CEDH · CASELAW;ADVISORYOPINIONS;PROTOCOL16;OPINIONS;ENG — 14 décembre 2023

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display:inline-block } .s7BF29C1E { width:139.76pt; display:inline-block }     GRAND CHAMBER ADVISORY OPINION as to whether an individual may be denied authorisation to work as a security guard or officer on account of being close to or belonging to a religious movement Requested by the Conseil d’État of Belgium (Request no. P16-2023-001)           STRASBOURG 14 December 2023       This opinion is final. It may be subject to editorial revision. TABLE OF CONTENTS PROCEDURE THE QUESTION ASKED THE BACKGROUND AND DOMESTIC PROCEEDINGS GIVING RISE TO THE REQUEST FOR AN ADVISORY OPINION I.   THE BACKGROUND TO THE REQUEST II.   THE DOMESTIC PROCEEDINGS A.   Arguments of the parties in the domestic proceedings B.   Judgment of the Conseil d’État in the “extreme urgency” suspension proceedings C.   Judgment of the Conseil d’État in the proceedings on the application to set aside, requesting an advisory opinion from the Court D.   Factual developments subsequent to the request for this advisory opinion RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE I.   On security firms and security departments of public transport companies II.   The classification of information, documents or data III.   The organisation, role and duties of the auditeur in the Conseil d’État THE COURT’S OPINION I.   PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS II.   THE QUESTION ASKED BY THE CONSEIL D’ÉTAT A.   Initial observation B.   Scope of protection under Article 9 of the Convention C.   Criteria for examining the necessity in a democratic society of the interference at issue 1.   A pressing social need (a)   Acceptability of preventive measures (i)   Preventive measures aimed at restricting rights exercised collectively by a group (ii)   Preventive measures aimed at restricting rights exercised individually (b)   Requirements for the taking of individual preventive measures (i)   Nature of the risk (ii)   Reality and scale of the risk (iii)   Immediacy of the risk (iv)   Review by a judicial authority 2.   Proportionality OPERATIVE PROVISIONS The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of: Siofra O’Leary, President Georges Ravarani, Marko Bošnjak, Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Pere Pastor Vilanova, Arnfinn Bårdsen, Branko Lubarda, Yonko Grozev, Latif Hüseynov, Jovan Ilievski, Maria Elósegui, Ioannis Ktistakis, Andreas Zünd, Frédéric Krenc, Diana Sȃrcu, Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, Anne Louise Bormann, judges, and of Johan Callewaert, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 18 October 2023, Delivers the following opinion, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     By a letter of 4 April 2023 to the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”), the Conseil d’État of Belgium submitted a request under Article 1 of Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Protocol   No.   16” and “the Convention”), to give an advisory opinion on the question set out at paragraph 10 below. 2.     That letter was received in the Registry on 13 April 2023 and the request was considered by the Court to have been formally lodged on that date. 3.     On 10 May 2023 the panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber of the Court, composed in accordance with Article 2 § 3 of Protocol No.   16 and Rule 93 § 1 of the Rules of Court, decided to accept the request. 4.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined on 22   May 2023 in accordance with Rules 24 § 2 (g) and 94 § 1. 5 .     By a letter of 23 May 2023 the requesting court was invited to provide any further information no later than 17 June 2023 (Rule 94 § 2). By another letter of 23 May 2023, the parties to the domestic proceedings were invited to submit written observations to the Court within a time-limit of 23   June 2023 (Article 3 of Protocol No. 16 and Rule 94 § 3). Within that time-limit, further information from the requesting court and the written observations of the parties to the domestic proceedings were received in the Court’s Registry. 6.     By a letter of 17 May 2023 the Belgian Government informed the Court of their wish to exercise their right of intervention (Article 3 of Protocol   No.   16 and Rule 44). They subsequently explained that they did not have any further information to submit in addition to that already provided to the Court by the Belgian State in its capacity as respondent in the domestic proceedings (see paragraph 5 above). 7.     The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights did not exercise her right to submit written comments (Article 3 of Protocol   No.   16). 8.     The written observations of the parties to the domestic proceedings were transmitted to the Conseil d’État, which did not submit any comments on them (Rule 94 § 6). 9 .     After the close of the written procedure, the President of the Grand Chamber decided that no oral hearing should be held (Rule 94 § 5). THE QUESTION ASKED 10 .     