CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 10 juillet 2003

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s3964C3A3 { width:1.36pt; display:inline-block } .s901C2590 { width:56.7pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     386   10.7.2003   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF MURPHY v. IRELAND   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of Murphy v. Ireland (application no. 44179/98). The Court held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. (The judgment is available only in English.)   1.     Principal facts   Roy Murphy, an Irish national, was born in 1949 and lives in Dublin. He is a pastor attached to the Irish Faith Centre, a bible-based Christian ministry in Dublin.   In early 1995 the Irish Faith Centre submitted to a local independent and commercial radio station an advertisement for the screening on its premises of a video dealing with “the historical facts about Christ” and “evidence of the resurrection”.   In March 1995 the Independent Radio and Television Commission (“IRTC”) stopped the broadcast, applying section 10(3) of the Radio and Television Act 1988 under which “no advertisement shall be broadcast which is directed towards any religious or political end or which has any relation to an industrial dispute”. This ruling did not affect the later transmission of the video by satellite.   The applicant brought judicial-review proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the relevant statutory provision. He submitted that either the IRTC had wrongly construed section 10(3) or the provision was unconstitutional.   By judgment delivered on 25 April 1997, the High Court found that the IRTC had not infringed section 10(3). It also considered that the unspecified right to communicate guaranteed by Article 40(3)(1) of the Constitution was at issue, since the principal purpose of the advertisement was the communication of information. However, section 10(3) constituted a reasonable limitation on the right to communicate and there were good reasons in the public interest for the ban. The Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal on 28   May 1998.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 31 July 1998 and transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998. It was declared admissible on 9 July 2002.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of 7 judges, composed as follows:   Georg Ress (German), President , Lucius Caflisch (Swiss), Pranas Kūris (Lithuanian), Riza Türmen (Turkish), Boštjan Zupančič (Slovenian), John Hedigan (Irish), Hanne Sophie Greve (Norwegian), judges , and also Vincent Berger , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   The applicant complained that the prohibition of the broadcast of his advertisement had breached Articles 9 (freedom of religion) and 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention.   Decision of the Court   Article 10   The Court considered that the matter essentially at issue here was the applicant’s inability to broadcast an advertisement, which concerned primarily the regulation of his means of expression rather than the manifestation of his religion. It therefore fell to be examined under Article 10 of the Convention. The prohibition in question had been prescribed by law and had pursued the legitimate aims of preserving public order and safety and protecting the rights and freedoms of others.   In examining whether the prohibition had been necessary in a democratic society, the Court had to determine whether the national authorities had given relevant and sufficient reasons for banning the broadcast. The main argument advanced by the Government was the religious sensitivities in Irish society. Although Article 10 did not, as such, envisage that an individual was to be protected from exposure to a religious view simply because it was not his or her own, the Court observed that an expression which was not on its face offensive could have an offensive impact in certain circumstances. The relevant minister and the domestic courts had had regard to the extreme sensitivity of the question of broadcasting of religious advertising in Ireland and to the fact that religion was a divisive issue in Northern Ireland. The Court observed that the provision complained of had been designed to correspond to those particular concerns.   Other than advertisements in the audio-visual media, the applicant’s religious expression had not been restricted. He had retained the same right as any other citizen to participate in programmes on religious matters and to have the services of his church broadcast. Advertising tended to have a distinctly partial objective and the fact that advertising time was purchased would lean in favour of unbalanced use by religious groups with larger resources. In the Court’s view, those considerations were highly relevant reasons for prohibiting the broadcast.   With regard to whether those reasons were sufficient, the Court found persuasive the Government’s argument that a complete or partial relaxation of the prohibition would be hard to reconcile with the nature and level of the religious sensitivities at stake and the principle of neutrality in the broadcast media. Firstly, a provision allowing one religion and not another to advertise would be difficult to justify, while a provision allowing filtering by an authority on a case by case basis of unacceptable religious advertising would be difficult to apply fairly, objectively and coherently. Secondly, it was reasonable for the State to consider it likely that even a limited freedom to advertise would benefit a dominant religion. Thirdly, the applicant had not disputed the Government’s argument that allowing limited religious advertising would result in unequal consequences for national and independent broadcasters (because national broadcasters would be compelled to broadcast any advertisement satisfying the relevant criteria whereas independent broadcasters would be free to refuse or accept any religious advertising on purely commercial grounds). Fourthly, the dilution of the statutory provision in question by an amendment passed in 2001, which allowed the broadcasting of informational advertisements only, had not undermined the State’s view of religious sensitivities in 1988.   Finally, there appeared to be no clear consensus between the States that had ratified the Convention as to the manner in which to legislate for the broadcasting of religious advertisements. Having regard to the State’s margin of appreciation, relevant and sufficient reasons had been given justifying the interference.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Joanna Reynell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 1998 a full-time Court was established, replacing the original two-tier system of a part-time Commission and Court. [1] .   Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] .     This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.