CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 28 octobre 2003

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s94935B0F { width:389.85pt; display:inline-block } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     534   28.10.2003   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF STEUR v. THE NETHERLANDS   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of Steur v. the Netherlands (application no. 39657/98). The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) and of the European Convention on Human Rights.   (The judgment is available only in English.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicant, Peter Steur, a lawyer, is a Dutch national, who was born in 1951 and lives in Oegstgeest.   He acted for a client who was accused of obtaining social security benefits by fraud. Civil and criminal proceedings were instituted against Mr Steur’s client after he had made statements to Mr W., a social-security investigating officer ( sociaal rechercheur ), at an interview conducted without the presence of an interpreter or lawyer.   In the civil proceedings, Mr Steur alleged that Mr W. must have obtained the statements by subjecting his client to unacceptable pressure. Mr W. considered that those statements tarnished his professional honour and reputation and filed a complaint with the dean of the local bar association, who forwarded it to the disciplinary council ( Raad van Discipline ).   In a decision of 1 July 1996, the disciplinary council partly upheld Mr W.’s complaint, finding that Mr Steur’s allegations were uncorroborated and that he had transgressed the limits of acceptable behaviour and failed to observe the standards expected from a lawyer (“... de grenzen van het toelaatbare overschreden en heeft hij in strijd gehandeld met hetgeen een behoorlijk advocaat betaamt ”). Mr Steur lodged an appeal against that decision, but it was dismissed. The Disciplinary Appeals Tribunal ( Hof van Discipline ), noting that the applicant did not have any evidence in support of his allegations at the time they were made (having only received confirmation from his client subsequently), held that a lawyer was not permitted to make such allegations without any factual basis.     2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 25   November 1997 and transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998. It was declared partly admissible on 18 June 2002.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Jean-Paul Costa (French), President , Loukis Loucaides (Cypriot), Corneliu Bîrsan (Romanian), Karel Jungwiert (Czech), Volodymyr Butkevych (Ukrainian), Wilhelmina Thomassen (Netherlands), Antonella Mularoni (San Marinese), judges , and also Sally Dollé , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaint   The applicant complained, under Article 10 of the Convention, that the decision of the Disciplinary Appeals Tribunal meant that lawyers were not permitted at a hearing to argue on the basis of facts which were not within their knowledge that unacceptable pressure had been exercised on their client.   Decision of the Court   The Court noted that while no penalty had been imposed on the applicant, he had nonetheless being found guilty of violating the applicable professional standards. That could have had a discouraging effect on him, in the sense that he might have felt restricted in his choice of arguments when defending clients in future cases. It was therefore reasonable to consider that the applicant’s freedom of expression had been impeded by a “formality” or “restriction”.   It was common ground that the interference was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The Court noted that the applicant’s comments were liable to discredit Mr W. In that connection, it reiterated that the limits of acceptable criticism might in some circumstances be wider with regard to civil servants exercising their official duties than in relation to private individuals. However, civil servants were not deprived of all protection. In the case before the Court, the applicant’s criticism was limited to Mr W. in his capacity as an investigating officer in a specific case. It had been confined to the courtroom and did not amount to a personal insult. It was based on the fact that the applicant’s client had not fully understood his incriminating statement, given the absence of an interpreter at the interview.   The Court noted that the disciplinary authorities had not attempted to establish whether the applicant’s allegations were true or had been made in good faith. While it was true that no penalty had been imposed on the applicant, the threat of an ex post facto review of his criticism with respect to the manner in which evidence had been taken from his client was difficult to reconcile with his duty as an advocate to protect the interests of his clients and might adversely affect the way he performed his professional duties. In the circumstances, the Court found that the restrictions on the applicant’s freedom of expression did not meet a pressing social need.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. More detailed information about the Court and its activities can be found on its Internet site.   [1] .     Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] .     This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.