The question asked in the request for an advisory opinion was worded as follows: “Does the mere fact of being close to or belonging to a religious movement that, in view of its characteristics, is considered by the competent administrative authority to represent a threat to the country in the medium to long term, constitute a sufficient ground, in the light of Article 9 § 2 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the Convention, for taking an unfavourable measure against an individual, such as a ban on employment as a security guard?” THE BACKGROUND AND DOMESTIC PROCEEDINGS GIVING RISE TO THE REQUEST FOR AN ADVISORY OPINION 11 .     The request arose in the context of judicial proceedings pending in the Conseil d’État concerning an application for the suspension and setting-aside of a decision of the Minister of the Interior to withdraw, from an individual considered by the Belgian State Security Service ( Sûreté de l’État ) to be a supporter of the “scientific” Salafist ideology, an identification card entitling him to perform duties ensuring the security of the Belgian railway infrastructure and of its users, and to refuse to issue him with a second card for employment as a security guard. THE BACKGROUND TO THE REQUEST 12.     In order to be employed as a security guard or officer ( agent de gardiennage or agent de sécurité ) in Belgium, it is necessary to obtain an identification card, issued by the Minister of the Interior or the representative thereof (see paragraphs 49-56 below). 13 .     Between 2010 and 2019 S.B., a Belgian national living in Molenbeek ‑ Saint-Jean (Belgium), was employed by G4S, a private company specialising in security services. Among other duties he was assigned to guard buildings of the European Commission for which he had obtained special authorisation (“NATO clearance”). In that capacity he performed reception and patrol duties, including: enforcing access control, checking in visitors, searching bags, monitoring labourers in sensitive areas, carrying confidential mail and patrolling the premises to prevent intrusion. He was also assigned as control-room operator to handle the alarm system, oversee mobile teams on the site, monitor CCTV surveillance, open and close entrances remotely and set up additional security arrangements for VIP visits. 14.     Wishing to change job, S.B. applied at the end of 2018 to the company Securail, which was responsible for the security of the Belgian railway infrastructure and its users. He was employed as a security officer on an operator’s post in the control room located at Bruxelles-Midi railway station. The duties assigned to any operator in the control room – those he was exercising and is still exercising to date – include in particular the handling of telephone calls and security alerts, reacting to incoming alarms, executing CCTV surveillance and alerting emergency services according to the established protocol. While his line manager was on a long-term absence, S.B. was also asked to take over that manager’s task of coordinating with other services responsible for security and safety, ensure completion of work orders in connection with the various technologies deployed, coach other operators, if necessary create new instructions and procedures and have them applied, and ensure the follow-up of information and requests from other security-related services. 15.     In order to perform these various tasks, S.B. holds an identification card which was issued by the Minister of the Interior at the request of his employer. The card entitles him to continue working as a security officer. It is still valid to date and will expire on 18 June 2024. 16 .     S.B. had no criminal record on 21 February 2019, the date on which the Federal Public Service issued him with the relevant certificate which he needed to follow a security training course. In the same year his former employer, the company G4S, proposed that, in addition to working for Securail, he could be employed by its subsidiary G4S Event Security to handle the security of major events. This work would mainly have involved monitoring access to various events, managing the flow of visitors, accompanying VIPs and supervising other security officers under his responsibility. The recruitment of S.B. to that post required the potential employer to obtain for him a second identification card that was specific to the relevant type of work. 17.     On 2 May 2019 G4S submitted an application for that purpose to the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry’s services began a security investigation into S.B. and in that context asked the State Security Service, the Belgian civilian intelligence service, for information on him. 18 .     On 30 March 2020 the State Security Service informed the Ministry of the Interior that S.B. was known to the intelligence services on account of his contacts with several individuals of the scientific Salafist orientation, and sent the following assessment: “According to our assessment [S.B.] is a supporter of this ideology. Supported by a majority of Salafists, the ‘scientific’ branch considers preaching to be the main instrument for spreading its ideology, and eschews political intervention and violence as means of action. Most of the proselytising carried out within scientific Salafism therefore takes the form of teaching activities, the production of teaching aids about Islam or the dissemination of sermons.” 