact with the outside world in the previous week.   The applicants alleged that this regime had a negative effect on their psychological stability. Mr van der Ven was deemed by psychologists to be “capable of acts of desperation” and found to have serious difficulties coping. It was noted that his behaviour improved dramatically during a brief stay in a psychiatric observation clinic. A psychological report found indications that Mr Lorsé was “suffering under the protracted isolation” describing “memory and orientation disorders” as well as “signs of depersonalisation”.   The criminal proceedings against Mr van der Ven, on charges including murder, manslaughter/grievous bodily harm, rape and narcotics offences, ended on 26 March 2002. He was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.   Mr   Lorsé was convicted of drugs and firearms offences and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment and a fine of one million Netherlands guilders (NLG). His conviction and sentence became final on 30 June 1998. On appeal the prison term was increased to 15 years. It also appears that he has been sentenced in Belgium to a six-year prison sentence for drugs-related crimes but that the proceedings there are still pending.     2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The applications were lodged on 30 August 1999 and 19 November 1999 respectively and declared admissible on 3 April 2001.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Elisabeth Palm (Swedish), President , Wilhelmina Thomassen (Netherlands), Gaukur Jörundsson (Icelandic), Riza Türmen (Turkish), Corneliu Bîrsan (Romanian), Josep Casadevall (Andorran), Boštjan Zupančič (Slovenian), judges ,   and also Michael O’Boyle , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints The applicants alleged that the detention regime to which they (or their husband/father) were subjected in a maximum-security prison breached Article 3 and Article 8. The applicants in Lorsé and others also relied on Article 13.   Decision of the Court   Article 3 The Court observed that, throughout their detention in the EBI, Mr van der Ven and Mr Lorsé were subjected to very stringent security measures. The Court further considered that their social contacts were strictly limited. However, the Court could not find that they were subjected either to sensory isolation or to total social isolation.   The applicants were placed in the EBI because they were considered by the domestic courts to be extremely likely to attempt to escape from detention facilities with a less strict regime, and because, if they were to escape, they would pose an unacceptable risk to society in terms of again committing serious violent crimes. Having regard to the very serious offences of which the applicants stood accused and were subsequently convicted, the Court accepted this assessment.   The Court took note of psychological reports submitted by the applicants and of a report from   the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, following a visit to the prison complex in question in November 1997, which concluded that “the regime being applied in the (T)EBI and EBI could be considered to amount to inhuman treatment. To subject prisoners classified as dangerous to such a regime could well render them more dangerous still”. The Court did not diverge from this view that the situation in the EBI was problematic and gave cause for concern, particularly where detainees were subjected to the EBI regime for protracted periods of time.   The Court was struck by the fact that the applicants were submitted to weekly strip-searches in addition to all the other strict security measures within the EBI. In view of the fact that the domestic authorities were well aware that the applicants were experiencing serious difficulties coping with the regime, and bearing in mind that at no time during the applicants’ stay in the EBI did it appear that anything untoward was found in the course of a strip-search, the Court was of the view that the systematic strip-searching of the applicants required more justification than had been put forward by the Government.   The Court considered that in the situation where the applicants were already subjected to a great number of control measures, and in the absence of convincing security needs, the practice of weekly strip-searches that was applied for a period of approximately three-and-a-half years (for Mr van der Ven) and more than six years (for Mr Lorsé) diminished their human dignity and must have given rise to feelings of anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them.   Accordingly, the Court concluded that the combination of routine strip-searching with the other stringent security measures in the EBI amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment, in violation of Article 3, in respect of Mr van der Ven and Mr Lorsé.   While the Court accepted that the conditions under which the visits from the other applicants to Mr   Lorsé took place must have caused them emotional distress, it considered that the circumstances complained of did not attain the threshold of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article   3 and that there had, therefore, been no violation of Article 3 concerning the other applicants.   Article 8 The Court observed that the applicants were placed in the EBI because the authorities thought it likely that they might attempt to escape. The Court accepted that the authorities were entitled to consider that an escape by the applicants would have posed a serious risk to society. The security measures were established in order to prevent escapes. Finding that the restrictions of the applicants’ right to respect for their private and family life did not go beyond what was necessary in a democratic society to attain the legitimate aims intended, the Court found no violation of Article 8 in either case.   Article 13 (in the case Lorsé and others only) The Court observed that the decision to detain Mr   Lorsé in the EBI was reviewed every six months. It appeared from the file that prior to a decision on prolongation of that detention being taken, advice was sought, at least on a number of occasions, from the Penitentiary Selection Centre as to the psychological aspects of a prolongation. Mr   Lorsé was able to appeal against the decision to prolong his detention. It appeared from the decisions reached by the Appeals Board in his case that this Board not only assessed the risk and consequences of an escape by him, but that it also examined whether there were any indications or circumstances militating against an extension of his placement in the EBI and that it carried out a balancing exercise of all the interests involved.   The interests of Mr Lorsé’s family members had therefore been taken into account in the proceedings. The Appeals Board stated explicitly in its decision of 16   March   2000 that it also had regard to Mr   Lorsé’s psychological condition. The Court was satisfied that the Board did in fact address and rule on the complaints relating to the allegedly harmful effects – on Mr   Lorsé as well as on the other applicants – of the continued detention of Mr   Lorsé in the EBI.   The Court further observed that the Appeals Board was competent to take binding decisions: if it had found that Mr   Lorsé’s placement ought not to have been extended, it had the power to quash the decision in question, following which a new decision would have had to have been taken   – which was in fact what the Appeals Board did. Alternatively, the Appeals Board could have annulled the decision or ruled that its decision was to take the place of the decision appealed against.   In addition, it had been open to the applicants to institute interim injunction proceedings if they wished to obtain a judicial ruling on the compatibility with Article 3 of the regime as such. Such proceedings might have resulted in an interim injunction being issued to the effect that the regime in the EBI be modified in respect of Mr   Lorsé.   Given that the word “remedy” within the meaning of Article 13 did not mean a remedy bound to succeed, but simply an accessible remedy before an authority competent to examine the merits of a complaint, the Court considered that the proceedings before the Appeals Board and the possibility of interim injunction proceedings taken together provided the applicants with an effective remedy. Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 13.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] .     Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] .     This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.