CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 30 mars 2004

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s1C7BEF1E { margin-left:28.52pt; padding-left:7.48pt; font-family:serif } .sFE832CA2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s13F94BDE { font-family:Arial; letter-spacing:-0.1pt } .s5B366099 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; letter-spacing:-0.1pt } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS     157 30.3.2004   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF HIRST v. THE UNITED KINGDOM (No. 2)   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of Hirst v. the United Kingdom (No. 2) (application no. 74025/01).   The Court held unanimously that: there had been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections) of the European Convention on Human Rights; no separate issue arose under Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) or Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention.   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded a total of 12,144 euros for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicant, John Hirst, is a British national, born in 1950, who is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment in HM Prison Rye Hill, Warwickshire (United Kingdom).   On 11 February 1980 Mr Hirst pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility. He was sentenced to a term of discretionary life imprisonment. His tariff (the part of his sentence relating to retribution and deterrence) expired on 25 June 1994. However, he remained in detention, as the Parole Board considered that he continued to present a risk of serious harm to the public.   As a convicted prisoner, Mr Hirst is barred by section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 from voting in parliamentary or local elections. He issued proceedings in the High Court, under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, seeking a declaration that section 3 was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. On 21   and 22 March 2001 his application was heard before the Divisional Court; but his claim and subsequent appeal were both rejected.     2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the Court on 5 July 2001 and declared partly admissible on 8 July 2003. A hearing took place in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 16 December 2003.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Matti Pellonpää (Finnish), President , Nicolas Bratza (British), Viera Strážnická (Slovakian), Rait Maruste (Estonian), Stanislav Pavlovschi (Moldovan), Lech Garlicki (Polish), Javier Borrego Borrego (Spanish), judges , and also Michael O’Boyle , Section Registrar .     3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   The applicant complained about being barred from voting, relying on: Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention; Article 10, in that voting was a form of expression which was fundamental to a functioning democracy; and, Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, in that he was discriminated against as a convicted prisoner in relation to his voting rights.   Decision of the Court   Article 3 of Protocol No. 1   The Court first noted the divergences in law and practice in the countries which had ratified the European Convention on Human Rights: in around 18 countries, no restrictions were imposed on prisoners’ right to vote; in around 13 countries, prisoners were not able to vote; and, in the remainder of the contracting states, loss of voting rights was tailored to specific offences or categories of offences or discretion was left to the sentencing court.   The Court reiterated, however, that a ny devaluation or weakening of the right to vote threatened to undermine the democratic system and that it should not, therefore, be lightly or casually removed.   Legitimate aim The United Kingdom Government had asserted that the voting restrictions on prisoners were designed to prevent crime and punish offenders and to enhance civil responsibility and respect for the rule of law.   Notwithstanding its doubts as to the validity of either aim in the modern day, the Court decided to leave open the question of whether the aims behind the voting restrictions could be regarded as legitimate.   Proportionality The Court noted that the restriction on prisoners’ voting rights as applied in the United Kingdom did distinguish between different reasons for detention and varying types of crime and might be regarded as less draconian than the laws applied in certain other countries; it affected only those convicted of crimes sufficiently serious to warrant an immediate custodial sentence; it did not apply to prisoners on remand, those imprisoned for default in paying fines or those detained for contempt of court. Furthermore the restriction was lifted as soon as the prisoner was released.   Nonetheless, the provision stripped of their Convention right to vote a large number of people, (over 70,000), in a manner which was indiscriminate. It imposed a blanket restriction on all convicted prisoners. It applied automatically to all such prisoners, irrespective of the length of their sentence and irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence. A prisoner sentenced to a week’s imprisonment for a minor infraction might lose the right to vote if detained over election day, whereas a prisoner serving several years for a more serious crime might, by chance, avoid missing an election.   An additional anomaly arose in Mr Hirst’s case, in that he had completed the part of his sentence relating to punishment and continued to be detained only on the ground of his continuing danger to society. Insofar as a disqualification from voting was to be seen as part of a prisoner’s punishment, there was no logical justification for it to continue in Mr Hirst’s case.   The Court accepted that a wide margin of appreciation should be granted to the national legislature in determining whether restrictions on prisoners’ right to vote could still be justified in modern times and, if so, how a fair balance was to be struck. In particular, it was for the legislature to decide whether any restriction on the right to vote should be tailored to particular offences, or offences of a particular gravity or whether, for instance, the sentencing court should be left with an overriding discretion to deprive a convicted person of her or his right to vote.   The Court observed that there was no evidence that the United Kingdom legislature had ever sought to weigh the competing interests or to assess the proportionality of the ban as it affected convicted prisoners.   The Court could not accept that an absolute bar on voting by any serving prisoner in any circumstances fell within an acceptable margin of appreciation. Mr Hirst lost his right to vote as the result of the imposition of an automatic and blanket restriction on convicted prisoners’ franchise and might therefore claim to be a victim of the measure. The Court therefore concluded that there had been a breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.   Articles 10 and   14   The Court held that no separate issue arose under Article 10 or Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.