19.     On 8 March 2021, on the basis of an investigation report drawn up after the relevant enquiries had been made, the Security Conditions Investigation Board found that S.B. failed to satisfy the statutory profile for employment as a security guard and suggested that the Ministry of the Interior initiate a procedure for the purpose of refusing to issue him with a second identification card. 20 .     On 28 April 2021 the Ministry of the Interior informed S.B. of the Investigation Board’s opinion and of his right to consult his administrative file, to receive a copy and to make submissions in his defence. 21.     On 17 May 2021 counsel for S.B. consulted the administrative file and, on 28 May 2021, submitted arguments in his client’s defence. 22.     On 6 July 2021 the Ministry summoned S.B. to an interview. 23.     The interview took place on 16 August 2021. According to the minutes, S.B. stated, among other things, that he was a practising Muslim, explaining that he sometimes “transmitted messages about Islam in a private context, for example to friends or family”, copying and pasting the messages for them using text messaging or WhatsApp, that he did “not claim allegiance to a movement or particular ideology, apart from Islam”, that he had not “had problems with the police or other administrative authorities”, that if he had “encountered persons with links to extremist or terrorist circles, it [had] been coincidental” and that he “considered, on the contrary, that nothing [could be] resolved through violence”. 24 .     In a decision of 15 October 2021 (“the impugned decision”), the Ministry of the Interior decided to withdraw S.B.’s identification card that had been issued to the security company Securail and refused to issue the security guard identification card sought by the company G4S Event Security. Referring to the opinion of the State Security Service dated 30 March 2020 (see paragraph 18 above), the Ministry gave the following reasons: “In the light of the foregoing, it should be observed that scientific Salafism represents a threat to our model of society and to our country. Any security guard or officer must display conduct that is respectful of the fundamental rights of his or her fellow citizens and must respect democratic values. In the present case, on the basis of the State Security Service’s assessment finding that you are a supporter of the scientific Salafist ideology and that you have contacts with a number of individuals of this Salafist orientation, I consider that, through your conduct and in particular your form of proselytising – which you acknowledged during your interview –, you are undermining the State’s basic democratic values. Even though you have stated that you reject any violence in the name of Islam, the State Security Service has nevertheless indicated that you are a supporter of an ideology which, in particular, questions the legitimacy of Belgian law, advocates community sectarianism, fosters a backward view of the role of women and takes positions which threaten the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens by a reactionary vision seeking to rid Islam of all its non-Islamic evolutions and influences. ... On the basis of all of the above-mentioned elements, I consider that the fact that you are the supporter of an ideology – scientific Salafism – belonging to the Salafist branch is likely to be incompatible with the fundamental values of our law-governed State and with the fundamental rights of its citizens. This also indicates a lack of integrity and is capable of impairing the trust that needs to be placed in any security guard or officer. Consequently, I am of the view that the above-mentioned factors constitute a counter ‑ indication to the profile expected of a security guard or officer, as laid down by section 64 of the Private and Individual Security Act of 2 October 2017 and that therefore you do not meet the condition prescribed in section   61 (6 o ) of that Act.” 25 .     The Ministry of the Interior further based the impugned decision on extracts from a brochure on Salafism, which was available on the State Security Service’s website, where the authority explained that scientific Salafism and political Salafism posed a threat for the following reasons: “In the medium to long term, scientific Salafism and political Salafism also pose a threat to our country. First, an intolerant version of religion, refusal to recognise the legitimacy of Belgian law (in relation to Sharia law) or community sectarianism clearly represent a danger for the democratic and constitutional order. Such a sectarian application of religion could lead to the emergence of truly parallel societies where the authority of a State and of a democratic system would no longer apply. Secondly, sexual inequality, a backward view of the role of women and the position vis-à-vis religious freedom may in the long run seriously threaten fundamental rights and freedoms. Examples include repeated calls to hatred of Jews or of Western values, an obligation for women to be invisible in public places, prohibition of mixing and the resulting quasi-apartheid of the sexes, or threats proffered against opponents and against critics of Islam (genuine or not), thereby seriously impugning freedom of expression. Lastly, since Salafists claim to speak for all Muslims they tend to make generalisations, thus triggering heated reactions among far-right groups toward the Muslim population as a whole. This has the effect of polarising society and undermining the principle of ‘living together’ ( le vivre-ensemble ). It should further be noted that the main victims of Salafists are often other Muslims.” 