CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 10 avril 2003

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s3964C3A3 { width:1.36pt; display:inline-block } .s901C2590 { width:56.7pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     197   10.4.2003   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF SIGURÐSSON v. ICELAND   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of Sigurðsson v. Iceland (application no. 39731/98). The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to an independent and impartial tribunal) of the European Convention on Human Rights.   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction), the Court awarded the applicant, by six votes to one, 25,000 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage and, unanimously, EUR   15,000 for costs and expenses.   1.     Principal facts   The applicant, Pétur Thór Sigurðsson, is an Icelandic national, born in 1954 and living in Reykjavík.   In April 1997 the applicant lost a court case against the National Bank of Iceland. It subsequently emerged that the husband of Judge Guðrún Erlendsdóttir, who was one of the Supreme Court judges who had examined his appeal, had been one of the guarantors of debts owed to the National Bank and 20 other creditors on which the debtor had defaulted, totalling approximately ISK 50,000,000 (approximately EUR 600,000), including ISK 16,000,000 (approximately EUR 190,000) to the National Bank as one of the two major creditors. In order to raise funds to pay the debt, her husband had issued four mortgage certificates in amounts totalling ISK 13,600,000 (approximately EUR 160,000) to a financial institution owned by the National Bank secured on two properties belonging to his wife. The four certificates were sold to another financial institution the following month. On 6 June 1996 the husband had signed a settlement agreement with the National Bank by which he was released from 75% of the debts against a final payment of the remaining 25%. The debt cancellation released him from debts amounting to ISK 11,000,000 (approximately EUR 132,000) to the National Bank. Pétur Thór Sigurðsson unsuccessfully applied to the Supreme Court for the proceedings to be reopened on the ground that the judge in question had not been impartial.         2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 23   October 1997 and transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998. It was declared admissible on 14 June 2001.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of 7 judges, composed as follows:   Georg Ress (German), President , Ireneu Cabral Barreto (Portuguese), Lucius Caflisch (Swiss), Boštjan Zupančič (Slovenian), Hanne Sophie Greve (Norwegian), Kristaq Traja (Albanian), judges , Đavið Thór Björgvinsson (Icelandic), ad hoc judge , and also Vincent Berger , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaint   Mr Sigurðsson complained that, on account of the close financial relationship between the judge and her husband on the one hand and the National Bank of Iceland on the other, his case against the bank had not been heard by an independent and impartial tribunal as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.   Decision of the Court   The Court observed that there was no evidence to suggest that Judge Guðrún Erlendsdóttir had been personally biased. However, there were three sets of circumstances which could give rise to an issue of impartiality under Article 6 § 1. In the Court’s view, the debts owed by her husband to the National Bank at the time of adjudication of the applicant’s case in April 1997, totalling approximately ISK 2,500,000 (approximately EUR 30,000), could reasonably be considered moderate and there was nothing to indicate that that alone could have constituted financial pressure capable of affecting her impartiality. Nor did it appear that the four mortgage certificates issued to a financial institution owned by the National Bank had established as such any direct financial link between her husband and the National Bank that could call the judge’s impartiality into question. However, neither of those two sets of circumstances could be dissociated from the third factor, which was the wider context of the debt settlement reached between her husband and the National Bank and Judge Guðrún Erlendsdóttir’s role in facilitating that settlement. Presumably, without the security provided by her, the debt settlement would not have materialised.   The Court was not persuaded by the Government’s argument that the debt settlement had been an attractive alternative to declaring the judge’s husband bankrupt and not one that could be viewed as a favour towards him personally. On the contrary, even assuming that the solution reached had suited the creditors, it found that the cancellation of 75% of such large debts had to be considered favourable treatment. When the four mortgage certificates were brokered and the debt settlement was concluded with the National Bank, the applicant’s case was already pending before the Supreme Court. There had at least been the appearance of a link between the steps taken by Judge Guðrún Erlendsdóttir in favour of her husband and the advantages obtained by him from the National Bank. The Court would not speculate as to whether she had derived any personal benefit from the operation and found no reason to believe that either she or her husband had had any direct interest in the outcome of the case between the applicant and the National Bank, but given the proximity in time to the Supreme Court’s examination of the case, the applicant could reasonably have feared that the Supreme Court had lacked the requisite impartiality.   Judges Ress and Zupančič expressed concurring opinions and Judge Greve expressed a partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion, all of which are annexed to the judgment.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Joanna Reynell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] .     Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] .     This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.