CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 24 avril 2003

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .s3964C3A3 { width:1.36pt; display:inline-block } .s901C2590 { width:56.7pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     219   24.4.2003   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF YVON v. FRANCE   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of Yvon v. France (application no. 44962/98). The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) of the European Convention on Human Rights.   The Court held that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained and awarded the applicant 15,973.86 euros for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicant, Louis Yvon, is a French national, who was born in 1931 and lives at Saintes (Charente-Maritime).   He is a winegrower and the former owner of 21 hectares of land with a house and farm building that were expropriated in the public interest to make way for the Saintes south-western bypass. Since the parties could not agree on the amount of compensation to be paid, an application was made to the expropriations judge in September 1994, who assessed the compensation at nearly 220,000 euros. The applicant did not accept that amount, which he considered should be nearer 574,000 euros, and appealed. He asked the Revenue Department, which was the expropriating authority’s representative, for a copy of the documents it had relied on in its written submissions. That request was turned down by a letter signed by the deputy director of the Revenue Department who had acted as Government Commissioner in the relevant proceedings.   In his capacity as Government Commissioner, the same official lodged submissions in support of a cross-appeal in which he assessed the compensation at less than had previously been determined. The Government said that those submissions were served on the parties by the registry of the Expropriations Division of the Poitiers Court of Appeal. The Expropriations Division dismissed an objection in which the applicant complained of the dual rule played by the Revenue Department, which was both the expropriating authority’s representative and Government Commissioner. An appeal by the applicant to the Court of Cassation was dismissed on 8 April 1998. 2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 7 October 1998 and allocated to the Third Section of the Court on 1 November 1998. It was declared admissible on 19 September 2002 and a hearing was held on 28 November 2002.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of 7 judges, composed as follows:   Georg Ress (German), President , Ireneu Cabral Barreto (Portuguese), Jean-Paul Costa (French), Lucius Caflisch (Swiss), John Hedigan (Irish), Hanne Sophie Greve (Norwegian), Kristaq Traja (Albanian), judges , and also Vincent Berger , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that there had been a breach of the principle that judicial proceedings should be adversarial because the Government Commissioner could not be compelled to communicate his submissions. He added that he had also been put at a disadvantage by the fact that the Government Commissioner, who had played an important role in assessing the expropriation compensation, had addressed the judge last. Finally, the privileged position enjoyed by the Government Commissioner in the expropriation proceedings contravened the principle that there should be equality of arms between the parties.   Decision of the Court   Equality of arms   The Court noted that in proceedings for assessing expropriation compensation, the party whose land had been expropriated had both the expropriating authority and the Government Commissioner as opponents. The Government Commissioner and the expropriating authority – which in certain cases was represented by a civil servant from the same department as the Government Commissioner – enjoyed considerable advantages in terms of access to relevant information, including access to the Land-Registry index. In addition, the Government Commissioner, who was both an expert and a party to the proceedings, played a dominant role in the proceedings and had considerable influence over the judge. The Court considered that that combination of factors created an imbalance to the detriment of the party whose land had been expropriated, in breach of the equality-of-arms principle. Consequently, that principle had been contravened, in violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.   The principle that judicial proceedings should be adversarial   As regards the complaint concerning the failure to communicate certain documents, the Court reiterated that in civil proceedings the principle that judicial proceedings should be adversarial did not require each party to communicate to an opponent documents which, as in the case before the Court, had been not communicated to the judge either.   As to the argument that there was no statutory obligation on the Government Commissioner at first instance to communicate his or her written submissions to the parties or to lodge them at the registry within a set period, the Court held that the applicant had no grounds for complaining of a breach of the adversarial principle, as he had obtained an adjournment of the case after being served with the submissions.   Finally, as regards the complaint that the Government Commissioner had addressed the judge last, the Court noted that the applicant had received the written submissions before the hearing and had been given a proper opportunity to reply; accordingly, there had been no breach of Article 6 § 1 on that account.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Joanna Reynell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] .     Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] .     This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.