26 .     On 18 June 2022 S.B. sent the State Security Service a request for access to the administrative documents in his file and also lodged a complaint with the Standing Committee for the Supervision of Intelligence and Security Services. The State Security Service rejected the request on the grounds that all the requested documents were classified pursuant to the Classification and Security Clearances, Certificates and Assessments Act of 11 December 1998. 27 .     On 31 August 2022, S.B. asked the State Security Service to reconsider the refusal but was unsuccessful. THE DOMESTIC PROCEEDINGS 28.     By an application lodged in the Conseil d’État on 25 October 2021 against the Belgian State (represented by the Ministry of the Interior), S.B. sought the setting-aside of the decision taken by the Minister on 15 October 2021 to withdraw his identification card as security officer and to refuse to issue him with a second identification card for employment as a security guard (see paragraph   24 above). 29.     Even though, as a general rule, the Court does not reproduce the written observations or other documents submitted by the various participants in its advisory proceedings, in the context of the request at issue it nevertheless finds it useful, in order to ensure a better understanding of the criteria that it will set out in its response, to give an overview, in the following paragraphs, of the main arguments of the parties in the proceedings before the Conseil d’État , as the question which has given rise to the request emanates from the factual and legal points discussed in those proceedings. Arguments of the parties in the domestic proceedings 30.     Relying on Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention, the applicant in the domestic proceedings stated that his Muslim faith had been known to his employers and that it had never posed the slightest difficulty in the performance of his work for G4S and Securail, which had employed him in succession. He argued that the mere fact of having exchanges about religion with his relatives, in a private context, fell within the private practice of worship and did not constitute a “form of proselytising”. The Minister’s decision of 15 October 2021 had in his view been the result of a manifest error of judgment. 31.     He further submitted that he had never shown any lack of integrity in his work, had never encountered any difficulties with his colleagues, his managers or members of the public for whose security he was responsible, and had never shown any lack of respect for fundamental rights or democratic values. He submitted that the opposite party had not produced any actual evidence to show that his alleged ideology had had any impact on his professional integrity or on his fulfilment of the requisite profile, as laid down in section 64 of the Private and Individual Security Act of 2 October 2017 (see paragraph 54 below). He added that, as he was from Molenbeek ‑ Saint ‑ Jean in Belgium, where he still lived and where he knew many people, it was possible that he had unwittingly crossed paths with people involved in the dissemination of scientific Salafism, without necessarily sharing their ideas. In his view, his social, ethnic and religious background could not be seen as incompatible with the statutory profile. 32.     With regard to his procedural rights, he alleged in particular that he did not know exactly what the concept of “scientific Salafism” was supposed to cover and said that no specific question had been put to him in that regard at his interview in order to enable him to defend himself effectively. He pointed out that the questions put to him on that occasion had remained fairly broad as to his religious practice, without referring specifically to his supposed beliefs or to whether or not they were compatible with his duty of integrity or with respect for democratic values and the fundamental rights of other citizens. 33.     He also stressed that the decision to withdraw his identification card would deprive him of any possibility of employment in the relevant field and would bring an end to a professional career for which he had specifically trained and from which he derived his income. He noted in that connection that the impugned measure had the effect of immediately depriving him of the possibility of continuing to work in his current post and that his chances of finding another job with an equivalent salary were minimal, since he would not be able to rely on the experience he had acquired over more than ten years in the field of private security. In addition, his dependent wife and two minor children relied on his income, as he was the only breadwinner in the household. Even if he were able to obtain a substitute form of income (i.e.   unemployment benefit or the living allowance, revenu d’intégration sociale ), the immediate implementation of the impugned decision was capable of placing him and his family in a situation of financial insecurity overnight. He also submitted that the reasons on which the decision was based, namely that he did not fit the security profile because he was a supporter of scientific Salafism, were likely to seriously damage his honour and reputation, especially in the professional environment in which he had worked for more than ten years. He argued that the seriousness of the damage was sufficient to justify a suspension of the impugned decision. 