CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 9 mai 2003

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3964C3A3 { width:1.36pt; display:inline-block } .s901C2590 { width:56.7pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     248   9.5.2003   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF COVEZZI AND MORSELLI v. ITALY   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of Covezzi and Morselli v. Italy (application no. 52763/99). The Court held:   ● by six votes to one that there had been a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights on account of the failure to involve the applicants in the decision-making process; ● unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the emergency care order made in respect of the applicants’ children; ● by five votes to two that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the failure to hear the applicants before making the care order; ● unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the manner in which the care order was implemented; ● unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the lengthy suspension of contact between the applicants and their children; ● unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the fact that the children had been placed in separate homes; ● unanimously that no separate issue arose under Article 6 (right to a fair trial) of the Convention; and ● unanimously that it was unnecessary to examine whether there had been a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the Convention.   The Court considered that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants. It awarded them 10,000 euros for costs and expenses.   (The judgment is available only in French.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicants, Delfino Covezzi and his wife Maria Lorena Morselli, are Italian nationals. They were born in 1959 and lived at Massa Finalese (Modena) at the material time. They have five children who were born in 1987, 1989, 1991, 1994 and 1999. Mrs Morselli now lives in France with her fifth child, who was born there. The applicants also acted for and on behalf of their four eldest children in the proceedings before the Court.   In June 1998 the applicants’ niece, then aged 12, alleged that she, her brother and the applicants’ four eldest children had been subjected to sexual abuse by certain members of the family. She did not, however, make any accusation against the applicants.   In November 1998, without hearing evidence from the applicants, a youth court found that they had neglected their parental duty by failing to notice that their children had been subjected to repeated sexual abuse. It made a care order. The children were placed in four different homes and all contact between them and the applicants was suspended. Conflicting medical reports were produced on the issue whether the four children had been sexually assaulted. The applicants unsuccessfully applied to the youth court to have the care order discharged. Under Italian law, they could not appeal to another court as the youth court had used the emergency procedure. The applicants also made unsuccessful applications to have their children moved to the care of another local authority and reunited in the same home and to be given access to them.   In the meantime, one of the applicants’ children said that she had been subjected to sexual abuse by Mr Covezzi with Mrs Morselli’s collusion and that her brothers had also been subjected to abuse. Consequently, criminal proceedings were brought against the applicants. On 24 September 2002 the Modena Criminal Court, ruling at first instance, sentenced the applicants to 12 years’ imprisonment and made an order withdrawing their parental rights.     2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the Court on 9 August 1999 and declared admissible on 24   January 2002 following a hearing.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of 7 judges, composed as follows:   Christos Rozakis (Greek), President , Luigi Ferrari Bravo (Italian), Giovanni Bonello (Maltese), Peer Lorenzen (Danish), Nina Vajić (Croatian), Snejana Botoucharova (Bulgarian), Elisabeth Steiner (Austrian), judges , and also Søren Nielsen , Deputy Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   The applicants complained that the family had been split up, their children placed in separate homes and that the members of the family had not been allowed contact. They also complained that no appeal lay against the decision taken by the youth court under the emergency procedure. They relied on Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.   Decision of the Court   Article 8 of the Convention   The interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life was in accordance with Articles 330, 333 and 336 of the Civil Code and Law no. 184 of 1983. It pursued a legitimate aim, namely “the protection of health or morals” and the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others”, in that it was intended to protect the children’s welfare. As to whether the measures were necessary in a democratic society, the Court said that it would examine whether the reasons relied on to justify the measures were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention.   The emergency care order The Court found that the care order was based on relevant and sufficient reasons, that is to say strong presumptions that the children had suffered sexual abuse by members of Mrs   Morselli’s family, and doubts about the applicants’ ability to protect them. It noted in that connection that the circumstances in which the abuse had taken place had been extremely serious, as there had been repeated acts of violence and a number of adults and children had been involved. The Court further considered that the authorities had carefully assessed the scope of the applicants’ niece’s allegations before taking the children into care. In those circumstances, it considered that the emergency care order had been proportionate and necessary in a democratic society and found that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention.   The failure to hear evidence from the applicants before making the order The Court reiterated that it might be impossible or undesirable to associate the persons having custody of a child in the decision-making process in urgent cases. In this case, it was not unreasonable for the authorities to take the view that, owing to the close ties between the applicants and the persons – in particular, Mrs Morselli’s father and brothers – suspected of sexually assaulting the children, it might be harmful to the children for prior information to be given about the procedure. In view of the gravity of the alleged offences and the fact that, as the youth court had noted, the children were caught up in a general climate of intimidation, the authorities could not be criticised for having acted disproportionately when they considered they were under a duty to protect the children from all risk of pressure from the family. Accordingly, there had been no violation of the Convention on that ground.   Enforcement of the care order The Court noted that the parties had given two different versions of the facts and that the applicants had not provided any evidence to support their allegations concerning the alleged brutality with which the children had been taken into care. Accordingly, the Court could not hold that there had been a violation of the Convention on that point.   Suspension of contact The Court noted that the reason given for suspending contact between the applicants and the children was the applicants’ inability to protect the children and the need to get the children to a place of safety. Renewed contact had been subject to the outcome of the authorities’ investigation of the parties’ circumstances with a view to assessing the children’s psychological state and the relations within the family. Meetings with the parents had been organised from the day after the children were taken into care. However, the applicants had stopped attending the meetings in February 1999, and the case file recorded that they had failed to cooperate with the relevant authorities. The Court also noted the complexity of the case and the children’s desire not to return to live with their natural family. It considered that the authorities had struck a fair balance between the children’s interests and the applicants’ rights and found that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention.   The fact that the children were placed in separate homes The decision as to where the children should be placed had been taken on practical grounds and by reference to the need to ensure that each of the children received the support of a family and a particularly high level of protection. The children’s continued placement in separate homes had been justified by the state of their relations with each other and their psychological state. The Court considered that the explanations that had been given by the authorities were reasonable and sufficient to render the measure “necessary” under the Convention and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Accordingly, there had been no violation of the Convention on that point.   The proceedings in the youth court The Court noted that the applicants had been given an opportunity to inform the judicial authority of their doubts about the competence and good faith of the social services and the expert witnesses who had been appointed. It did not consider that there had been any failure to supervise the manner in which social services had implemented the youth court’s decisions.   However, the Court was entitled to examine the length of the decision-making process under Article 8, as delays could lead to the dispute being determined by a fait accompli before the relevant court had even heard the case. The Court noted that in the case before it the applicants had not been able to play any role in the proceedings for over four months, as they had had no right to challenge the need for the care order or to express their opinion. Evidence had not been heard from them until 31   March 1999. The Court also noted that it had taken the youth court the excessively long period of 20 months to decide the issue of the applicants’ parental rights. In addition, the applicants had had no right of appeal during that period against the youth court’s interim order but had made seven unsuccessful applications between January and November 1999 in an effort to challenge it. Under those circumstances, the applicants had not been sufficiently involved in the decision-making process in the proceedings concerning their parental rights. The Court accordingly found that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on that account.   Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention   The Court held that no separate issue arose under Article 6 and that there was no need to examine the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.   Judge Bonnello expressed a partly dissenting opinion, and Judges Lorenzen and Vajić a joint partly dissenting opinion, both of which are annexed to the judgment.   ***   The Court’s judgments are available on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Joanna Reynell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] .     Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] .     This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.