34.     In observations accompanying the administrative file concerning the applicant and sent to the Conseil d’État , the Minister of the Interior stressed that, as an administrative public-order authority, she was bound by a general duty of care on the basis of Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code, and that this obligation required her to exercise her administrative policing powers, including those conferred by legislation in matters of private security, and, in particular, to take the necessary measures to prevent or limit risks and to anticipate foreseeable negative consequences. She argued that in the case at issue she had been able, without committing a manifest error of judgment, to infer from the various elements set out in the impugned decision that the applicant’s conduct was incompatible with the requisite profile of a security guard, whose characteristics were: respect for the rights of citizens, integrity, ability to deal with aggressive behaviour on the part of third parties and the absence of suspected links with criminality, and also the requirements of loyalty, discretion, respect for democratic values and the absence of any risk to national security or public order. 35.     Referring to the case-law of the Court, which, in her view, did not rule out the possibility for countries to take restrictive measures against members of religious movements promoting an ideology that was contrary to democratic principles, and relying on the explanations provided by the State Security Service, she emphasised that Salafism was an ultra-orthodox, reactionary and intolerant branch and that “in the medium to long term, scientific Salafism and political Salafism also represent[ed] a threat” to the country. 36.     The Minister further observed that the applicant in the domestic proceedings had not produced any documents concerning the financial situation of his household or the financial constraints that he and his family would have to face as a result of the impugned decision. The few elements relied on in support of his assertions were, in her view, insufficient for an assessment of his overall financial situation, particularly at a level of extreme urgency. Given that the impugned decision, though not a sanction, constituted a serious measure against him, the Minister indicated that the principle audi alteram partem , which required that he be able to defend himself, was nevertheless applicable. In the present case, however, that principle had been upheld by the possibility for the applicant to consult his administrative file, to submit written pleadings in his defence and to give oral evidence. According to the Minister, nothing had prevented the applicant from enquiring about the concept of “scientific Salafism” if, as he alleged, he did not know what it represented, relevant documentation being available on the State Security Service’s website. Lastly, the Minister pointed out that the applicant had had one month to prepare for his interview and that he could have requested an extension of the time-limit for lodging his written submissions or for being interviewed if he had considered that the time allowed was insufficient. Judgment of the Conseil d’État in the “extreme urgency” suspension proceedings 37.     In the “extreme urgency” suspension proceedings, the auditeur at the Conseil d’État gave the following opinion: “... in the absence of any more detailed explanation by the State Security Service of the factors which led it to consider that the applicant was a supporter of scientific Salafism and, in addition, in view of the intelligence services’ failure to submit documents in support of their opinion of 30 March 2020 following my investigative measure of 27 October, the Conseil d’État is not in a position to verify that assertion in practice. In order to carry out its review, the Conseil d’État can assess the applicant’s situation only in the light of the tangible and undisputed factors brought to its attention, namely the fact that the applicant is a practising Muslim who may well, having regard to his surrounding community, have come into contact with individuals adhering to the religious branch in question. These verifiable and undisputed facts by themselves do not suffice to prompt the conclusion that the applicant is necessarily a supporter of scientific Salafism himself. The above-mentioned factors, which have to be taken into account, do not in themselves justify the withdrawal of the applicant’s Securail identification card or the refusal of his G4S Event Security identification card. This amounts to an infringement of the principle of equality and of freedom of religion, as guaranteed by the provisions referred to in the ground of appeal. It has not been shown that the intelligence services were able, without committing a manifest error of assessment, to conclude that the applicant was a supporter of scientific Salafism, such that the impugned decision, which is based on that assessment, is itself flawed.” 38 .     In judgment no. 252.020 of 29 October 2021, adopted in the “extreme urgency” suspension proceedings, the Conseil d’État ordered, in accordance with the opinion of the auditeur , the immediate suspension of the Minister of the Interior’s decision of 15 October 2021 (see paragraph 24 above), by way of interim relief. Citing Article 19 of the Belgian Constitution and Article   9 of the Convention, which, in its view, constituted an inseparable whole, the Conseil d’État gave the following reasons for its judgment: “... In order to be compatible with freedom of religion, an interference must satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 9, paragraph 2, of the Convention, pursuant to which the interference must be prescribed by law, must pursue one or more of the aims referred to in that Article and must be necessary in a democratic society, which presupposes that it meets a pressing social need and that it is proportionate to the aims pursued. In its judgment of 2 February 2016, Sodan v. Turkey , the European Court of Human Rights found as follows in respect of that Article: ‘... 54. The mere fact that the applicant was actually or supposedly close to or belonged to a religious movement cannot in itself constitute a sufficient ground for taking an unfavourable measure against him, since it has not been clearly demonstrated either that the applicant was not acting impartially or was receiving instructions from members of that movement, or that the movement in question represented a genuine threat to national security’. In the present case, it should be observed that the applicant’s actual or supposed proximity or adherence to a religious movement is based solely on an ‘assessment’ made by the State Security Service on the basis of evidence which is not known to either the parties or to the Conseil d’État and whose relevance and probative value are therefore not established beyond reasonable doubt at this stage of the proceedings. Similarly, the nature and frequency of the applicant’s alleged contacts with a number of followers of the scientific Salafist orientation also remain unknown. During his interview, the applicant did not acknowledge that he was a member of such a movement, but merely that he was a practising Muslim. Even though, at that interview, he stated that he had on occasion ‘transmitted messages about Islam in a private context, for example to friends or family, which I copy/paste for them via text messaging or WhatsApp’, that does not necessarily mean that those messages, the content and recipients of which remain unknown, could be regarded as a form of proselytising that is typical of the scientific Salafist orientation. The criticisms levelled at the applicant about challenging the legitimacy of Belgian law, community sectarianism, a backward view of the role of women and positions threatening the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens are based only on a theoretical presentation of scientific Salafism. There is no evidence in the administrative file to establish the existence of specific, concrete facts attributable to the applicant showing that he would give preference to religious imperatives over strict adherence to the rule of law or that he would treat certain categories of people in a discriminatory manner on grounds linked to a Salafist vision of Islam. Consequently, it has not been sufficiently established that the applicant has lacked integrity or undermined either the fundamental values of the rule of law by which our State is governed or the fundamental rights of citizens. Moreover, according to the State Security Service’s analysis referred to in the reasoning of the impugned decision, scientific Salafism has the particular feature, compared with other forms of fundamentalism, of eschewing political involvement and violence as means of action ... That is why the analysis considers that this faction could pose a threat only in the medium to long term, but not in the immediate future. It follows that the applicant’s actual or supposed adherence to this orientation, which he denies and which has not been established at this stage of the proceedings, could not in itself constitute sufficient evidence to conclude that the immediate withdrawal of the applicant’s security guard card, and the refusal to issue a new one, are necessary on account of a risk he might pose to the internal or external security of the State or to public order. ...” Judgment of the Conseil d’État in the proceedings on the application to set aside, requesting an advisory opinion from the Court 39.     On 12 November 2021 the Minister of the Interior applied to the Conseil d’État for the resumption of the proceedings on the application to set aside the impugned decision. 40.     On 14 March 2022 the applicant in the domestic proceedings filed supplementary pleadings in which he submitted that there was no reason for the Conseil d’État to depart from what it had held on an interim basis in its previous judgment (see paragraph 38 above). He argued that it had not been established that he had sent messages which could be regarded as a form of proselytising typical of the scientific Salafist orientation, that his administrative file contained no document from which it could be established that there were specific, concrete facts attributable to him which showed that he did not satisfy the security profile requirements, that the reference to a theoretical presentation of scientific Salafism (see paragraph 25 above) was insufficient in itself to form the basis for the impugned decision, and that it had not been established that he had been lacking in integrity or had infringed the fundamental values of the rule of law or the fundamental rights of citizens. In any event, his actual or supposed adherence to scientific Salafism could not in itself be a sufficient basis for concluding that the immediate withdrawal of his security officer’s card and the refusal to issue a new card as a security guard were necessary on account of a risk he allegedly posed to the internal or external security of the State or to public order. 41 .     On 27 April 2022 the auditeur dealing with the case before the Conseil d’État visited the premises of the State Security Service where he consulted the file classified as “secret” in the applicant’s name and met the officials of the relevant department. In his report of 29 April 2022 the auditeur reported as follows: “It is clear from the consultation of this file and from the oral presentation of the material collected by the State Security Service that the applicant is indeed, contrary to what he alleges, and without reasonable doubt, a supporter of the scientific Salafist ideology and that he engages in certain activities in this context. The material on the basis of which I arrive at that conclusion cannot be subject to adversarial debate, since it is classified as ‘secret’, in accordance with the Classification and Security Clearances, Certificates and Assessments Act of 11 December 1998.” 42.     In the conclusion to his report, the auditeur proposed that the application to set aside be dismissed and, accordingly, that the previously granted suspension of the impugned decision be lifted, for the following reasons: “Following my investigative measure of 27 April 2022, it is proven that the applicant is indeed, without reasonable doubt, a supporter of the ideology of scientific Salafism and that he is taking an active part in this movement, contrary to what he claims. It follows that the above-cited reasoning of the judgment in X , no. 252.020 of 29 October 2021 ..., which was set out apparently at a time when it had not been physically possible to consult the file classified as secret, or to take evidence from the State Security Service, can no longer be upheld. The information obtained during the investigative measure of 27 April 2022, which confirms that the applicant is indeed a supporter of scientific Salafism and engages in certain activities in that context, also makes it possible to revisit the lessons to be drawn ... from the judgment ... The Conseil d’État must take account of the special prerogatives granted to persons who have been issued with identification cards by and under sections 89 et seq. of the Act of 2 October 2017, which allow for a restrictive approach by the administrative authority to the profile conditions set out in section 64 of that Act. This requirement of stringency corresponds, moreover, to the intention of the legislature, which, in the Act of 2 October 2017, added various characteristics to the existing profile. In the present case, the measures decided in the impugned decision, namely to withdraw and refuse security guard identification cards, were based on the applicant’s adherence to the ideology of scientific Salafism and his proselytising activities in that context, which cannot be disputed beyond reasonable doubt. The applicant’s links with the scientific Salafist ideology and activities in that context are not limited, as he maintains, to mere contacts, as a consequence of his social environment, ‘with individuals belonging to a certain religious branch, without his being aware of those people’s religious beliefs and practices or sharing their ideas’. Furthermore, the letters of recommendation from the applicant’s former and current superiors do not call into question his adherence to the scientific Salafist ideology or his activities linked to it. ... The fact that the aforementioned threat to our country is foreseen ‘in the medium to long term’ does not have the effect of manifestly vitiating the assessment made by the authority which adopted the impugned decision. It is noteworthy in that regard that the legislature allowed the authority adopting the impugned decision to take into account the mere risk to the internal or external security of the State or to public order. As a result, the legal regime introduced by the Act of 2 October 2017 sought to prevent the occurrence of events that might call into question the requirements set out in section 61, first paragraph (6 o ), of the Act of 2 October 2017. It follows that the pursuit of activities in the context of scientific Salafism may be such as to justify, without arbitrariness, the impugned decision, even if it is not established that the systemic threat to Belgium is an immediate one. Accordingly, the authority which adopted the impugned decision was entitled to consider, without committing a manifest error of assessment or error of fact, that, in view of the applicant’s adherence to the ideology of scientific Salafism and to the proselytising in which he engaged, he was undermining the fundamental democratic values of the State. Such a finding was sufficiently serious to justify, in a manner that was not manifestly unreasonable, the decision taken. It is not for the Conseil d’État to substitute itself for the authority which took the impugned decision by assessing, in its discretion, the interpretation to be given to the condition of a lack of risk for the internal or external security of the country or for public order, unless a manifest error of judgment can be found, no such error having been demonstrated in the present case. The judgment in Sodan v. Turkey of 2 February 2016 of the European Court of Human Rights, as cited in the judgment ... no. 252.020 of 29 October 2021, can be transposed to the present case in so far as it provides theoretical guidance. It cannot, however, be applied without taking account of the specificities of the case at hand, bearing in mind that it is not the mere Muslim faith of the person concerned or his relatives which lies at the heart of the authority’s assessment, but indeed the fact that he belongs to an extremist religious movement, which represents a threat to Belgium and its democratic values, together with his activism in that context. Therefore the impugned decision has not entailed a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s freedom of religion.” 43 .     As regards the upholding of S.B.’s “procedural rights”, the auditeur considered, in the context of the same report, that the applicant’s complaints alleging a failure to respect those rights were ill-founded. The auditeur found that the information to the effect that the applicant was considered to be a supporter of scientific Salafism was clear from the letter sent to S.B. by the Minister of the Interior on 28 April 2021 (see paragraph 20 above), by which the administrative procedure with a view to the withdrawal or refusal of an identification card had been initiated; the applicant had therefore been in a position to set out his arguments in his defence pleadings in full knowledge of the accusation against him. The auditeur further noted that the principle audi alteram partem , which had given the applicant the possibility of defending himself, did not require that he be specifically questioned on this point during his interview. As to the fact that the State Security Service’s note on scientific Salafism had not been included in the administrative file disclosed to the applicant, he noted that this omission raised no problem since the note in question – reproduced in part in the grounds of the impugned decision – was a general information note, freely accessible on the internet, which did not contain any specific or direct assessment about the applicant in person, and therefore did not have to be included in the administrative file made available to him prior to his interview and to the filing of his pleadings. Moreover, the applicant had not alleged in the administrative proceedings that he was unable to understand the meaning to be given to scientific Salafism, and had even set out in his pleadings the reasons why he denied being a supporter of that ideology. 44.     In his last set of observations, the applicant submitted that consultation by the auditeur at the Conseil d’État of the classified material gathered about him by the State Security Service could not lead to the invalidation of the judgment previously delivered by that court in the urgent proceedings (see paragraph 38 above). He argued that, since the material gathered by the auditeur during his investigation was classified, and thus not subject to any adversarial debate between the parties, the Conseil d’État bench examining his appeal should not have been “satisfied with the conclusions reached by the State Security Service as to his ideological adherence, even if the auditeur had been persuaded by it”. In his view, the Conseil d’État should have been able to review the classification of that information and to give him access to at least the substance of the findings against him, so that he could understand the facts imputed to him personally. He added that he should be able to dispute and interpret those facts himself in order to ensure adversarial debate and an effective review by the Conseil d’État of the impugned decision. 45 .     In her last set of observations the Minister of the Interior observed that the “criteria” laid down by the Court in Regner v. the Czech Republic ([GC], no. 35289/11, 19 September 2017) were satisfied in the present case and that there had been no breach of the right to a fair trial or of the adversarial principle. Pointing out that both the auditeur and the members of the Conseil d’État had enjoyed a right of unrestricted access to all the classified documents on which the Security Service had based its